


SE ASIA Question and Answer Booklet Year 6 Preliminary Examinations (2)



RIVER VALLEY HIGH SCHOOL
YEAR 6 Preliminary Examinations (2)
in preparation for General Certificate of Education Advanced Level
Higher 2

HISTORY

Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c 1900 – 2000

9731/02

24th September 2014
3 hours

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your index number and name on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work for each section securely.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

Section A

You must answer Question 1.

The ASEAN Way and Crisis management

- 1) Read the sources and answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

Amitav Acharya associates the “ASEAN Way” with “a high degree of discreteness, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles, which are often contrasted with the adversarial posturing and legalistic decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations.”

First, ASEAN cultivated a culture of “*musyawarah* and *mufakat*” (“consultation and consensus” in Indonesian). Second, ASEAN now organizes more than 1,000 meetings a year that touch on virtually every topic, from trade to tourism and from health to the environment. As a result, thousands of invisible formal networks have evolved in the region. Third, ASEAN embraced a policy of non-intervention. The West frowned on this and encouraged ASEAN states to criticize one another when their human-rights records slipped. Yet ASEAN countries wisely ignored this advice and assiduously avoided meddling in one another’s domestic affairs. The result has been peace.

From an article, “ASEAN: The Way Forward”, Kishore Mahbubani & Rhoda Severino 2014

Source B

For 32 years, ASEAN nations have boasted of a special spirit of harmony. It was "the ASEAN way" of doing things. In truth, "the ASEAN way" is a cover for inaction and ineffectiveness, for tolerating bad policy and worse politics. When a crisis strikes, whether it's the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, the trauma of the 2004 tsunami, or the permanent stain of the military dictatorship in Burma, ASEAN specialises in standing by uselessly. No matter the nature of the problem - economic, seismic or political - the "ASEAN way" is consistent in its utter failure to take effective action. Through the last two decades, ASEAN spins out a tropical cyclone of paper describing the alleged free trade zone it is creating, supposedly a precursor to a grand, seamless economic union in the model of the European Union. ASEAN's paralysis meant it was left to the International Monetary Fund to deal with the economic crisis. It was left to outside powers and charities to respond to the tsunami.

From an article published in an Australian online newspaper in November 2009.

Source C

“ASEAN not only led the diplomatic opposition to Vietnam’s moves in Cambodia; it also actively engaged, under Indonesia’s leadership, in the diplomacy that led to the political settlement of the conflict, including the “cocktail parties”, the Jakarta Informal Meetings, consultations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the Paris Conference on Cambodia. Helped by a growing rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow (as well as between Beijing and Washington) by reportedly, a Sino-Soviet deal specific to Cambodia, and finally by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the settlement, concluded in 1991, resulted in a Vietnamese disengagement from Cambodia; the reduction of the Khmer Rouge to an eventually failed insurgency; a constitution and UN-administered election; and a reasonably viable and independent Cambodia. It was the best outcome for Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia possible under the circumstances.”

Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community 2006.

Source D

Dr Mahathir said the referendum in which East Timorese chose independence was not fair because Indonesia was not given the opportunity to explain to the people why the territory should remain within the republic. He criticised the "rather heavy-handed" way Australian troops operated in East Timor. "We are not against the militias or the East Timorese," he said. "We want peace.". So did the people of East Timor.

But the militias opposing independence, who were trained, armed and supported by the Indonesian military, set about imposing a reign of terror aimed at blocking separation from Indonesia. If the multinational force led by Australia had not moved in, the toll of murder victims and burned villages would have continued to mount. Mr Ramos Horta's disregard for Asean is understandable. ASEAN leaders without exception forbore to condemn the rampaging militias for fear of angering a powerful neighbour. In these circumstances it is not surprising that he has decided that "the ASEAN Way" is not the way for East Timor.

From the South China Morning Post 1999.

Source E

The International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled in favour of Malaysia over the sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligitan, two small islands off the north-east coast of Borneo. Buoyed by that victory - which was bombastically spun as little short of a glorious diplomatic coup by the nation's ultra-loyal and nationalistic press - the premier has now turned his sights on other similar disputes.

