

SECTION A: THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

1. How far do Sources A to E support the view that the UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era had been largely ineffective?

Sources	L2/3 (Analysis)	L4/5 (CK/CR)	L4/5 (Tone/Provenance/Purpose/usefulness)
Support			
Source B: From an article by the 'New York Times', a news agency based in the United States, December 1994.	Source B supports the hypothesis in showing the operation constraints in mounting peacekeeping operations, "money is short, integrated training for multinational forces is scant, many nations decline risky assignments". State sovereignty also posed a problem in terms of opposing giving the United Nations real power to intervene in conflicts.	Source B's claim that member states were hesitant in contribution of troops and in risking themselves in risky assignments can be supported by Source C, where the international community had criticised UN member states especially the US for not heeding calls from the conflict-ridden Third World nations.	The context of the source, 1994, could perhaps explain the critical mood towards the United Nations, as reflected by the New York Times. Clinton's lukewarm response in African countries such as Somalia at this point in time had garnered criticism from his own citizens, and it was also during this time, that other peacekeeping troops from Belgium, France and Sweden were withdrawing their troops from Mogadishu. This source can be considered as reliable as its purpose could be to simply analyse the events surrounding its time, though its disappointment in the United Nations was palpable.
Source C: Adapted from a report of a Roundtable discussion sponsored by Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 1993.	Source C supports the hypothesis in showing the failures in Somalia and the Balkans in the post-Cold War world, particularly criticising the Clinton administration and the UN for their lack of action, causing the term "summer of discontent" to take hold.	Based on CK, it was clear that the US actions in Somalia and former Yugoslavia was a lot different from just a few years ago in the Gulf War. Not only did the US took it upon themselves to intervene without placing their troops under the charge of UN, but the US was also quick to withdraw from Somalia when 18 of its soldiers lost their lives in the operation. This can also be supported by Source A which showed UNOSOM II troop strength dwindling to 7 956	Similar to Source B, the source was also taken in the context of the ongoing conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda. Thus the purpose of the roundtable discussion could simply be to conduct analytical research and discussions on the effectiveness of the UN, and particularly the US in its ongoing peacekeeping operations. Thus the source cannot be said to have any vested interests.

Sources	L2/3 (Analysis)	L4/5 (CK/CR)	L4/5 (Tone/Provenance/Purpose/usefulness)
		troops by 1995.	
Challenge			
Source A: Adapted from a UN publication, “Blue Helmets—A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping”, 1996.	Source A (can be either a support or a challenge source), showed that in spite of the withdrawal of troops from Somalia, and UNOSOM II did not achieve its mission to “rebuild the internal structures” of Somalia, there was still a silver lining in terms of the success in humanitarian aid.	It is indeed true that in spite of UN peacekeeping’s many failings, and in part due to the changing nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War world, UN in Somalia and Rwanda managed to protect thousands of civilians by constructing safe sites. In UNOSOM as well, the UN managed to bring relief to millions facing starvation and assisted in the return of refugees.	While being a UN publication, this source still managed to show both the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping in Somalia by mentioning the difficulty the troops faced in completing the mission, followed by the small successes in humanitarian operations. Students could also argue that the mention of success in this source could limit the reliability of the source.
Source D: Adapted from a report by Pew Research Centre, a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world, March 2016.	Source D challenges the hypothesis by proving that the increase in UN peacekeeping forces in the 2000s is a testament to the faith that countries have on United Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and stability. The source, however, also did mention some of the inefficiencies of having an increasing volume of missions, which were the scandals on sexual abuse.	It is indeed true, that with the end of the Cold War, the reliance on the United Nations to maintain peace had increased, perhaps due to the lack of Cold War rivalry and proxy wars to dominate UN peacekeeping, but also do to the mutating nature of post-Cold War conflicts from interstate to intra-state, and which thus required more than just traditional peacekeeping, but multi-dimensional peacekeeping. This can be supported by Source A which talked about the humanitarian angle of UN peacekeeping mission, thereby strengthening the claim that UN’s responsibilities had increased and thus was more relied on. (However, students could also weaken the claim in this source by saying that an increase in the	This source is reliable as it came from a non-partisan fact tank whose purpose was merely to inform the public on the issues, attitudes and trends that shaped America and the world. Due to its purely analytical purpose, this source can be seen as objective.

