

ANGLO-CHINESE JUNIOR COLLEGE
Preliminary Examinations
JC2

HISTORY

8814/01

Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000

16 August 2017

3 hours

Additional Materials: Writing Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your class, index number, and name on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **any three questions**.

Begin each question on a **fresh sheet of paper**.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

This document consists of **5** printed pages.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN BOSNIA

1 Read the sources and then answer the question.

When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the Sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

It seems that the major failure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was that it never had a clear purpose. Initially, the UN was hesitant to get involved in Bosnia as it began as an intra-state conflict and it was unsure of its role in these situations. This hesitance led to tremendous human rights violations and the displacement of 750,000. Once the UN got involved they were indecisive as to the use of force to carry out UNPROFOR's mandate. It was not until NATO took over military operations and the United States and other nations got involved in negotiations that there was any progress towards peace. The experience in Bosnia makes it clear that the UN needs to make decisions as to what course of action it will follow very early in the conflict. Also, the protection forces must be given the rules of engagement and resources necessary for the mission to be successful.

From United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Improvements for Mission Success, a western academic publication, 2003

Source B

'In traditional peacekeeping we don't disarm at the point of a gun,' explained Shashi Tharoor, a senior UN official in New York who handles UNPROFOR affairs. 'We supervise and we monitor voluntary disarming.'

Mr Boutros-Ghali described the limitations even more clearly. 'If there is no political will of the protagonists to solve peacefully their dispute, we cannot play a role,' he said. A further, profound contradiction complicated the enterprise. The UN has a built-in bias towards sovereign states. In late 1991 both the UN and the United States wanted to keep Yugoslavia together, but the Western Europeans, with Germany in the lead, had decided to let it fall apart.

Mr Perez de Cuellar wrote to the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, asking that Germany slow down its campaign to recognise President Franjo Tudjman's regime in Zagreb, Croatia. Mr Genscher wrote back to refuse, in language that bordered on the undiplomatic.

From an article in The Independent, a British online newspaper, 1993

Source C

One of the most unfortunate aspects of the UN in Bosnia has been the contrast between the shrill rhetoric, particularly from the Clinton administration, which has accompanied Security Council resolutions and the lack of accompanying military commitment to implement the mandates. Security Council resolutions usually pronounce that 'all measures necessary' are to be used in implementation, but this, as the distinguished UN scholar, Thomas Weiss, puts it, is 'quintessential doublespeak'. Without adequate means or authority, UN forces have been left 'wandering in the void' between peacekeeping and enforcement. At least until 1995, US statements on Bosnia seem to have been 'designed more to assuage public conscience and satisfy the 'CNN factor' than to have a conclusive impact on the conflict.'

Research paper prepared for the Australian Parliament's reference, 1995

Source D

In a December 1993 interview, former UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant-General Francis Briquemont commented on this difference by pointing out that there "is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field.

The former UNPROFOR commander referred to UNSC Resolution 836¹ as an example of this gap. The Lieutenant-General said that at least 7500 troops would be needed to carry out the task of resolution 836 but only 2000 troops were ever deployed to the safe areas, and as a result, UNPROFOR's ability to fulfil this task was, and still is, limited by its number of troops. The troops were probably not sent because many UN member states might have believed that even if 7500 troops were deployed, the Serbs would have still pushed towards their military objectives. But it could have also stemmed from the fact that some states did not want to commit any more resources, regardless of whether the additional troops would have provided any more good. Indeed, the Security Council, more than likely, passed Resolution 836 with the hope that its adoption alone would prove to be enough to deter the Serbian military. In other words, the Security Council might have tried to bluff the Serbs by talking tough. If that was the case, it failed as the Serbs called the bluff.

From a Canadian academic evaluating the UNPROFOR, 1995

¹ **United Nations Security Council resolution 836** was adopted on 4 June 1993. After reaffirming Resolution 713 (1991) and all subsequent resolutions on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the Council expressed its alarm at the continuing situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and decided to expand the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) by allowing it to use force to protect the "safe areas".

Source E

Advice offered on other matters by the Secretary-General, based on the advice of UN commanders, was also ignored. For example, by late May 1995, a deteriorating security situation, the failure of NATO air attacks of May 25 and May 26 to make a difference on the ground, the hundreds of UN troops held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, and the widespread criticism of the UN provided the context for the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council. He presented four discrete options for the future of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These options were presented with the advice and backing of the Force Commander and the Commander of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command.

The Secretary-General did not favour withdrawal except as an option of last resort because he considered it an abandonment of the Bosnian people, who had already endured enough suffering. Similarly, he did not favour muddling through. The greater use of force, he stated, would require replacing UNPROFOR with a multinational force. He identified a change of the mandate as the only realistic option for the UN. The Security Council ignored all of the options and attempted combining "muddling through" with a greater use of force by authorising the creation of a rapid reaction force. Though the Security Council faced a difficult decision, this response illustrated its lack of support for a mission it created.

*From an article by Major-General Barry Ashton,
former Deputy Force commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, 1997*

Now answer the following question.

'Primary responsibility for the failure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia rests with the Security Council.' How far do Sources A–E support this view?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 'The Cuban Missile Crisis was the inevitable result of US policy towards the Cuban Revolution.' How far do you agree?
- 3 To what extent did Gorbachev's policies make the collapse of the USSR unavoidable?
- 4 How far were the problems experienced by the international economy since the 1970s due to its over-dependence on the American economy?
- 5 "The establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was the reason for China's economic prosperity in the 1980s and 1990s." Discuss the validity of this view.
- 6 Why did attempts to solve Arab-Israeli conflict after 1973 not achieve greater success?