



HISTORY

9731/02

Paper 2 The History of Southeast Asia, c.1900 to 1997

Wednesday, 26 August 2015

3 hours

Additional Materials: Cover Page
Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and civics tutorial group in the spaces provided on the cover page and on every sheet of answer paper.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Write clearly the question numbers on the first page of every question attempted and the cover page.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid and tape.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear handwriting in your answer, and to leave two lines between each paragraph on the answer paper.

Section A

You must answer Question 1

ASEAN'S ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT, 1978-1991

1 Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

During the last five years, the ASEAN countries have succeeded in mobilising world public opinion, including the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries, against Vietnam. In 1982 and 1983, 105 countries voted for the ASEAN resolution at the UN General Assembly which called upon Vietnam to approach the negotiating table, and urged a political solution which would include the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the holding of free elections under international supervision. The ASEAN countries have also been largely successful in persuading the West and Japan to withhold their bilateral economic assistance to Vietnam until the problem of Cambodia is resolved.

From a speech delivered by a Singaporean diplomat to a conference on the Cambodian crisis held in the USA, 1984.

Source B

ASEAN had little influence over either Vietnam or China, or the conflict between them, and was unable to offer Vietnam any incentive for a withdrawal of forces without the cooperation of China or the Soviet Union. ASEAN contributed to the resolution adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea of July 1981 and developed the phased withdrawal in 1983. ASEAN, in this sense, assumed a valuable international role in taking the diplomatic lead in the dispute and in defining possible solutions which at some later stage may acquire international endorsement. Nonetheless, the passing of unimplementable resolutions did little to maintain morale within ASEAN when there was little serious expectation of a solution. The realisation that a solution required the active involvement of the great powers and that these powers were to a large extent unresponsive to ASEAN's proposals raised questions about the relevance of the organisation to the resolution of the dispute. ASEAN would lose status among its members if it were seen largely as a body coordinating diplomatic approaches to the great powers without an ability to produce a more direct input into the resolution of regional disputes.

From an article by a British expert on international security in Asia, 1987.

Source C

ASEAN not only led the diplomatic opposition to Vietnam's moves in Cambodia; it also actively engaged, under Indonesia's leadership, in the diplomacy that led to the political settlement of the conflict, including the "cocktail parties", the Jakarta Informal Meetings, consultations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the Paris Conference on Cambodia. Helped by a growing *rapprochement* between Beijing and Moscow (as well as between Beijing and Washington), by reportedly, a Sino-Soviet deal specific to Cambodia, and finally by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the settlement, concluded in 1991, resulted in a Vietnamese disengagement from Cambodia; the reduction of the Khmer Rouge to an eventually failed insurgency; a constitution and UN-administered elections; and a reasonably viable and independent Cambodia. It was probably the best outcome for Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia possible under the circumstances.

From a book written by a former ASEAN Secretary-General, 2006.

Source D

The time has come for ASEAN to lay down its heavy and now risky burden of trying to find a solution to the Cambodian problem if not to suffer further humiliation and hurt from its Western partners. The villains and victims that ASEAN and its Western allies had agreed upon eleven years ago have been unilaterally reversed by the latter. The new objectives, now that accord has been reached between the Western nations and the Soviet Union, require that the Vietnamese, rather than the Cambodians, should win the battle for Cambodia. It was fear of the Soviet Union which earlier prompted the Western powers to cheer ASEAN efforts to force the Soviets' proxy to disgorge from its fruit of aggression. But since Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev descended from the mountain five years ago bearing the perestroika and glasnost tablets proclaiming an end to the East-West Cold War, it has become necessary to reward the Soviets by ditching the Cambodia coalition and reinstating the Vietnamese as overlords of all Indochina. Hence the need to also ditch the ASEAN solution.

From a newspaper article written by a former Singapore Foreign Minister, 1990.

Source E

ASEAN played a prominent diplomatic role during the Cambodian conflict, especially in keeping the issue in the political limelight of the United Nations. In attempting to bring pressure to bear on Vietnam to withdraw, however, it did not act alone but was part of an international division of labour, including China and the United States, which employed complementary military and economic coercion. There was a period during the late 1980s when ASEAN, under the leadership of Indonesia, held a series of informal meetings in Jakarta in an attempt to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict on a regional basis but without evident success.

In the event, the Cambodian conflict as an international problem was resolved as a consequence of the nature of the end of the Cold War whereby the Soviet Union withdrew material and diplomatic support from Vietnam, which was in turn obliged to come to terms with China, its prime adversary. The process of regional peace-making was then taken out of ASEAN's hands and addressed directly and with ultimate success by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, who were responsible for the terms of an accord reached at an international conference in Paris in October 1991. Although ASEAN governments were represented, and Indonesia's Foreign Minister had been a co-chair with that of France, ASEAN had been confined, in effect, to the diplomatic margins.

From an academic article by a British scholar specialising in the international relations of Southeast Asia, 1999.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A-E support the view that ASEAN was of no relevance to the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, 1978-1991?

Section B

You must answer **THREE** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

- 2 Assess the view that the rise of nationalist movements, before World War Two, was a response to modernisation.
- 3 'Southeast Asian nationalists won their independence.' How valid is this statement for the period after 1945?
- 4 How significant was the Communist influence in the politics of Southeast Asian states since independence?
- 5 How far did the role of the government promote economic development in independent Southeast Asia?
- 6 To what extent were Southeast Asian nations able to resolve their inter-state tensions?