The best-known quarrel involves the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, a small archipelago believed to have great oil and gas resources that is claimed by Malaysia, China, Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan and the Philippines. All the claimants except Brunei have troops stationed in the area, making it the region's most likely military flashpoint and thus a risky fight to pick, particularly as Beijing is involved. So Kuala Lumpur turned to a much softer target, Batu Puteh (White Rock), a speck on the map in the Singapore Straits that Singapore also claims - under the name Pedra Branca.

The Guardian Newspaper reporting on, “Gunboat Diplomacy in the Singapore Straits” 2003.

Now answer the following question:

How far do Sources A – E support the hypothesis that the ASEAN Way is an effective “method” for Crisis management in Southeast Asia?

Answer Scheme (SBQ)

How far do Sources A – E support the hypothesis that the ASEAN Way is an effective “method” for dispute management in Southeast Asia?

	“How far do Sources A – E support the hypothesis that the ASEAN Way is an effective “method” for crisis management in Southeast Asia?”	
	Grouping of Sources	Support Sources : A and B
		Challenge Sources: C,D,E
		Evaluation / Analysis
1	Source A	Support - ASEAN Way was Effective
	<p><i>From an article, “ASEAN: The way forward”</i></p> <p>Evaluation</p> <p>Use of CK</p>	<p>Source A supports the hypothesis and suggests that ASEAN Way has been an effective method in dispute management in Southeast Asia by highlighting the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Its conciliatory approach through consultations, discussions and consensual decision making had acted to unify the various member states within the region. Ultimately the ASEAN WAY was even able to “absorb” other states of different ideologies and economic systems (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam). Indeed the Indochina communist states were formerly regarded as enemies by the ASEAN bloc. It bears testimony to the versatility of the ASEAN WAY. In addition to this ASEAN had also enlarged its dialogue partners to include the major powers in the Asia-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, China, India) through the ASEAN + 3, and ASEAN + 6 frameworks – the ASEAN WAY therefore also involves the engagement of such powers and in recognising their role in ensuring peace and security in the region. Such networking eventually led to the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1993/1994 which has a membership of over 77 nation states. • While the ASEAN Way is based on being “non-binding” it nevertheless promotes cooperation (and concerns) by organising countless (more than a thousand) discussions and meeting covering a wide range of issues. These range from “trade to tourism and from health to environment). These meetings act as a form of preventive diplomacy, in that such informal settings act to crystallise each ASEAN states postures and position in issues. Some notable examples of such informal meetings leading to formal positions / Declarations includes the setting up of ASEAN Free Trade Area and lowering of CEPT, Informal Workshop on South China in 1991 leading to the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea and the 1997 regional haze action plan <p>Apart from seeking consensus and consultations, the ASEAN Way also embodies the principle of “non-intervention”. This is reflected in the Bangkok Declaration, in ZOFPAN and also in the Treaty of Amity & Cooperation and cross referenced to in Sources C (Cambodia) and Source D (East Timor / Indonesia).</p>
2	Source C	Use of Cross References
	<i>Former ASEAN Secretary-General</i>	Support - ASEAN Way was Effective