Sources	L2/3 (Analysis)	L4/5 (CK/CR)	L4/5 (Tone/Provenance/Purpose/usefulness)
		volume of peacekeeping missions does not necessarily mean that UN peacekeeping is successful, but rather had led to UN being overstretched and in need of peacekeeping reform to meet the new demands.	
Source E: Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2015.	Source E is by the President of the Republic of China who emphasised on the need for collective effort in maintaining security as "no country can maintain absolute security on its own effort. He also highlighted the essential role of the UN Security Council in "ending conflict and keeping peace", along with cooperation in non-political aspects such as economic and social fields.	Nil	As this source is a public statement made at the 70 th Session of the UN General Assembly, the reliability and objectivity of the author can be called into question, as his purpose in this speech might be to rally fellow UN members towards greater cooperation.

Level 6:

Overall, there are merits to both sides of sources. Students could choose to modify the hypothesis by taking into account both the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world; Sources B and C showed UNPK's major failures due to its member states lack of commitment in providing troops and resources, especially in Somalia. At the same time, there were some small successes shown in Sources A and D, which is that the post-Cold War world did see UN playing a more essential role in peacekeeping as seen in the increasing number of missions taken up, and had also shown successes in providing humanitarian aid at the very least, in situations where the UN could not completely resolve the conflicts or keep peace.

2. Evaluate the validity of the assertion that it was Soviet aggression that was responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War.

Students attempting this question could refer to the orthodox/traditionalist school of thought to support the hypothesis. Other schools of thought should also be given, namely the revisionist, post-revisionist and post-post revisionist schools of thought to counter the hypothesis. Better answers would evaluate the different schools of thought in order to come to a judgment on the “validity of the assertion” mentioned in the hypothesis.

Support argument:

Students may highlight the Orthodox school of thought to bring out aggressive role of the Soviet Union that led to the start of the Cold War. During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the historians viewed the Cold War as the inevitable product of the hostile, aggressive and expansionist foreign policy of the USSR and Stalin. They argued that being confronted with Soviet aggression; the US reacted in defence of democracy and capitalism. They may cite the alleged failure of Stalin to meet his obligations agreed at Yalta, in February 1945, in particular, those obligations linked to Poland. Students may cite the communist takeover of Eastern Europe in the years 1945–1948 culminating in the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the foundation of the German Democratic Republic. They may also mention the Soviet pressure placed on Turkey and the attempted communist takeover of Greece in the Greek Civil War. Finally, candidates may focus on the Berlin Blockade as evidence of Soviet responsibility and intention to spread communism, and for which the United States merely was reacting in defense and in the name of protecting capitalism and democracy.

Students can also bring up the post-post revisionist argument which tended to confirm traditionalist positions. Zubok stressed the importance of Communist ideology in Stalin’s foreign policy and pursued aggressive policies for example by presenting an ultimatum to Turkey after the war and demanded territorial concessions, refusing to withdraw from northern Iran and pursued an expansionist posture at the Potsdam conference in 1945. However, post-post revisionist differed from orthodox in saying that Stalin had no plan to attack the West, but simply followed the bottom line of Marxist thought.

In evaluating this school of thought, students could highlight the context within which the orthodox school of thought was produced. The traditionalists’ view was very much shaped by personal experience of the US diplomats turned historians like Herbert Feis and Louis Halle. As

a result the orthodox explanation of the Cold War origins closely reflected the view projected by the US government and may not be particularly objective in viewing the Soviet Union.

The advent of post-post revisionism after 1991 also leaned more towards the role of Stalin's aggression, in part due to the opening of Soviet archives. Historians such as Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov used the de-classified Soviet document to analyze Stalin's part in causing the Cold War. All these revealed though a genuine desire to avoid confrontation with the USA but a fanatic belief in Communism, lots of personal faults and mistakes on the part of Stalin. Thus the availability of unexplored resources after 40 years opened up a new vision for post-revisionist historians, who emphasized on redefining the orthodox perspective by abandoning extreme polarities of blaming the either side entirely.

Counter-argument:

Students can also bring in the Revisionist school of thought by historians like William A. Williams, G. Kolko, Joyce Kolko, Thomas G. Paterson and G. Alpperowitz which emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s. This approach stressed the defensive aspect of USSR's foreign policy faced with an aggressive USA attempting to gain economic dominance and to assert their ideology of capitalism through Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan over Europe by undermining communism. The US had its own economic and strategic agenda, which it actively, if not always successfully pursued. Thus, the foreign policy of US was designed to meet the expansionist requirements of capitalism. The policies of the US under the Roosevelt and Truman administration were not those of innocent, disinterested power intent upon international justice. Rather than Soviet expansionism creating American insecurity, the US commitment to the expansion of capitalism created Soviet insecurity.

