

**JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 2016
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (8814/9731)
SUGGESTED APPROACHES**

**SECTION A
THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON**

Source A

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,

1. Approves the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops;
2. Takes note of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far;
3. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any further delay;
4. Deplores the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon.

From the UN Security Council Resolution 427, 3 May 1978.

Source B

In UNIFIL, the Secretary-General was saddled with the problems which resulted from its flawed terms of reference of 1978, and the Israeli invasion of 1982. The mandate remained as unrealistic as ever, because of the presence of PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces or client forces. UNIFIL did not represent an uninterrupted cordon along the Lebanese border. It appears the initial rush and political pressure upon Waldheim to deploy, left a legacy of political and organizational problems to his successor. The Secretary-General's efforts in the 1980s – personally and through Brian Urquhart and then Marrack Goulding – to bring peace to southern Lebanon and 'restore' Lebanese authority were largely frustrated. However, at a more local level, opportunities to quell small-scale fighting, facilitate communication, and protect the local population, were fulfilled to an impressive extent. The UN continued to communicate with senior representatives of the principal parties, achieving minor agreements in an exercise of conflict management. The Secretary-General's Office continued to issue frank and sometimes outspoken public reports on the status and frustrations of UNIFIL, thereby exerting at least some leverage upon the parties.

*From a book written by British academic, Edward Newman,
'The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War
to the New Era', 1998.*

Source C

Mr. Perez de Cuellar could hardly be described as passionate in carrying out the often tedious duties of Secretary General of the United Nations. Today, however, as the Security Council and General Assembly unanimously elected him to a second five-year term, he flashed a smile and for an instant seemed genuinely happy. When he starts his new term on January 1, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, 66 years old, will be the oldest person to have held the \$193,000-a-year Secretary General's job. He will face most of the same international problems and regional conflicts that were there five years ago: the war in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, conflicts in Cambodia, Central America and southern Africa, the Palestinian question, and the Lebanese civil war. Mr. Perez de Cuellar

has drawn sharp criticism from the Israelis for his handling of the conflict in Lebanon. He achieved no major diplomatic victory in his first term, but did enjoy a few minor achievements. His critics charge he is overly cautious in a job that is ill defined and depends on the personality of its holder.

From The New York Times, 11 October 1986.

Source D

UNIFIL is interesting in the contemporary context. It is an operation about whose viability the then Secretary-General and his senior advisers had doubts. It was nevertheless pushed through the Security Council by the United States for pressing, if passing, political reasons: US President Carter was launching the negotiations which were to lead to the Camp David Accords and did not want that process derailed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon which had just taken place. UNIFIL has not been able to carry out its mandate because it has never enjoyed the necessary cooperation from all the parties concerned.

*From a lecture by Under-Secretary-General
of the United Nations, Marrack Goulding,
4 March 1993.*

Source E

A private comment about Perez de Cuellar was echoed by the international press when he was first elected Secretary-General of the United Nations, in December 1981. He was “somebody who could fall off a boat without making waves”. In his characteristic style, Perez de Cuellar shrugged his shoulders when he heard the criticism and ignored it altogether.

Conflicts of nerves and wills is the perpetual environment of the Secretary-General. He has been held personally responsible “to history and mankind” by an Iraqi minister for the destruction suffered by Iraq during the recent conflict in the Middle East; the French government has in several instances asked him to immediately investigate allegations about the violence in Lebanon; leftist groups in South Africa have blamed him for being a passive instrument of apartheid, while the Pretoria government has at the same time accused him of being a leftist agitator. A wave maker he certainly was not.

From a publication by a human rights group, October 1991.

1. How far do Sources A–E support the view that Perez de Cuellar should bear the most blame for the failure of UNIFIL during the civil war in Lebanon (1978-1991)?

The issue of contention is whether the Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar (1982-1991) was principally responsible for the failure of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon or should other parties in the conflict bear greater responsibility for the failure to resolve the civil war in Lebanon in an ill-fated mission in the first place.¹ Sources supporting the hypothesis would show the Perez de Cuellar struggled with resolving the conflict because he was not the right person for the job of leading the mission and was not able to manage relations between the various stakeholders contributing to the peacekeeping force. Sources challenging the hypothesis would reveal that the Perez de Cuellar should not bear the most blame because the UNIFIL operation was poorly established to begin with because it was rushed, and occupying forces in South Lebanon would not cooperate with the UN. At face value, Source E and Source C support the hypothesis, Source B, D, and A challenge the hypothesis.

