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DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL
Preliminary Examination
Year 6

H2 HISTORY

9731/02

Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997

22 September 2015

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your Centre number, index number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer only **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

Section A

You must answer Question 1.

ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict

1. Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

During the past five years, the ASEAN countries have succeeded in mobilizing world public opinion, including the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries, against Vietnam. ASEAN has worked actively within the UN to push for a holistic political solution to Cambodia. The ASEAN countries have also been largely successful in persuading the West and Japan to withhold their bilateral economic assistance to Vietnam until the problem of Cambodia is resolved. Vietnam has been seriously embarrassed. From 1975 – 1978, Vietnam was seen by the Third World as a heroic country, having defeated first the French and then, the United States. Today, thanks to ASEAN's efforts, Vietnam is viewed by most of the countries of the Third World as an aggressive and expansionist state.

Adapted from a speech by Tommy Koh, Singapore Permanent Representative to the UN from 1979 to 1984, delivered in 1984.

Source B

Despite ASEAN's active role in lobbying the UN and its persistent criticism of Vietnam during its annual foreign ministerial meetings, the resolution of the Cambodian dispute was at a standstill until as late as 1988.

The truth was that the face of ASEAN's external solidarity concealed different internal strategic perceptions. Malaysia and Indonesia, alarmed at the great power implications of confrontation with Vietnam, advanced at a March 1980 bilateral summit in Kuantan, Malaysia, the Kuantan Principle. This was followed by subsequent diplomatic overtures initiated by both Malaysia and Indonesia, such as Five-Plus-Two Formula and the Proximity Talks. However, these efforts fell through due to objections by Thailand and Singapore, both of which were sensitive to their own geo-strategic vulnerabilities.

In the midst of such disunity, Indonesia chose to act on its own, proposing an informal meeting (or "cocktail party") in 1985, which Vietnam agreed to in July 1987. The proposal finally materialized in the form of the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) in July 1988, after being subjected to several amendments in response to the objections raised by Thailand and Singapore during the foreign ministerial meeting in August 1987.

Adapted from "International Relations in Southeast Asia" by American Political Scientist Donald E Weatherbee, 2009.

Source C

Despite ASEAN's diplomatic role in the crisis, which certainly helped to frustrate Vietnamese and Soviet regional ambitions, ASEAN had very little impact on the eventual resolution of the conflict. In the rapid turn of events in 1988 where there was a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, ASEAN's role in bringing about the resolution of the Cambodian dispute was greatly diminished. Observing the end of the Cambodian crisis, one cannot help but feel that the moment the members of the United Nations Security Council stepped up to assume greater responsibility for resolving the issue, ASEAN's role as a facilitator of reconciliation became undisputedly small.

Adapted from an article from the "Southeast Asian Studies Journal", by Japanese academic Yukawa Taku, 2011.

Source D

It seems as if Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was a gift to ASEAN – an organisation in search of a cause. Even since January 1979, when a Vietnamese blitzkrieg swept the Khmer Rouge out of power in Cambodia, ASEAN had not only found the call for withdrawal of the Hanoi troops from Cambodia an important glue for the organisation but also a very useful cause to promote themselves on the world stage. It cannot be denied that ASEAN's prestige had been enhanced through its incessant lobbying for political support in international organisations such as the UN. This laid the foundations for an overtly united regional stance to act firmly and persistently against acts of aggression in Indochina.

However, it might be unwise to gloat over ASEAN unity. The solidarity that was achieved over Cambodia was often on paper, while behind the scene the member countries tugged and pulled in different directions. In fact, the reason behind ASEAN success had been its ability to gently trim its common sails to accommodate the different wind currents rather than let them plunder asunder. The development of a two-tier approach in which individual members conduct one set of policies towards Vietnam while ASEAN, as an organisation, enunciates another, had ultimately contributed to the political and military stalemate which developed in Cambodia.

Adapted from "Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia: The ASEAN Perspectives", by academic Nayan Chanda, 1990.

Source E

ASEAN's unity over the Cambodian crisis was not to be taken for granted. It had to be forged and maintained continuously. The different member states had their own views on how to go about achieving ASEAN's objectives over Cambodia. Thailand, bordering Cambodia, had the most immediate and direct strategic stake. Indonesia had old links with Hanoi which it sought to leverage on, and some years later played a key role in convening two Jakarta Informal Meetings that paved the way for the Paris Peace Conference. Malaysia had its concerns over forming the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to bring together the anti-Vietnam Cambodian factions. Such dynamics defined ASEAN's campaign on the Cambodian issue. Despite our differences, we were successful in mounting a sustained, united front towards achieving our goal.

Adapted from a speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Foreign Minister from 1988 to 1994, delivered in 2011.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A-E support the view that ASEAN's handling of the Cambodian Crisis revealed more weaknesses than strengths?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.
You must support each answer with examples drawn from
at least three countries.

2. Which method was the more effective colonial response to nationalist challenges in the years from 1900 to 1941: suppression or accommodation?
3. Assess the view that the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia was delayed because the colonial masters were unwilling decolonisers.
4. "Government intervention often brought about more harm than good." Evaluate the validity of this statement in the economic development of independent Southeast Asia.
5. To what extent was Authoritarianism responsible for bringing about stability in independent Southeast Asian states?
6. Evaluate the claim that efforts at Regional Cooperation between independent Southeast Asian states were futile.