Having said that, just like the traditionalist view, the revisionist view was influenced by the context of the Vietnam War, forced some historians not only to reconsider the American attitude towards communism in general and were also ready to take a more sympathetic view of the difficulties Stalin had found himself in at the end of the Second World War. This particular view was also limited in not taking into account Roosevelt's pragmatic approach and flexible approach towards Russia.

Students could also point to the post-revisionist school of thought that blames neither side as being aggressive and instead claims that both the US and the USSR were concerned about their security interests and misinterpreted each other's actions as a threat to their interests. USA failed to understand USSR's need for political/territorial security needs and economic security as the US and its European allies feared that Soviet domination of Eastern Europe could limit access to needed markets, foodstuff and raw materials, as well as pose a security threat to Western Europe. To Stalin, the need to ensure such a devastating war was not again inflicted upon the Soviet Union was undoubtedly a weighty and pressing concern. One tactic which the Soviet Union used in 1945 was establishing buffer zone of Soviet-influenced states in Eastern Europe, which would act as a barrier against further invasion of the Soviet Union from the West. This Soviet obsession with security was difficult for the US government to understand. To the US government, the USSR was more interested in spreading communism.

Likewise, USSR failed to understand USA's need for political, economic and military security in implementing the Truman Doctrine. Truman Doctrine was mainly a response to the political and social upheaval taking place in Greece and Turkey. Truman referred to every nation as having to choose between two ways of life and declared that it was the policy of the United States 'to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures'. It was a decisive turning point in origins of the Cold War. After this important speech, the foreign policy of USA took a more militant tone in the containment of what was perceived as Soviet expansionism. It set the tone and substance of United States foreign policy for the next two decades. By establishing military bases in strategic places and creation of a military alliance pact among the Western European countries, NATO, the US could be argued to have strived to achieve military security for Western Europe. Stalin's aggressive actions in Berlin accelerated the negotiations that led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. In effect, the treaty pledged the US to the defense of Europe by providing mutual assistance to any member in case of aggression against any of the signatories. Whatever that the US had done was perceived to be acts of aggression aimed at containing the spread of communism and a tactic to achieve world domination.

Context wise, post-revisionists was a response to the revisionist school of thought. During the period, "post-revisionism" challenged the "revisionists" by accepting some of their findings but rejecting most of their key claims. Another current attempted to strike a balance between the "orthodox" and "revisionist" camps, identifying areas of responsibility for the origins of the conflict on both sides. Thomas G. Paterson, in *Soviet-American Confrontation* (1973), for example, viewed Soviet hostility and U.S. efforts to dominate the postwar world as equally responsible for the Cold War. These historians have tended to agree with the revisionists that the objective of creating a Soviet sphere of

influence was the outcome of Stalin's concern for security. But at the same time they have argued that it was quite legitimate and understandable that Stalin's action posed a threat to Western interest as USA was uncertain of Stalin's proceedings.

3. “An era of risk taking.” Appraise the validity of this statement in explaining the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

To answer this question, students should define the term “risk taking” in relation to the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Risk taking here can be construed as actions by Castro and Khrushchev; Castro in terms of seeking help from the Soviet Union risking American backlash, and Khrushchev risking a nuclear holocaust in attempting to plant nuclear missiles in Cuba secretly. The development of the conflict itself also placed the world at the brink of an international nuclear crisis. To counter the hypothesis, students could argue that the risks involved were exaggerated, as the Cuban Missile Crisis merely confirmed existing Cold War trends due to the renewed arms race.

Support argument:

Students could argue that Khrushchev's action providing military aid to Castro was a risky move that was bound to antagonize the United States. The Soviets had already shipped 125 tanks and 925 anti-aircraft guns to Cuba in April 1961, but in May 1962, the Soviets decided to deploy four motorized regiments, two tank battalions, a Mig-21 fighter wing, 12 anti-aircraft missiles batteries, tactical nuclear cruise missiles and offensive R-12 and R-14 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) on Cuba. In all, over 40,000 Soviet military personnel were garrisoned on the island. The Americans watched all this with great alarm. They seemed ready to tolerate conventional arms being supplied to Cuba, but the big question was whether the Soviet Union would dare to put nuclear missiles on Cuba. In September Kennedy's own Intelligence Department said that it did not believe the USSR would send nuclear weapons to Cuba. The USSR had not taken this step with any of its satellite states before and the US Intelligence Department believed that the USSR would consider it too risky to do it in Cuba. However, their predictions were unfounded as

Khrushchev had sought to gain nuclear parity, in relation to US placing missiles in Turkey. Hence, the Soviet Union began work in constructing launching pads for nuclear weapons and US aerial photography caught evidence of Soviet MRBM sites on Cuba and confirmed twenty four SAM sites. US' fears came true and made the next six days highly tense as the Americans secretly discussed and planned on their response. It was at this time when Kennedy and Khrushchev were negotiating with each other that the world was on the brink of a nuclear war as Soviet ships were also approaching the quarantine line. Further escalation would have led to US invasion of Cuba and culminate in another war.