	<p><i>Rodolfo Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community 2006</i></p> <p>Balance</p>	<p>Source C supports the hypothesis that the ASEAN Way was effective in crisis / dispute management in 2 ways. Based on contextual knowledge, while there was initial differences to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN “unified” its stand based on 2 key features of the ASEAN WAY:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-intervention in the internal affairs of states • and its abhorrence to the use of force as a means for conflict resolution. <p>Vietnam was essentially intervening in the internal affairs of Cambodia and instead of seeking a negotiated settlement used armed invasion to occupy the country. As such ASEAN used the UN and diplomatic exchanges (through consultations / discussions) in convincing other states that the Vietnamese occupation and thereafter installed governments were illegitimate.</p> <p>ASEAN took the lead in mobilising International opinion and also used the ASEAN WAY in the discussions, dialogues as a means in resolving the Cambodian conflict. This included actions such as hosting “cocktail parties”, to the “Jakarta Informal Meetings” which involved all Cambodian factions to engaging the members of the Security Council and other stake holders. This suggests that ASEAN Way helped to resolve the Cambodian conflict and paved the way for an independent Cambodia.</p> <p><u>Counterpoint/contrast</u> (ASEAN Way was effective but.....) / limitations of the Source</p> <p>While Source C credits ASEAN & the ASEAN Way of playing an important role, it also suggests that there were other reasons for the end of the Cambodian conflict. This include the “thaw” in relationship between the superpowers and China (USSR, USA, China), a purported Soviet-China deal to end the conflict in Cambodia, and the collapse of the USSR. This seems to suggest that the ASEAN Way may not have been the only reason for the success of the Cambodian case. Based on contextual knowledge, there was no real breakthrough from 1979-1987 insofar as Cambodia was concerned. It was only after Gorbachev renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine, the ending of Soviet patronage to Vietnam that progress was seen in the case of Cambodia. As such, this contextual knowledge seems to undermine the role of the ASEAN Way.</p>
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3	Source B	Challenge / ASEAN Way was ineffective
	<p data-bbox="145 197 493 376"><i>From an article published in an Australian newspaper online in November 2009.</i></p> <p data-bbox="145 488 311 519">Evaluation</p> <p data-bbox="145 1003 272 1034">Balance</p>	<p data-bbox="517 159 1495 728">Source B challenges the hypothesis in suggesting that the ASEAN Way is nothing more than a “cover for inaction and ineffectiveness”. It is similar to the argument that the ASEAN Way is nothing more than a “talk-shop” method which focuses on form than substance. The source suggests this is by claiming that while there are “cyclones of paper” generated about aspirations / declarations there has been very little tangible results. One example cited is ASEAN’s aim of forming an economic “union” through the ASEAN Free Trade Area which it declared in 1992. The source argues that even after 17 years this has remained a mere illusion. Another notable event which demonstrates ASEAN inability to act collectively is the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98). Such is the weakness of the ASEAN Way and ASEAN integration as a regional grouping. Other examples of the slowness of the ASEAN Way cited included the lack of response to the human tragedy which followed the Asian Tsunami (2004) in terms of disaster response and relief operations, and the indecisiveness in condemning the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Burmese military junta.</p> <p data-bbox="517 763 1495 929">Source B even condemns the ASEAN and the ASEAN Way of standing by uselessly in all of these crises which were handled by external powers and organisations such as the United Nations & NGO’s (Tsunami / Burma), and the International Monetary Fund (Asian Financial Crisis 1997/98).</p> <p data-bbox="517 996 1495 1064">Counterpoint/contrast (ASEAN Way was ineffective but.....) / limitations of the Source</p> <p data-bbox="517 1099 1495 1368">While the source does give evidence that the ASEAN Way was ineffective, it fails to consider that the ASEAN Way is slow by virtue of its consensual seeking and consultation driven manner. By its scale and magnitude the 2004 Asian Tsunami was unprecedented and unexpected. In addition to this, not just ASEAN but even the UN had any contingencies to deal with the disaster. However, after the 2004 Tsunami, ASEAN quickly set up a disaster response and relief framework. This proves the effectiveness of the ASEAN Way.</p> <p data-bbox="517 1404 1495 2004">While it was true that ASEAN failed to come up with a collective decision in stemming the financial crisis it was still an unprecedented event in Southeast Asian history – given that ASEAN had never encountered such a crisis before. It occurred rapidly and spread as a “contagion” to the other ASEAN economies. It has now been widely accepted that the flight of capital was fuelled more by speculation than reason. In any case, the ASEAN Way also recognised the “primacy of national self-interests over common ASEAN interests – indeed during the Cambodian crisis both Thailand and the Philippines aligned themselves to the US in order to safeguard their defensive needs. Likewise during the AFC, most ASEAN states could not help in bailing out or shoring up each other given that nearly all their reserves were used to defend the value of their own currencies. Insofar as Burma is concerned the ASEAN Way has allowed for less isolation of the junta, led to opening up of the country and even democratic reforms within the country – all these prove that the source is biased and does not consider the extent to which the ASEAN Way had proven itself to be an effective method of managing crisis in Southeast Asia.</p>

Sipadan/Litigan disputes” officially” occurred in 1979 because Malaysia published maps indicating that these islands fell under its jurisdiction.

