



RIVER VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL
Year 6 Preliminary Examination 2
In preparation for the General Certificate of Education
Advanced Level
HIGHER 1

HISTORY

8814/01

Paper 1 International History, 1945-2000

16 September 2015

3 hours

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write in dark blue or black ink.

You may use a HB pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO NOT WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

This document consists of **5** printed pages.

Section A

You must answer Question 1.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN SOMALIA

- 1 Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

When answering Question 1 candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

At the root of the failure -- and its enduring legacy -- is the hatred most Somalis now feel for their would-be rescuer. That hatred is the result of a succession of bitter betrayals by the organization. In Somali eyes, the United Nations' first betrayal came in January 1991, when the dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown after 21 years in power. As the U.N. forces hurriedly left, the country slid into civil war and famine. When full-scale war broke out a year later between the militias of Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid and his arch-rival, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the United Nations watched silently, not even offering humanitarian assistance. If one thing united Somalis from all walks of life in those dark days, it was anger at the United Nations for having abandoned the country.

Under mounting pressure from relief agencies, the United Nations returned, belatedly, in April 1992, having brokered a cease-fire in February. Promises of relief aid slowly restored Somali hopes. But when some 500 Pakistani Blue Berets finally did arrive last October, after a painstaking agreement worked out by Mr. Sahnoun, they were ill-equipped, stuck to their barracks and relied on hired Somali guns to protect them.

Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, co-directors of African Rights, a human rights organization based in London, writing in October 10 1993.

Source B

The resources to implement the Security Council's many mandates in the 1990's were totally inadequate. It was, of course, welcome news that the Council was working closely together on a day-by-day basis without the grinding clashes of the Cold War period. The problem was that with no effective Military Staff Committee and with no standing forces from member states, every employment had to be put together from scratch. It was all very well for the Council to authorise a new operation in a certain part of the world. But it was left to the luckless secretary-general to go around to UN members, cap in hand, asking them to contribute soldiers, police forces, administrator, logistical support, and food supplies. Some members would contribute forces willingly for food distribution in Central Africa but decline to have their troops sitting between Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. Every mission involved a

new and different combination of contributing nations. Inevitably, this gap between promise and performance could only hurt the Security Council's reputation.

Paul Kennedy, a British historian specialising in international politics, writing in 2006.

Source C

The Somali peace talks under way here hit a snag today when one of the strongest factions said it had no confidence in the United Nations' ability to help the country and called on the United States to take up the role of mediator among the warring parties.

The faction, the Somali National Alliance led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid, said in a statement that the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali does not understand Somalia's "intricate political problems". General Aidid has opposed the United Nations role in Somalia all along because he thinks Mr. Boutros-Ghali is biased against him and looks more favorably on his principal rival, Mohammed Ali Mahdi. General Aidid's stand makes it unlikely that Mr. Boutros-Ghali can now succeed in persuading the opposing factions invited to this meeting to hold a national reconciliation conference to pick a new interim government for the country.

Paul Lewis, writing for the New York Times in 1993.

Source D

In the face of the deteriorating humanitarian situation, in December 1992, the Security Council authorized Member States to "use all necessary means" to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia under Chapter VII of the Charter. The 36,000-strong force, codenamed Operation Restore Hope, improved humanitarian conditions. However, the US was not prepared to undertake the task of disarming the warring factions. Concerns about this led the US to push for the United Nations to essentially take over the operation, almost from the outset. By late February 1993, the US had already reduced its presence from some 26,000 to 16,000.

The botched 3 October raid by US Rangers intended to capture a number of Aideed's key aides—which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers—effectively ended American involvement in Somalia. Four days later, on 7 October, President Bill Clinton announced that the US would withdraw its combat forces and the bulk of its logistics units by 31 March 1994. In February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. The mission was withdrawn in March 1995.

Extract from the book Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities.

Source E

Mohammed Sahnoun was the UN special envoy. Of all the people involved in Somalia, he was probably best equipped to try to rebuild the political consensus that could pave the way for a government of national reconciliation. But he received no backing from New York. Too much had to be referred back to UN headquarters; his efforts came to nought.

The United Nations has given second place to diplomacy and reconciliation. When the United States began Operation Restore Hope late last year, it provided a great opportunity. U.S. and other UN troops were welcomed across the country. But time was wasted. Earlier in October, when the Americans withdrew from a number of outlying areas, they were replaced generally with troops who were not as cohesive and effective. That is not surprising; many different nationalities and commands were involved. But the real failure was on the political front. The United Nations dragged its feet, and no advance was made.

Malcom Fraser, president of Care International, an aid agency in Somalia, speaking to the press in October 20, 1993.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A-E suggest that the UN was to blame for the failure of its operation in Somalia from 1991-1993?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 “Neither side was to blame for the Cold War; it was a mutual misunderstanding.” Critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of this interpretation.
- 3 “Local partners had a greater role than superpowers in both the Cuban Missile Crisis and Korean War.” To what extent is this assessment valid?
- 4 To what extent was Japan’s Economic Miracle just a matter of luck? Discuss.
- 5 “Religious fundamentalism was wholly a product of anti-western sentiments.” How far do you agree?
- 6 How far do you agree that the Arab-Israeli conflict was protracted primarily due to the geopolitical rivalry of the superpowers?

Copyright Acknowledgements

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Source B © Paul Kennedy; The Parliament of Men; 2006.

Source C © Paul Lewis; NY Times; 1993.

Source D © Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams; 2000.

Source E © Malcolm Fraser; NY Times; 1993.