Furthermore, USSR's actions in placing missiles was indeed an uncalculated risk, as prior US actions and treatment towards his ally, Castro, should have given Khrushchev some kind of inclination that the US regard their backyard seriously. Kennedy's obsession with Cuba as a result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, coupled with domestic politics and questions of national security, made it difficult for him to accept the presence of Castro in nearby Cuba. A strict embargo on all Cuban imports remained in place and in February 1962, Washington secured the expulsion of Cuba from the Organisation of American States (OAS). At the same time, US forces conducted amphibious exercises near Puerto Rico in the Caribbean unobtrusively codenamed 'Ortasc' (Castro spelt backwards) aimed at overthrowing an imaginary dictator. After the abortive, CIA-inspired Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, Castro turned to Moscow for military protection. The Bay of Pigs episode was a humiliating personal rebuff for Kennedy and handed Castro an easy propaganda victory which made the US even more resolved to stem the spread of communism in their backyard. In the meantime, a trade agreement between USSR and Cuba was struck in 1960, the USSR extended \$100 million in credits to Cuba and promised to buy 5 million tons of Cuban sugar over the next three years.

Counter argument:

However, it could be also argued that both sides had never intended to escalate tensions into an all-out nuclear war. While Khrushchev's main ambition to address the missile gap between US and USSR could be counted as a gamble, his letters to Kennedy also indicated an attempt to placate the latter by insisting that his move to place missiles in Cuba was purely defensive and well within their rights. In the first letter, Khrushchev also negotiated with Kennedy to not invade Cuba and to respect the sovereignty of the nation and in return, the USSR would dismantle the missiles.

Kennedy's response to the two letters given by Khrushchev also showed his desire to take the softer approach of having 'quarantine' rather than to invade Cuba or launch preemptive air strikes against the missile sites. This blockade would later allow the two sides more time to resolve the issue. He also chose to respond to Khrushchev's first letter in assuring him that he would not invade Cuba in return for the withdrawal of the missiles. Furthermore, when a U-2 air plane was shot down by Cuban ant-aircraft gunners, Kennedy did not retaliate, in spite of the suggestions by his advisors. He felt that bombing a small nation that could touch off a nuclear war over the issue of obsolete missiles in Turkey, missiles he had already ordered to be removed in the first place, was not worth it. As a result, Robert Kennedy, the president's brother and closest advisor, met with the Soviet Ambassador to tell him that the US was prepared to pledge not to invade Cuba in the future. Khrushchev immediately seized the initiative and sent two messages to Washington. The first offered to take away the missiles in return for American promise to respect the sovereignty of Cuba; the second warned that Moscow expected the Americans to honour their promise to decommission the Jupiters.

4. Account for the factors that helped and hindered the continued American domination of the international economy from 1945 to 2000.

Students attempting this question should examine the factors that have helped and hindered US dominance in the global economy over 50-year period of time. Post-World War II, the ensuing Cold War rivalry and motives as well as US' own willingness to take the helm in the

recovery of the international economy. However, the changing circumstances from 1970s onwards along with the rise of other economies threatened the position of the US as the dominant player in the global economy.

Helped continued American domination:

The US became dominant in the international economy due to World War Two and the state it came out of. For the US, the Second World War was significant and generated a boom in the American economy which drove it past previous years of Depression and towards prosperity. During the wartime, the US as a manufacturer of airplanes and weapons was able to create and supply Western nations like Britain and France in the fight against Germany. Naturally, as the demand was high, this led to increased GDP and output of goods. In addition, unlike much of the European countries after the war, the US was scot-free after the war, except maybe for Pearl Harbour. The Second World War had destroyed much of the infrastructure of European countries impeding their abilities to recover economically. The domestic situation was so bad that Britain was practically forced to relinquish control of its colonies in Southeast Asia as it could not sustain them. Hence not only did the Second World War drive the US towards increased production but it also left it in a comparatively good state in terms of infrastructure to continue economic growth after 1945.

