



NANYANG JUNIOR COLLEGE

Year Two

Preliminary Examination 2015

HISTORY

Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997

9731/02

22 September 2015

3 hours

No Additional Materials are required

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and civics tutorial group on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN AND THE CAMBODIAN INVASION

1. Read the sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

(ASEAN's) campaign on the Cambodian issue at the UN was an equally important theatre, focused on denying Vietnam the opportunity to claim Cambodia's seat at the UN General Assembly. With intense lobbying, we pushed through the ASEAN resolution in support of Cambodia year after year with increased majorities. Our goal was to keep the issue in international consciousness and persuade Vietnam to come to the negotiating table. When our campaign began, we were unaccustomed to the mores and customs of the UN. Our diplomats had to learn on the fly and adjust their tactics to the situation.

Excerpt from a speech by former Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Wong Kan Seng, in 2011.

Source B

The Bogor peace talks or JIM 1 finally capped ASEAN's long-drawn effort to break the Cambodian stalemate, representing a very significant diplomatic achievement for ASEAN. More importantly, JIM 1 reflected the dynamics of ASEAN's politics of accommodation as seen in the shifts in its policies on Vietnam and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. Considering that ASEAN had initially refused to endorse any direct and indirect meeting with Vietnam or its Cambodian proxy unless Vietnam withdrew its troops totally and unconditionally, the adjustments in its policies to meet Vietnam halfway reflected its desire to open channels of communication in order to continue with its established patterns of consultation.

Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way", 2005.

[Turn over

Source C

With the improvement of relations between China and Vietnam and the indications that they were making progress in the process of achieving full normalization of relations, in the summer of 1991, the need to support the respective sides in the Cambodian conflict was diminishing. China's policy had been to support groups opposed to Vietnam in Cambodia, and, with relations normalized with Vietnam, this would no longer be in China's interest. From the Vietnamese perspective, with a cessation of Chinese backing of anti-Vietnamese groups in Cambodia, there would not be the same need for Vietnam to support the pro-Vietnamese State of Cambodia (previous People's Republic of Kampuchea). Furthermore, a resolution of the Cambodian conflict was a necessary prerequisite for the official full normalization of relations between China and Vietnam, as this was one precondition stated by China. With China and Vietnam wanting to fully normalize their relations, increased pressure was put on the Cambodian parties to find a negotiated settlement.

From an academic review of the Cambodian Conflict, published in a research journal in 2007.

Source D

The main reason behind the willingness of the Cambodian factions to agree on the establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) was not directly influenced by ASEAN's diplomacy, but by the pressure of the "Perm-Five". It was the "Perm-Five" who pressed all Cambodian factions to hold elections in 1993 and the UN produced five resolutions allowing the UN to monitor peace and democratization process in Cambodia through UNTAC. This was a triumph as it successfully transformed the fighting among Cambodian disputants in battlefields into national elections.

From a book published in 2009 by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace.

Source E

Since 1979, with each meeting, we have been regularly able to increase the votes against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The fact that ASEAN is able to mobilise more support in the United Nations against the combined lobbying of Vietnam and its communist allies, is proof that ASEAN is not ineffectual. It is an ASEAN effort. We asked the Americans and our Western friends not to take the lead in this matter but to follow us.

Adapted from comments made by Singapore's former Foreign Minister, Mr S. Rajaratnam.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A-E support the view that ASEAN played a key role in the successful resolution of the Cambodian Crisis?

[Turn over

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section. You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

2. "Before 1941 little had been achieved by nationalist movements across Southeast Asia." Discuss.
3. How far do you agree with the view that the independence of Southeast Asia should be credited to the colonial powers?
4. "Post-war Southeast Asia was largely authoritarian in nature." Discuss.
5. Assess the effects of government interventions in the economies of independent Southeast Asia.
6. How adequate is the concept of sovereignty in explaining all instances of inter-state tensions in independent Southeast Asia?