



MERIDIAN JUNIOR COLLEGE
Preliminary Examination
Higher 2

H2 History

9731/01

International History, 1945 - 2000

14 September 2016

3 Hours

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and civics group clearly on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black ball point pen on both sides of the paper.
Write the number of the question that you are attempting in the margin of every sheet of paper used.
Start each question on a fresh sheet of paper.
At the end of the examination, fasten this cover sheet and all your answers (in chronological order) securely together.

Section A

Answer Question 1.

Section B

Answer any three questions.

All questions in this paper carry **25 marks**.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

Question	Marks
1	
Total	

This document consists of 4 printed pages.

SECTION A

You **must** answer Question 1.

The United Nations in Rwanda

1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

Source A

As the killing intensified, the international community deserted Rwanda. Western nations landed troops in Rwanda or Burundi in the first week to evacuate their citizens, did so, and left. The UN mission (UNAMIR), created in October 1993 to keep the peace and assist the governmental transition in Rwanda, sought to intervene between the killers and civilians. It also tried to mediate between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan army after the RPF struck from Rwanda to protect Tutsi and rescue their battalion encamped in Kigali. On April 21, 1994, the United Nations Security Council, at the behest of the United States—which had no troops in Rwanda—Belgium, and others, voted to withdraw all but a remnant of UNAMIR. The Security Council took this vote and others concerning Rwanda even as the representative of the genocidal regime sat amongst them as a non-permanent member. After human rights, media, and diplomatic reports of the carnage mounted, the UN met and finally arrived at a compromise response on May 16. UNAMIR II, as it was to be known, would be a more robust force of 5,500 troops. Again, however, the world failed to deliver, as the full complement of troops and materiel would not arrive in Rwanda until months after the genocide ended.

From a paper entitled “The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction” by William Ferroggiaro, 20 August 2001.

Source B

The loss of ten peacekeepers is a terrible blow to any troop-contributing country. However, even if the Belgian Government felt that the brutal murder of its para-commandos and the anti-Belgian rhetoric in Rwanda at the time made a continued presence of its own contingent impossible, the inquiry finds the campaign to secure the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR difficult to understand. The analysis of the situation in Rwanda, which was presented as an underlying argument for withdrawal painted a picture of on-going massacres, in addition to the fighting between parties. However, the focus seems to have been solely on withdrawal rather than the possibilities for the United Nations to act, with or without Belgium.

Discussions within the Security Council during these first weeks of the genocide show a body divided between those, such as the United States, who were sympathetic to the Belgian campaign to withdraw the mission, and others, with the Non-Aligned Movement Caucus in the forefront, advocating a strengthening of UNAMIR... The decision by the Security Council on 21 April to reduce UNAMIR to a minimal force in the face of the killings which were by then known to all, rather than to make every effort to muster the political will to try and stop the killing has led to widespread bitterness in Rwanda.

From an independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide, 15th December, 1999.

Source C

The Rwandans who organised and executed the genocide must bear full responsibility for it. But genocide anywhere implicates everyone. To the extent that governments and peoples elsewhere failed to prevent and halt this killing campaign, they all share in the shame of the crime. In addition, the UN staff as well as the three foreign governments principally involved in Rwanda bear added responsibility: the UN staff for having failed to provide adequate information and guidance to members of the Security Council; Belgium, for having withdrawn its troops precipitately and for having championed total withdrawal of the UN force; the US for having put saving money ahead of saving lives and for slowing the sending of a relief force; and France, for having continued its support of a government engaged in genocide. In contrast to the inaction of the major actors, some non-permanent members of the Security Council undertook to push for a UN force to protect Tutsi from extermination. But all members of the Security Council brought discredit on the UN by permitting the representative of a genocidal government to continue sitting in the Security Council, a council supposedly committed to peace.

From a 1999 report by Human Rights Watch, a global human rights organisation.

Source D

Mr. Riza was very clear in that I stick to my classic Chapter VI mandate, that I was not an intervention force and that the rules of engagement were to be strictly defense, and nothing more. There was a concern that we could get drawn into this exercise, and you can still see that paranoia of Somalia coming back, you know, "Just stay where you are, you are not in authority to intervene."

Now, in this UN stuff, the commander, although he has troops, they don't really belong to him. They're loaned by the country to the UN to be used, but each of these countries provides a contingent commander, a senior guy who communicates directly back to his capital. And so the contingents were over the course of the day getting more and more communications with their international capitals, who were becoming more and more restrictive in what they wanted their guys to do, because the risk was too high, and the situation too confused. And so we entered this arena where I had troops, and I didn't have troops; and how much of them could I use? And to what avail? And as the day wore on it proved that there were a bunch of the troops that were absolutely useless, and they were going to do absolutely nothing.

General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda during the genocide, 2004.

Source E

The report notes problems in the flow of information from the field to Headquarters, from the Secretariat to the Security Council – and back. Further, there were problems between the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Force Commander, known in New York, but not acted on... In its final observations, the Inquiry states that, faced with genocide or the risk of it, the United Nations had an obligation to act transcending traditional peacekeeping principles. "There can be no neutrality in the face of genocide, and no impartiality in the face of a campaign to exterminate part of a population."

*From 'United Nations Information Service, 2000',
Independent Inquiry into United Nations Actions during 1994 Rwanda Genocide.*

Now answer the following question:

How far do Sources A - E show that the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Rwanda failed primarily due to a lack of political will of the member states?

SECTION B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2** How far has the historical debate about the origins of the Cold War changed since the collapse of the USSR in 1991?

- 3** Which did more to cause the collapse of Communism by 1991: the policies of Reagan or Gorbachev?

- 4** How far do changes in ideology explain China's economic growth in the post-Mao era?

- 5** To what extent was the growth of religious fundamentalism a reaction against secular politics?

- 6** Assess the significance of the Zionists' actions in the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

- End of Paper-