In addition, the US' own willingness to take the lead in rehabilitating the economy of its allies was another reason that helped its dominance. As mentioned, World War Two had left Europe and even Japan in dire conditions which did not facilitate economic growth. Consequently, the US took on the role of a saviour in a sense and greatly aided the recovery of these nations' economies. US engaged in asymmetrical trade with nations in Europe to foster their domestic growth. By purchasing their goods and allowing them to discriminate American products, the US provided a solid base from which Europe could recover. Similarly, the US did the same with Japan with the added bonus of the Korean War which drove the Japanese Economic Miracle and the double digit growth. Hence the US was dominant as it provided the struggling world with the tools and money to recover by pumping in resources to Europe and Japan. Perhaps the most important reason for its dominance after 1945 resides in the US ability to create international trade and institutions capable of managing it. Through the creation of the Bretton Woods System which pegged the US dollar to gold, the US created a system that facilitated trade by standardising the value of things and also created a financial system that made recovering economies highly dependent on the health of the US economy. More importantly, however, is the GATT which was formed as a subset and later on the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Both of these institutions played a pivotal role in fostering international trade of various rounds of talks at the GATT as they helped to lower down or in some cases even abolish taxes and tariffs. So important to the global economy were these institutions that when the BWS was abolished, the whole world saw immediate repercussions. Hence the ability of the US to create this rendered US dominant in the global economy.

Lastly, American MNCs also played a pivotal role in not only facilitating trade but at establishing the US as the dominant force in the economy. MNCs have achieved this through a variety of ways, the first of which being the export of American culture to the rest of the world.

Brands such as Coca-Cola and MacDonald's to name a few have established themselves abroad and perpetuated the notion of a great America, a land full of opportunity and prosperity. Secondly, MNCs have allowed a necessary transfer of skills to other parts of the world. Without this, the economy would not have been propelled as fast at this transfer enabled countries like Japan and Germany to become drivers of economic growth around the world.

Hindered continued American domination:

However, it remains important to address the fall from dominance which the US saw as its economy declined after the 1970s. Students should take note that the very factors which drove the US to success in the short run came back as liabilities in the long run. Years of asymmetrical trade and provision of aid accounts for the twin trade and budget deficit which the US experienced in the 1970s. Consequently, this led to not only the dissolution of the BWS but to a wave of protectionism. Hence the US was not dominant through the 1970s after its period of Golden Years.

US dominance in the global economy through their role in maintaining the international monetary stability through the Bretton Woods System was adversely affected by its decision to devalue its currency meant to restore the competitiveness of its economy. Students can argue that by 1970s, US economy was badly weakened by deficit financing for the Vietnam War and the Great Society. US suffered from a 5.3% inflation rate and a 6% unemployment rate. The overvalued American dollar under the Bretton Woods System meant that foreign products were cheap for US consumers and US products were expensive in other countries, thus contributing to deterioration in the US trade balance. American decision to end its commitment to the Bretton Woods System and unilaterally changed the international monetary system by ending the link between the US dollar and gold, resulted in a devaluation of the dollar as it began to float against other currencies. This meant that the international economy was no longer dependent on that of the USA.

Oil crisis: American dominance of the global economy was interrupted by the onset of oil crisis in 1973. The increase in prices of oil badly affected US economy and weakened its will and economic capacity to maintain free trade. The steep oil prices caused increasing inflation and unemployment, thus eroding the purchasing power of the people. On the other hand, industrialized countries reacted to the oil crisis by selling manufactured goods and services to OPEC at sharply rising prices (thereby exporting their inflation). As international trade shrank, competition for markets intensified, imports threatened domestic industries, and a worldwide withdrawal into protectionism began. The United States responded by adopting a more aggressive trade policy and increasingly relied on bilateral initiatives and regularly threatened to deny access to the American market to force changes in other countries' trade policies. Therefore, US dominance and promote growth of the global economy through freer trade was interrupted by the oil crisis of 1973.

Trade imbalances: The fact that in the 1970s and 80s, the whole world was talking about America's "decline" by the United States itself greatly inflated the panic of the American people. It is true that there were a few problems in the U.S. economy, which indeed hindered the growth of the economy and the enhancement of enterprise competitiveness, yet it was mainly the faster development of Japan and West Germany, and the resultant trade imbalances that made the United States lag relatively behind. .

5. "The establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was the reason for China's economic prosperity in the 1980s and 1990s." Discuss the validity of this view.

The establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was part of China's economic policy to open up the economy to international trade. In answering this question, students should examine other factors such as rural reforms and urban reforms. Evaluation of hypothesis should involve comparing the impact of the various factors, and how the SEZs perhaps had less of an impact as compared to other reforms, or how the SEZs became a sort of platform to liberalizing Chinese economy beyond the economic zones themselves.

