



HWA CHONG INSTITUTION
JC2 Preliminary Examination
Higher 1

**CANDIDATE
NAME**

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CT GROUP

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**INDEX
NUMBER**

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HISTORY

8814

International History, c. 1945 – 2000

September 2016

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

3 hours

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

Write your **name** and **CT class** clearly in the spaces at the top of this page.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Attempt both Section A and Section B.

Attempt one question from Section A and only three questions from Section B.

Please start every question on a *fresh* sheet of paper and label each question clearly.

If you did not manage to complete a question, please hand in a piece of blank paper with your name and CT on it.

At the end of the examination, fasten your responses with the string provided **together**.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

The Post-Cold War Secretary General of the United Nations

1. Read the sources and then answer the question.

Source A

Mr Boutros-Ghali has repeatedly pointed out that the unprecedented financial crisis that the organization is going through is due not to current expenditure, but to the cost of peace-keeping operations. Since 1992 this has increased fourfold, from 600 million dollars to 2.6 billion. The "blue berets" have intervened on 17 different occasions in the last four years - with United States agreement. This has not stopped Washington withholding its dues from the UN: these now amount to 1.5 billion dollars, more than half of what the organization is owed. The secretary-general has therefore not hesitated to take the United States to task, though often not by name. Mr Boutros-Ghali complains publicly that the Americans are making his work more difficult, that the members of the Security Council are giving him impossible tasks and that they are trying to escape responsibility for their own failures by laying them at the door of UN officials.

A journalist in a French left wing newspaper, 1996

Source B

The failures of the United Nations should not be blamed just on the great powers. They owe as much to the mindset of U.N. administrators, who think that no problem in the world is too intractable to be solved by negotiation. These mandarins fail to grasp that men with guns do not respect men with nothing but flapping gums. A good example of this incomprehension was Annan's negotiations with Saddam Hussein. In 1998, Annan undertook shuttle diplomacy to Baghdad, reached a deal with Saddam to continue weapons inspections, and declared him "a man I can do business with." Almost immediately Saddam flouted his agreement with Annan.

A large part of the problem is that Annan and his staff work not for the world's people but for their 188 governments. Annan proclaimed last fall that sovereignty is on the decline - and so it is, everywhere except at the U.N. There, at least in the General Assembly, all regimes, whether democratic or despotic, have an equal vote. Annan and other employees must be careful not to unduly offend any member state, and so they wind up adopting a posture of neutrality among warring parties, even when one side is clearly in the wrong.

Extract from a foreign affairs magazine, 2000

Source C

The Secretary-General proved most successful in facilitating the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and in ending the superpower dimension to the conflicts in Cambodia, Central America, and Afghanistan. To an extent, Perez de Cuellar's achievements are explained by the changing political climate, and as such he was at the right place at the right time. However, it is to his credit that he managed, orchestrated, and exploited this changing context.

An academic in a book on the United Nations, 1998

Source D

The new Secretary-General soon became an international star. Capitalizing on his insider's knowledge of the organization, Annan showed a remarkable confidence in taking the UN in new directions. He boldly called for the organization to prevent future Rwandas and Bosnias, a challenge that engendered serious political opposition from many states, especially those in the developing world that feared it would lead to UN meddling in their internal affairs. He helped ravaged countries such as East Timor and Sierra Leone recover from calamity. He presided over an expansion in peacekeeping missions. He concluded a compact with international businesses to share in UN activities. He courted the U.S. Congress and convinced "Senator No," Jesse Helms of North Carolina, to restart the payment of U.S. dues. And by the end of his first term, he had won the Nobel Peace Prize for himself and the institution.

A journalist in a magazine, 2006

Source E

The post-Cold War world now, in Boutros-Ghali's view, was less one of opportunity for peacekeeping than one of grave challenge... [Intervention without consent] had been issued at a time of hope. It came immediately after a sequence of positive developments, including the apparent success of Operation Desert Storm and the unprecedented deployment in Cambodia. But the future was not to justify this optimism... The wide alliance built around the war against Iraq proved ephemeral, and the reformism of the last days of the Soviet Union had given way to a new, often resentful, post-Soviet Russian nationalism. The humiliation of the UN in Bosnia lay just ahead, as did the abject failures of operations in Angola and Somalia and the UN's inability to prevent genocide in Rwanda. These were complex situations, and it was perhaps beyond the capacity of any external intervention to significantly improve them. And there were peacekeeping successes ahead as well, notably in Mozambique. But by 1995 the public perception of peacekeeping was one of inadequacy at best and general failure at worst.

Norrie MacQueen in the book Peacekeeping and the International System, 2006

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A – E support the view that the post-Cold War UN Secretary Generals were successful in their role? [25 marks]

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 To what extent would you agree that more than anyone else, Stalin created the conditions for the start of the Cold War? [25 marks]
- 3 “Great men, not faceless masses, ended the Cold War.” Discuss. [25 marks]
- 4 How far would you agree that China’s economic growth after 1978 was more a result of “change from below” than “reform from the top”? [25 marks]
- 5 “The reason for the rise of religious fundamentalism in the 20th century was the pace of change in conservative societies.” Assess the validity of this assertion. [25 marks]
- 6 To what extent was the India Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir merely a territorial dispute between sovereign nations? [25 marks]

END of PAPER

Acknowledgements:

- Source A Rouleau, Eric; Why Washington Wants Rid of Mr Boutros-Ghali. Le Monde Diplomatique. November 1996.
- Source B Boot, Max; Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of UN Peacekeeping; Foreign Affairs; March/April 2000.
- Source C Newman, E; The UN Secretary General from the Cold War to the New Era; Springer; 15 April, 1998.
- Source D Schlesinger, Stephen; Annan at the End: Grading the Secretary General; Foreign Affairs; November/December 2006.
- Source E MacQueen, Norrie; Peacekeeping and the International System; Routledge; 16 October 2006.