In the final analysis, an overall challenge of the hypothesis is preferred because the challenge sources are stronger as a group than the support sources. Taken as a group, the challenge sources are plagued by problems related to their overall reliability and lack of benefit of hindsight. Source C is written in an informal journalistic

¹ Some candidates completely forgot the ‘issue of contention’ element and instead commenced their introduction as they would a Section B essay, which only points to the lack of preparation of these candidates. Also, many candidates did not say that the ‘issue of contention’ was either something or something else, completely ignoring the need for balance when establishing the ‘issue of contention’.

style and in the middle of the conflict, with a severe lack of a long-term perspective. Likewise, Source E suffers from being heavily biased and lacks any kind of neutrality besides also being deprived of the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, Source C and Source E appear preoccupied solely with making personal attacks on Perez de Cuellar rather than to be fairer in their assessment by looking at his work in the context of political developments during that period. In contrast, Source B provides an objective perspective on the role played by the Secretary-General as well as other factors behind the weaknesses of UNIFIL during the civil war in Lebanon. As the strongest source, it reinforces information found in Source A that despite reinforcements to UNIFIL it was sabotaged by the lack of cooperation from the warring parties. Likewise, Source D reveals that the promised international support did not actually arrive as the civil war in Lebanon developed, distributing blame for the limitations of UNIFIL away from Perez de Cuellar alone. Ultimately, a more accurate hypothesis culled from the key ideas in sources B, D, and A that provide a more balanced view, would be 'Perez de Cuellar should not bear the most blame for the failure of UNIFIL during the civil war in Lebanon because the peacekeeping mission did not enjoy the necessary cooperation from all parties, especially the United States, despite the best attempts of Perez de Cuellar.'²

In conclusion, Source C and Source E support the hypothesis whereas Source B, Source D, and Source A challenge the hypothesis. Since overall the challenge sources are preferred, a more accurate hypothesis would be: 'Perez de Cuellar should not bear the most blame for the failure of UNIFIL during the civil war in Lebanon because the peacekeeping mission did not enjoy the necessary cooperation from all parties, especially the United States and Israel, despite the best attempts of Perez de Cuellar'.³

SECTION B

2. 'The causes of the Cold War in Europe are to be found in the rise of the USA and USSR as superpowers after WWII.' How far do you agree?

The Cold War refers to the state of tension, hostility, competition, and conflict, which characterized the West's relations with the Soviet Union for much of the post-war period. This question requires an examination of whether the transformation of the United States and the Soviet Union, from great powers to superpowers, precipitated the outbreak of the Cold War. To be a superpower, a nation needs to have an overpowering military, unrivalled economic might, and immense international political power. The competition to be the hegemon in Europe, with the preponderant power, especially in view also of the German Question, did cause the outbreak of the Cold War to the extent that it exacerbated the underlying tension and hostility originating from the ideological rift and the history of the mistrust between the two great powers prior the end of WWII. Therefore, this essay argues that the rise of the USA and USSR as superpowers caused the Cold War only insofar as exacerbating the pre-existing fundamental differences between both powers.

In the final analysis, the outbreak of the Cold War was attributed to the dynamic between the USA and the USSR involving much hostility and antagonism that arose from deep-rooted and long-standing incompatibility of two opposing ideologies. This, accompanied with the mutual antagonism and history of mistrust between the two superpowers, was exacerbated by their rise as superpowers. The ascendancy of USA and USSR from great powers to superpowers therefore caused the outbreak of Europe only to the extent of catalyzing the events that led up to it, as it served to exacerbate pre-existing tensions.

3. Which of the following has the best claim to mark the end of the Cold War: the signing of the INF Treaty; the fall of the Berlin Wall; or the collapse of the USSR? Explain your answer.

The 'end of the Cold War' refers to the thawing and denouement of the military-ideological-political rivalry between the 2 superpowers and their blocs, a process which occurred rapidly in the period 1985-91 as the USSR

² An L6 paragraph needs to do two things: 1) Decide whether an overall support or challenge of the hypothesis is preferred. In the case of this hypothesis, an overall challenge is preferred because taken as a whole the challenge sources are stronger than the support source. But stating this alone is not enough. You also need to provide evidence for why this is the case. 2) You need to modify the hypothesis. This would mean a more accurate version of the original hypothesis. Some candidates attempted this but created long and overly complicated hypothesis. Aim to be concise when you modify the hypothesis. Also account for why your modified hypothesis is more accurate.

³ Yes, you still need a final conclusion too.

weakened considerably, appeared to contract her presence in global politics, and finally imploded. The question requires us to pick a definitive event, the intermediate nuclear forces treaty of 1987, the destruction of the wall established in 1961, which kept East and West Berlin, and by extension, East Germany and West Germany bifurcated, or political liquidation of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991, as a boundary marker, which signified the end of the Cold War during the period 1985-1991. However, the term 'best claim' remains subjective because relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were driven by a complex interplay of ideological, political, and military factors. Therefore, this essay finally resolves that the collapse of the USSR can best lay claim to mark the end of the Cold War.