Support argument:

Under the open door policy, also known as the 'gaige kaifang', the Chinese government established 4 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in states like Shenzhen and Zhuhai. The incentives were given to foreign investors and they were encouraged to build public infrastructure. This purpose of this policy was to attract foreign investors into China. This factor was the most instrumental because it opened the Chinese once closed economy to an open economy. This was a huge deal as China was once a communist country. Before the implementation of this policy, China did not have the 3 most valuable economic resources; foreign capital, skilled labour and technology. However, after the SEZs, China soon gained all 3 resources within a span of a few short years. Not only that, this policy also gave China windows to the open world, where it generated up to \$4 billion worth of investments and its exports surged. The zones offered China foreign capital, technology, expertise and ideas. They give foreigners tax incentives and plenty of cheap labour. The SEZs have also been important bridges over which foreign capital, technology, goods, managers and ideas have crossed into the hinterland and over which the products of the hinterland have access to world markets. By 1990, the SEZs had attracted over \$4 billion and set up 5700 projects; their exports during the last decade (1980-1990) accounted for a tenth of China's exports and earned China \$3.85 billion in foreign exchange. This policy has little limitation too

and it was the one that laid the foundation and sowed the seeds to the growth of the Chinese economy as the success of the urban reforms depended on it. Therefore, the success of this policy proves that it was the underlying factor which is strongly attributed China's growth.

Counter argument:

In tandem with the progress of the SEZs, China had also begun rural reforms in the first phase, which involved the Chinese government implementing the household responsibility system. Due to the fact that China used to depend on its agriculture sector for its survival, the government wanted to focus on the rural sector first before moving on to the urban sector. With that, the government implemented the household responsibility system in 1974, where each household is given a plot, in which they were required to provide a fixed number of output of a specific good. Once this quota was fulfilled, peasants would then have the benefit of keeping their produce either for consumption or sale. This opportunity opened up eyes for many of the poor farmers as they had never been given the opportunity of keeping some of their produce to themselves before. Therefore, this encouraged the farmers tremendously to produce as much output as they possibly can, thus resulting in higher productivity, which meant that the Chinese economy was kept alive by the constant trading or selling of produce among peasants, thus resulting in an increased standard of living which gave rise to the Chinese economy.

Similarly for the urban reforms, the government decided to open its markets on exports and privatised the small businesses. The large companies on the other hand were heavily controlled and restricted by the Chinese government. The large companies were made to sign policies like the "Industrial Responsibility System", which was a system where the manager was given a higher authority and responsibility than the state. This implementation on SOEs was meant to motivate the working productivity as a certain set of money was reserved for their bonuses, making them strive to work harder. The higher delegation and recognition of their work can also increase their motivation, and improve their social needs and self-esteem need by feeling valued by the company. This therefore would positively in the rise of the Chinese economy as the workers were more incentivised to work harder.

However, good as these reforms are, they could not be said as being the policy that was most responsible for the rise of the Chinese economy. This was because the overemphasis on the rural reforms in the early 1970s caused the negligence of commune policies. At the time it was also regulated the production of consumer goods. In addition, the higher productivity of rural reforms provided less than significant impact on the rise of the Chinese economy as it did not advance China's economy as the developing world was getting more technologically

advanced. It also made China stay in the same position of being a 3rd world country. Similarly, however good the reforms were it did not provide and increase efficiency of the firms. Also, only small firms flourished and mushroomed, whereas big firms whom the government had the most interest in improving did not improve. This shows that the government's plan backfired as those firms with the strongest level of government intervention turned out to be worse.

Therefore, the rural and urban reforms were still relatively far off from being solely responsible, as there were just the little improvements, which had little significance in contributing to the growth of the Chinese economy. On the other hand, the largely successful open door policy and the establishment of SEZs was the one that made China catch up with the rest of the world in a short few years and made improvement so significant that China benefitted for life (influx of technology, foreign capital, and skilled labour).

6. “It was Israel’s belligerency that hindered the resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict from 1948 to 2000.” How far do you agree with this statement?