Contextual Knowledge

Sipadan and Litigan: Since 1968, Indonesia had tried to negotiate a settlement and reclaim the territory by referring to treaties signed between the British and the Dutch. It had however, in the interest of “peace”, recognised the status quo and sought consensus/ consultations in the “spirit of ASEAN Way”. While Indonesia waited Malaysia had extended its sovereignty by building infrastructures and developing the islands – it was this exercise of territorial jurisdiction which influenced the ICJ in awarding the islands to Malaysia. In a sense, Indonesia was penalised for following the “ASEAN Way”.

Pedra Branca / Batu Puteh: While maps before 1979 had clearly shown Pedra Branca as being part of Singapore, Malaysia tried to change the status quo by claiming that it was part of the Johor Sultanate. Eventually, ICJ awarded the main island of Pedra Branca to Singapore on the basis that Singapore had exercised control and jurisdiction of the islands since 1965. Singapore nevertheless did loose territory when the ICJ awarded Middle Rocks to Malaysia with the status of Southern Ledge being undecided. Malaysia claim especially in the case of Pedra Branca went against the ASEAN Way of respecting each other’s territorial sovereignty. Based on contextual knowledge it has been suggested that Malaysia had moved to claim these islands in anticipation of UNCLOS and wanted to claim a larger Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) including access to the oil rich Ambalat near Sipadan and Litigan.

Spratley Islands: The overlapping claims of ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Philippines) were due to the declaration of their respective Economic Exclusive Zones with the aim of exploiting the rich natural gas deposits and fishing grounds of the South China Sea. While the Manila Declaration (1992) is in line with the ASEAN Way it has not progressed beyond rhetoric. While the façade of unity was maintained, ASEAN states such as Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines had maintained armed troops in the area to protect their interests. This also seems to suggest that such ASEAN unity/consensus was more due to the common threat posed by China in the South China Sea. The Manila Declaration was too “open ended” and more an expression of intent than concrete action plan to solve hostilities. The “uselessness” of the Declaration was obvious when China seized both the Mischief and Scarborough Reef from the Philippines. A signatory of TAC and the Manila Declaration (both of which disavowed the use of force) the Philippines effectively lost control of these areas. While ASEAN protested China refused to negotiate or rescind its claims over the entire South China Sea. Source E therefore substantiates Source B which accuses ASEAN of standing by uselessly.

Note: Although TAC, had crisis management framework in the form of the “High Council”, none of the ASEAN states had referred to it for arbitration. They opted for mediation by the UN (ICJ) for crisis resolution. This seem to suggest the weakness of the ASEAN Way given that “no” crisis / disputes have ever been referred to the High Council level. It also seem to substantiate Source B which suggests that ASEAN depended on external assistance in managing crises (such as the Asian Tsunami, Asian Financial Crisis and other territorial disputes)

	Balance	<p><u>Counterpoint/contrast</u> (ASEAN Way was ineffective but.....) / limitations of the Source</p> <p>The ASEAN Way did prevail in both cases (Sipadan/Litigan and Pedra Branca) since there was extensive negotiations and discussions by the various parties in an effort to settle these disputes peacefully. After failing to come to an agreement, these disputes were mutually forwarded to the UN (ICJ) for arbitration. Insofar as the Manila Declaration is concerned it served within a year (1991-1992) unify competing ASEAN states into a unified force in confronting Chinese expansionism. ASEAN was able to unify all its member states in adopting a common position on the South China Sea claims . Although only 4 countries had territorial claims (Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines), ASEAN's 10 member grouping was able to act as a counter weight / counterbalance against China size. It also acted as a political balance against China military might – in canvassing for and trying to mobilise international support against Chinese aggression.</p> <p>(2) This sense of the “ASEAN Way” was successful since it had encouraged / forced China’s participation in a dialogue with ASEAN especially when there was a dispute over Mischief Reef. China. This suggests that there is strength I ASEAN Unity and that China is not dealing merely with small states but a regional grouping (offset China’s size and military strength).This shows the success of the ASEAN Way as a success for crisis management.</p> <p>The source also inaccurately portrays Dr Mahathir as calculating “expansionist” desiring to expand Malaysian territory at the expense of his ASEAN neighbours. The Source is biased given that both disputes were referred collectively for arbitration by the states involved.</p>
	Conclusion	<p>More Sources challenge the hypothesis than support it Hypothesis could be changed to ASEAN Way and dispute / conflict resolution?</p>