In conclusion, the terms 'best claim to mark' the end of the Cold War requires us to pick a touchstone event, or a boundary marker, which signified the end of the Cold War during the period 1985-1991. However, the term 'best claim' remains subjective because relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were driven by a complex interplay of ideological, political, and military factors. Therefore, while the INF Treaty marked the military end to the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall marked the ideological end to the Cold War, the definitive collapse of the USSR marks the political resolution to the Cold War. Therefore, this essay finally resolves that the collapse of the USSR can best lay claim to mark the end of the Cold War, because it removed one superpower in the bipolar rivalry, which predominated international affairs since 1945.

4. 'US dominance of the global economy was more detrimental than beneficial.' How far do you agree with this view of the period 1945-2000?

US dominance refers to the USA's control and influence over the financial-monetary system, liberal trading order, and global economic growth. This statement appears to be most applicable to the crisis decades from 1971 to 2000 when the USA's economic leadership contributed to financial-monetary instability, obstructed the further liberalization of the trading order, and hampered global economic growth, which far outweighed any positive impact the USA had on the global economy. However, during hegemonic period of 1945-1970, the 'golden age of capitalism', when the USA's unilateral management created a stable monetary order, made trading regime more liberal than ever, and promoted economic growth, which far outweighed the over-dependence on the USA and the asymmetrical benefits accrued. Thus this essay posits that US dominance of the global economy was more detrimental than beneficial only insofar as the period 1971 to 2000, whereas from 1945 to 1970, US leadership was more beneficial than detrimental.

In the final analysis, the USA's leadership only seemed beneficial in the long run as it did much to give the postwar economic order its foundations, confidence and sustenance to become the pluralistic, self-sustaining, truly international economy of the 1970s. The USA's dominance and the seeming benefits created during its hegemonic period also inadvertently caused the decline of that previous stability in the monetary order and liberalism in the trading regime. This saw USA pursue unilateralist policies, which brought detriment to the international economy instead, thus proving that American dominance has not always been beneficial. In fact, American dominance and leadership of the international economy only brought temporary benefits, which ironically actually plagued the system in the long run instead. Upon closer examination, many of the problems of the 1970s and 80s were inherited from the basic foundations of how the postwar economy was reconstructed under USA's leadership, thus proving that even US leadership during the hegemonic period was ultimately detrimental. The USA built its economic system on shaky foundations, which were the seeds that would grow unmanageable and cause the decline of the liberal and capitalist monetary and trading regime of the international economy. Thus, ultimately, the USA's dominance of the global economy was more detrimental than beneficial.

5. Did the rise of religious fundamentalism between 1970 and 2000 have a greater impact on the regional security of the Middle East or South Asia?

Religious fundamentalism, in this context, refers to a discernible pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled 'true believers' attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviours. The question requires an examination on whether radical religious militancy contributed to regional insecurity in terms of undermining the stability of states, becoming the point of origin for religiously motivated terrorism, heightening tensions between states, breaking all the rules of diplomacy, proliferating transnational terrorism, and the threat of mutually assured destruction more in the Middle East or South Asia. Ultimately, this essay argues that the rise of religious fundamentalism had a greater impact on the regional security of the Middle East from 1970-1988 whereas it had greater impact on the regional security of South Asia from 1989 to 2000.

In the final analysis, radical religious movements contributed more to regional insecurity in the Middle East than South Asia from 1970 to 1988 in terms of undermining the stability of states, becoming the point of origin for religiously motivated terrorism, heightening tensions between states, and breaking all the rules of diplomacy. However, radical religious fundamentalists had a greater impact on the regional security of South Asia than the Middle East from 1989 to 2000 by proliferating transnational terrorism, and the threat of mutually assured destruction.

6. Examine the responsibility of outside powers for the continuation, up to 2000, of the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir.

The diplomatic standoff between India and Pakistan is over the accession, sovereignty, and national identity of Kashmir, which has escalated into major wars and near-war crises from 1947 to 2000. The statement suggests that influential political players outside of South Asia like great power Britain, and the Cold War superpowers like USA and USSR, protracted the conflict between the two states. However, this ignores more successful efforts by external agents to create diplomatic frameworks for co-existence and overstates the role of the foreign powers in a dispute that was predominantly regional in nature. Therefore, this essay argues that the furthest extent the outside powers made the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir intractable was to indirectly exacerbate the conflict by emboldening India and Pakistan to pursue their regional objectives.

In the final analysis, it would be inaccurate to claim that the war over Kashmir waged by India and Pakistan was predominantly caused by outside powers. Outside powers merely aggravated pre-existing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Britain and the Commonwealth taking a pro-Pakistani position in the United Nations as well as the superpowers later emboldening local actors to pursue their regional objectives. The fundamental causes of the conflict were the dynamic of mutual antagonism between India and Pakistan based on divergent ideological commitments, to secular nationalism and religious nationalism, as the fundamentals of state-construction. Besides, India's virulent anti-irredentist position against Pakistan's irredentist claims over Kashmir added to the complexity of the conflict. Furthermore, religious fundamentalism from within the region worked to exacerbate the conflict long after the Cold War had ended proving that outside powers alone were not to be blamed for the continuing conflict over Kashmir.