The question requires students to consider that the peace process in the Arab-Israeli conflict faced obstacles along the way. Students are to consider the various reasons for these obstacles and the factors that prevented the improvement of Arab-Israeli relations. Students should also consider that the repeated, and numerous conflicts between Israel and their various Arab neighbours, as well as the aims and priorities of the various Arab countries and the realities of what was assumed to be a united ‘pan-Arab’ movement. Students should note that more than one factor is involved in this failure and definitely therefore, there were more than one belligerent, other than Israel. Better answers would go beyond mere listing of the different roles and agents

Support argument:

Israel’s belligerency can be seen in its unwillingness to give up land for peace – any territorial concessions made by Israel concerning the Golan Heights and the West Bank result in less favourable line of defence, established nearer to its centre of population and industry.

Furthermore, Israel's insecurity led to its unwillingness to trade land for peace. After 1973, when Arab nations launched a surprise attack during the Yom Kippur War, security became very much linked to territory. The especially hardline stance of the Likud Party in 1977 made sure that negotiations with the Arabs including the PLO would not be forthcoming. The King of Jordan had asked for concessions for land in return for peace, but Israel had just voiced its territorial contiguity which was necessary to its defence. Israel had a small population and relied on civilians than a standing army, thus the land was imperative for its defence. The Israeli's also avoided the first week of the Madrid Conference just to avoid giving concessions. As such, Israeli's intransigence at trading land for peace was a major factor in the failure of peace negotiations as there was no room for negotiation as its land was crucial for defence purposes.

Israel's belligerence could also be seen in their dogged determination to set up Jewish settlements, intensified after the 1967 war, which meant that they would be building some of those settlements in conquered Arab lands. The Likud government in Israel engaged in a policy of creeping annexation, which intensified the settlement policy in the 1980s. Between 1977-1987, the number of Israeli settlers increased from under 5000 to more than 60000 and the number of settlements from 36 to 100. Occupying the West Bank in 1967 was an important strategic gain in Israeli eyes and successive governments have ignored the Green Line and built numerous Jewish settlements on the territory. 400,000 settlers live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which is strategically, religiously and historically significant. Removing thousands of hardline settlers from other smaller, more isolated outposts would be a difficult task and contributed further to the hardline position of Israel as well as making any attempts at resolving the conflict more tangled. At the Madrid Conference, the backdrop of continued Israeli settlement policy in the Occupied Territories and the deterioration of Israeli PM Shamir's relations with the US made progress virtually impossible. On political and religious grounds, it is extremely risky for any Israeli politician to dabble in land for peace deals.

Counter argument:

It could be argued that the Arabs were also the belligerent ones in their refusal to recognize the state of Israel from the beginning.

The Arabs were recalcitrant in seeing Israel as a state from the get go and this left no room for any negotiations. Under the 1967 Khartoum Resolution, there was no negotiation and no recognition of the Israeli state. The Arabs were unwilling to acknowledge the right of Israel to exist, as seen in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, where the Arab summit conference held in Khartoum ended with the famous three no's and the swift rejection of any of Israel's suggestions that fell short of returning Arab lands and granting independence to the Palestinians.

Arabs' refusal to keep to the peace agreements during the Camp David Accords in 1978 was an apt example. The agreement was of Palestinian Autonomy in the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip; however it was refused by the Arabs. Hence, the peace treaty failed because the Arabs were against the idea of giving "self-governing" authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip as it ultimately led to the talk of who would have the "final" status. The treaty substantially strengthens Israel's position further. Therefore Arab's adherence to the non-existence of Israel was a major impediment to the peace negotiations.

Disunity within what was supposed to be a pan-Arab movement also hindered the peace process to the extent that peace, where achieved, was uneven and not across the board, and secondly, competition over internal leadership worked to prevent peace where it could have happened. In the first case, Jordan and Egypt earned the ire of other Islamic states because they, at different times made agreements with Israel without consulting the other states, and made decisions which only benefited that particular state. For example, Jordan's King Abdullah was supposed to have been given nominal control over the forces in invading Israel in 1948, however, his individual aims of controlling the Arab section of Palestine, or the West Bank conflicted with the aims of the other Islamic states, causing changing decisions with regards to the war, and complicating the plan to invade Palestine. The Camp David Accords of 1978 was signed by President Sadat which led to the Arabs showing their disapproval of the negotiation by ousting him out of the Arab league. Egypt was also ignored and kicked out of Arab politics when it signed the Egypt-Israeli treaty. This disunity resulted in the inability of the Arabs to form a united front in dealing with Israel, in war and in trying to create peace because they could not trust Jordan to work for the 'common good' but also because Israel diplomatically took advantage of this disunity to its own benefit. On the other hand, the peace processes were hindered in that they were not lasting due to Egypt's need to protect its own position as the leader of the Arab movement. The Baghdad Pact signed by American with Pakistan, and particularly Iraq was a challenge to this leadership of Egypt, who also faced challenges from Baath party leaderships in both Iraq and Syria. These challenges meant that Egypt needed to assert itself and demonstrate the willingness to go to war for the sake of the Arab movement, as seen in its receiving of Soviet arms through Czechoslovakia and its role in the Suez Canal crisis. In this, the agreements of the 1948 War of Independence did not hold out, and in the larger argument, peace agreements were hindered by the disunity within the Pan-Arab movement.

