

<b>Name:</b>		<b>Index Number:</b>		<b>Class:</b>	
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## **DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL**

### **Preliminary Examination**

### **Year 6**

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## **H2 HISTORY**

Paper 1 International History 1945-2000

**9731/ 01**

**16 September 2015**

**3 hours**

Additional Materials:                      Answer Paper

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### **READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your Centre number, index number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

### **Section A**

Answer **Question 1**.

### **Section B**

Answer **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

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This document consists of **4** printed pages.

**[Turn over]**

## Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

### UN Peacekeeping in Somalia

- 1 Read the sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

#### Source A

Interviewer: In the end you judge this whole thing a success or a failure?

Walter Clarke: In my view Somalia was not a military failure, it was a well-run military operation, but which had no political focus. It was a failed political military operation.

Interviewer: Explain what you meant by that.

Walter Clarke: In a traditional warfare, you bring force against force. One side will win and one side will normally lose. If you get into a peace operation, it is a political military operation, it's a humanitarian battlefield where the real enemies are gonna be things like impure water, disease, fears insecurity, displacement and all of that.

And that's the way these operations ought to be planned. In the case of Somalia, we didn't even focus on the immediate threats other than food. We certainly never focused on the longer-term political concerns of the country. After all, it began as a political problem, we became interested in it during the humanitarian period and we certainly were not focusing beyond that point.

*An interview with Walter Clarke, Deputy Chief of Mission for the US embassy in Somalia, from March to July 1993, broadcast on American television, 1 November 2001*

#### Source B

"The unprecedented and decisive actions of UNOSOM II since June 12 against General Aideed's armed militia, their arms depots, and their strongholds were essential for the restoration of law and order in Mogadishu; the elimination of heavy weapons in the Mogadishu area; the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries; the eventual resumption of discussion on political reconciliation; and the fulfillment of Resolution 837's mandate. If General Aideed and other perpetrators of the June 5 killings are apprehended, the Security Council will ensure that they are held accountable under the rule of law. In any event, the arrest warrant against General Aideed greatly restricts his mobility and effectiveness as a rogue leader, something I believe the vast majority of Somalis desperately want.

*Extracted from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement on International Security, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993*

### Source C

An unfortunate habit has developed of combining Chapter VI (mediation and peacekeeping with consent of parties) and Chapter VII (mandatory sanctions and use of force). This practice led in Somalia to a confused mandate which combined seeking Somali cooperation and acquiescence with forthright coercive measures. UNITAF set out to break a famine but its mandate infected UNOSOM II with the impossible task of forcibly disarming an undefeated group of militias and pacifying a ruined country. No wonder disaster ensued and the UN had to backtrack in a humiliating U-turn.

*Anthony Parsons, former UK Permanent Representative to UN from 1979-82, 1995*

### Source D

The Mission in Somalia proved to be decisive when necessary. Despite the slow passage of Security Council Resolution 814 left all parties with little time to plan for an orderly transition, set for 4 May, the UN positions for the new force were staffed. However, it quickly became apparent that Aideed had little respect for the new organization, the UN, or Admiral Howe. On 5 June 1993, his Somalia National Alliance forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers assigned to UNOSOM II. Another 44 were wounded. The following day, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 837 adopting a more aggressive military stance toward Aideed and asking member states for more troops and equipment. In Mogadishu, Pakistani and Italian forces conducted heavy armored patrols throughout the city, concentrating on the areas near the ambush site.

*Adapted from statement by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Chief of the Histories Division – U.S. Army Center of Military History and a veteran of Somalia*

### Source E

The UNITAF mission was a success during its too brief deployment through April 1993. Establishing the safety for relief workers while keeping the warlords somewhat placated and off balance; maintaining and demonstrating military primacy; pushing the military factions towards a locally led political process while opening up that process to civilian elites and eschewing precise formulas; removing heavy weapons from areas of conflict while fostering the restoration of police and government functions – these were undertakings of the highest order of delicacy in a militarized and fragmented society like Somalia's. UNITAF's accomplishments far exceeded the simple, publicly discussed goal of creating a "secure environment for humanitarian relief".

*Adapted from an article, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." Foreign Affairs Magazine*

Now answer the following question.

How far do the sources A- E supported the view that the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia was not well prepared?

**[Turn over]**

**Section B**

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

2. "The end of the Cold War has failed to bring about international peace and order." Discuss.
3. "The rise of the Third World had created more economic opportunities for the world economy. " Critically evaluate the statement with the development of the world economy since 1945.
4. Why was Japan unable to escape from their prolonged economic crisis in the aftermath of the crash of the property market?
5. To what extent do you agree with the view that the Arabs were responsible for the outbreak of the Arab Israeli conflict?
6. How far do you agree with the view that religious fundamentalism worsened existing conflicts rather than created new ones from the years 1979 – 2000?

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*Copyright Acknowledgements:*

Question 1 Source A	© <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/clarke.html">http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/clarke.html</a>
Question 1 Source B	© <a href="http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no26.html">http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no26.html</a>
Question 1 Source C	© Anthony Parsons. From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947 - 1994
Question 1 Source D	© <a href="http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm">http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm</a>
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