



# **JURONG JUNIOR COLLEGE**

## **PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2015**

**HISTORY 9731/1**

**HISTORY 8814/1**

**Paper 1: International History 1945-2000**

**Tuesday**

**1<sup>st</sup> September 2015**

**3 hours**

### **READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

1. Answer **four** questions.
2. You must answer Question 1 (Section A), and any three questions from Section B.
3. Begin each question on a new sheet of paper.
4. Fasten all your work securely together.

### **INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES**

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.

**NAME:**

**CLASS:**

You must answer Question 1.

## THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

- 1 Read the Sources and then answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

### Source A

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the importance of expanding and improving international co-operation among States, which will contribute to the elimination of acts of international terrorism and their underlying causes and to the prevention and elimination of this criminal scourge,

Convinced that international co-operation in combating and preventing terrorism will contribute to the strengthening of confidence among States, reduce tensions and create a better climate among them,

Reaffirming also the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, and upholding the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Once again unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security.

*General Assembly Resolution 42/159, passed on 7 December 1987.*

### Source B

Experience indicates clearly that this faith in the potency of legal treaties and conferences is misplaced. In fact, even as new anti-terrorist treaties have multiplied throughout the past 40 years, the incidence of terrorism has escalated. International treaties alone cannot solve the problem of terrorism. To be effective, they depend on governments to honor, abide by, and enforce them. Tragically, however, not all signatories can be relied upon to do so. In fact, each of the seven state sponsors of terrorism as identified by the U.S. Department of State (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan) and Afghanistan are State Parties to one or more of the 12 anti-terrorism treaties. To make matters worse, the treaties are often imprecise and limited in scope. The President of the General Assembly stated at the end of the October 1-5, 2001, that one of the obstacles faced was the need for a "clearer definition of terrorism."

*Extracted from an article by Heritage Foundation, a right-wing American think tank, 2002.*

### Source C

Throughout the 1990s, economic sanctions were the main policy instrument employed in the campaign against terrorism. By imposing sanctions on Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Security Council hoped to send a more general message and to change the behavior of state sponsors of terrorism. Washington in particular viewed “this type of concerted multilateral response to terrorism ... as an important deterrent to states considering support for terrorist acts or groups.” In March 1992, for the first time the Security Council backed up its rhetorical commitment with action, imposing mandatory economic sanctions on Libya, which had been accused of involvement in the Lockerbie bombing. Sanctions were fairly effective against Libya, getting it to meet both the specific and the more general demands.

*Extracted from an article by an expert on terrorism, published in 2003.*

### Source D

When it comes to terrorism, perhaps today's gravest threat to international peace and security, the UN has been hesitant, slow to act, and less than effective. Diplomatic niceties and political realities hamper timely and forthright action. And few countries have been willing to share sensitive information or intelligence on terrorism to so broad a forum. There were numerous attempts over the years to engage the United Nations in a meaningful campaign against State supported and other terrorist activities. But, on each occasion, the issues were hijacked by the defenders of those groups engaging in terrorism. They were deemed “insurgent groups” or “freedom fighters” and defended on the basis that they were asserting, or fighting for, “self determination.” While the UN Security Council is well placed to design and impose sanctions, and can draw on necessary expertise for this purpose, it is not well placed to monitor actual implementation and enforcement of the sanctions.

*Extracted from “Failed Diplomacy, The United Nations and the War on Terrorism”, 2010.*

### Source E

No international criminal code, international police force capable of combating terrorism, or international court with jurisdiction over all acts of terrorism exists. Governments around the globe nonetheless engage in collaborative counterterrorism activities, primarily by passing laws against terrorism and entering into cooperative agreements with one another. The UN Charter governs the use of force between states, and since 1963, 14 conventions and treaties have been passed that outline the obligations of member states regarding terrorism. The UN has been criticized for being ineffective against terrorism. Member states have in the past argued about who are the aggressors and who are the victims. Many nations object when more powerful members of the United Nations try to impose their views of what constitutes terrorism.