Mutual unwillingness to negotiate: Students could argue that instead of just blaming one side, both sides were unwilling to acknowledge the right to exist of the other, leading to the inability of both sides to compromise and come to a lasting agreement. Israel's refusal to

acknowledge Palestine means that it never dealt directly with the Palestinians until Oslo and beyond. This can be seen in the Camp David Accords, and the Madrid Conference where the Palestinians were not involved in any discussion on Palestinian territory, and even in the latter, was only involved as part of a joint delegation with Jordan, under which their right to speak was limited as well. Israel's settlement policy of continually intervening and building into what was land allotted to the Palestinians was a physical manifestation of Israel's refusal to acknowledge Palestine's right to exist. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, Golda Meir and following prime ministers hung on to certain conditions for peace that differed from those of the Arabs. Being convinced of the propensity of the Arabs to attack, Israel set the precondition for peace to be the signing of peace agreements with Israel as an assurance of goodwill and the end of hostilities and confrontations before Israel would withdraw from originally-Arab territories. However, on the other hand, the Arabs would only sign peace agreements with Israel on the condition that Israel first withdraw from these occupied territory like the Sinai Peninsula, as a gesture of goodwill and a sign that it was sincere about peace with the Arab states. In this, the process that both sides expected and desired were contradictory and contrasting, leading to the inability of the two to come to the negotiating table because beyond their aims, their conditions were already unaligned.

Islamic Fundamentalist groups: Islamic fundamentalist groups often had their own agenda and opinions that differentiated themselves from that of the Arab governments'. As opposed to the government's efforts to create peace with Israel, the religious fundamentalist groups were aiming to prevent it – preferring instead to create an Islamic state with permanent borders – one that did not include Israel. This can be seen in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, where what should have been another step forward in creating peace between both sides, was instead hampered attacks on civilians by individuals and religious fundamentalists on both sides. Hamas and other Palestinian rejectionist groups did not accept Oslo and launched suicide bomb attacks on Israelis. Suicide bombings served to harden Israeli public opinion and achieved little more than inflicting deep wounds on the psyche of both national communities. The Goldstein massacre of 29 Palestinians in the Ibrahimi Mosque during Ramadan, and the subsequent suicide bombings in Afula by Hamas led to accusations of the Arab states like Lebanon of sheltering religious fundamentalists, conditions under which Israel was not prepared to agree to peace with the Arab states, but instead retaliation by military means, in the case of Operation Grapes of Wrath. This attack on 11 April saw Israel attempting to drive Hezbollah out of Lebanon, as part of its stepped-up 'anti-terrorist' campaign that included Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PLO in Syria. In this way, the religious fundamentalists were a dimension separate from the Arab states which effectively complicated attempts by the governments to create peace with Israel, as they did not have full reign over the near-independent aggressive acts by the religious fundamentalists.

Role of superpowers/Cold War rivalry: The increased superpower intervention in the region hindered the resolution process because it gave both Israelis and Arabs the necessary aid that will allow them to compete against each other. Its aid only worsened the conflict further as it boosted confidence level from both sides when they had support from superpowers. Thus, they had the capability to not accede to each other. The superpowers were parties with vested interests in mediation of the conflict. For example, USSR started the Middle East arms race first which US saw as a means of trying to gain power by the USSR, so USA too started supplying arms into the Middle East to be on par with the USSR. Soviet Union gave military aid to Arab states like Egypt and in response after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an American-Israeli alliance was cemented and US foreign aid to Israel increased. So as both parties received military aid from their respective superpowers, both were sufficiently resolved with resources to go against each other. Hence, under such a situation where both parties are ready to go against each other due to superpowers aid, peaceful negotiation cannot be reached which hinders the resolution. Thus the intervention of superpowers had boosted confidence of parties to fight against each other. However, it can also be considered that it was the superpower sponsorship and intervention that made countries come together to negotiate on peace agreement in the Madrid Conference which showed its successful attempt to overcome obstacle to peace. However, the Madrid Conference ultimately was not successful to identify a resolution due to the absence of Israel and its unwillingness to negotiate.