*Sue Mahan, Pamela Griset, Terrorism in Perspective, 2013.*

Now answer the following question:

*“The efforts of the United Nations in combating terrorism have been insignificant”. How far do Sources A to E support the hypothesis?*

## Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 How far can it be argued that superpower actions from 1945 – 1949 were based on perceptions rather than reality?
- 3 “Credit for the ending of the Cold War should be given to the masses, not the leaders”. How valid is this statement?
- 4 To what extent can the economic turmoil experienced by the global economy from 1970 – 2000 be blamed on the USA?
- 5 How successful was the Japanese government in managing its economy from 1950 – 2000?
- 6 “The most severe consequence of the inability to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict up till 2000 was the Palestinian refugee crisis”. Discuss.

### Other Possible Questions

How far can it be argued that the Cold War broke out because the Soviet Union had imperialistic ambitions on Europe from 1945 – 1949?

*(A less fancier variation of the Korean War/Cuban Missile Crisis question):* How far did the superpowers benefit from their involvement in the Korean War and Cuban Missile Crisis?

How successful was the Japanese government in managing its economy from the 1960s – 2000?

Assess the reasons explaining the decline of the American economy from the late 1960s onwards.

### Other Possible Sources

Another African diplomat asks: "Yes, (Libyan leader Muammar) Qaddafi's actions are to be condemned by any standards, but what about the CIA mining Nicaragua's harbours? What is the difference between the explosion that killed American servicemen in Beirut and the one that killed Cuban servicemen in Huambo (Angola)? Are we to denounce terrorism selectively?"

Singapore's moderate UN delegate Tommy Koh says: "Basically, the UN is impotent with regard to terrorism because the nonaligned are split. A majority feels that a cause, no matter how sacred, does not justify any means and a minority feels that a cause, if sacred enough, justifies any means."

The Arab countries, in coordination with the communist governments and the non-aligned bloc, have been the loudspeaker for the terrorists, serving as intermediaries for the PLO regarding the right of self-determination but also endorsing the terrorist strategy as a legitimate tool in achieving it. This attitude has been strongly reflected by a reluctance to condemn Palestinian terrorism. In fact, lobbying efforts have diverted the discussions on terrorism towards perceiving the terrorists as the genuine victims of aggression rather than the true aggressors. Such lobbying has omitted the other inevitable angle, namely considering terrorism according to the laws of war.

*Extracted from an academic study on terrorism published in 1993.*

All of us at this conference have known the pain of terrorist acts against our families, our friends, our nations. The fight against terror and terrorism has gone on for years. Many brave men and women have worked to prevent terror, to find the terrorists, to break up their empire of fear. But more must be done. At the first-ever Summit of Security Council members, in 1992, and at the special commemorative session of the General Assembly, in 1995, heads of States agreed to act together to defeat terrorism. The nations of the world, by resolution of the General Assembly in 1994, adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, a concrete and comprehensive action plan. And terrorism has been condemned by the nations of the world last December, by the General Assembly. These

commitments are important, and they are global. But they are still only declarations. The task before us is to take this normative foundation as our platform for rapid and decisive action.

*Boutros Boutros-Ghali, speaking at Summit of Peacemakers, March 1996.*

The United States asked United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to go to Tehran to negotiate the hostages' release, or at least to determine whether there was a chance that negotiations could be opened. In the event, Ayatollah Khomeini refused to grant Waldheim an audience. Not only had Khomeini shown his disdain for the United Nations by refusing to meet with him, but twice the Secretary General believed his life was threatened by angry mobs. Prior to Waldheim's arrival into the country in December 1979, pictures had been published in the Iranian press showing him in conversation with the Shah. On his arrival he was forced to fight his way through numerous street demonstrations, and was denied the opportunity to speak with the hostages themselves. He returned to New York in a state of shock, stating on his arrival that he was 'glad to be back, especially alive'.

*David Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, 2001.*

It is important to promote participation of States in the existing anti-terrorism instruments, since many are far from being universal. [...]It should be noted that the existing multilateral conventions lack, in general, any institutional mechanisms for the review of their functioning or monitoring of compliance.

It should be recognized that the development of a common policy approach to the question of international terrorism by the General Assembly is necessarily a complex and arduous task. While the ideological and political differences within the international community on terrorism and how to approach it have narrowed, the issue is still extremely sensitive for many States.

*Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in an edited book published in 1998.*