Revision notes for “A “levels/ Summary of Case Studies

1. ASEAN WAY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT (Cambodia) (point form)

Consensus / Dialogues / Processes	Use of Contextual Knowledge	How did the ASEAN WAY help with crisis / conflict management & end the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (?)
<p>ASEAN “took the lead” and adopted the following strategies undertaken to end the Cambodian conflict via:</p> <p>1. ASEAN kept the issue in worldview from 1979 -1991 by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Canvassing Diplomatic Support Overseas : UNSC, Paris Peace Conference through to UN administered elections - Started the Jakarta <i>Informal Meetings</i> (JIM) which provided the platform for various contending factions and Vietnamese backed government to meet and have dialogue. Non-binding nature of meetings encouraged participation among the various factions 	<p>While the ASEAN role was important external factors such as the “thawing of relationships” between China, USSR and USA also played a critical role.</p> <p>Role of the Soviet Union such as end of Soviet financial support for Vietnam, Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Afghanistan & the Collapse & end of the Cold War (1989 -1991)</p> <p>Improvements in ties between USSR, China & US aided in the final resolution of the issue.</p>	<p>The common denominator which kept ASEAN together was the threat of Vietnamese Communism</p> <p>ASEAN was not neutral as it sought to be under US security umbrella (Thailand, Singapore, and Philippines), allowed US to open, use facilities in an effort to ensure & support US anti-communist efforts. Other defense arrangements include SEATO, Five Power Defense Agreement & ANZUS.</p> <p>Fuelled the arms race by channeling Chinese and American weaponry through Thailand and Laos for various Cambodian factions. (contrary to concept of non-intervention / neutrality.(ZOPFAN)</p>
<p>Criticism: Self-serving & a propaganda coup</p> <p>1. Acted as “glue” ASEAN solidarity & projected ASEAN into International limelight.</p> <p>2. ASEAN acted only as a response to the common threat posed by Vietnamese communist expansionism.</p>	<p>Criticism of the ASEAN Way; Human Cost of the ASEAN WAY??</p> <p>1975-1979 : Pol Pot Regime was 2.5 million deaths due to systematic torture and executions</p> <p>1979 – 1991: 1.5 million people due to famine, armed conflicts between Vietnamese and various Cambodian factions. 500,000 Cambodians were displaced as a result of the conflict.</p>	<p>ASEAN was internally weak and could not act as united front against the invasion. It was weak because ASEAN was unable to realize its vision of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Internally, ASEAN was also unable to provide military assistance for member states such as Thailand .or act as a deterrent against Soviet backed Vietnamese aggression. This inability resulted in undermining ASEAN’s ZOPFAN idea as threatened states such as Thailand turned to the PRC and USA for assistance, thereby enlarging Cold War conflict in Southeast Asia.</p>

2. ASEAN WAY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT (East Timor)

Consensus / Dialogues / Processes	Use of Contextual Knowledge	How did the <u>ASEAN WAY</u> function during the East Timor Crisis
<p>During the 1975, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting the bloc accepted Indonesia position on East Timor.</p> <p>From 1975 – 1999, issued was only raised at the UN and ARF without any progress.</p> <p>The 1999 Referendum (ASEAN actions).</p> <p>At the ASEAN Summit in 2000, a loosely worded communique was issued expressing support for Indonesia's territory and boundaries. It did not specifically recognise East Timor's independence and/or sovereignty.</p> <p>+ASEAN was unable to take its own action as it was bound by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member state</p>	<p>1975 The UN had condemned Indonesian invasion of East Timor. ASEAN (Philippines and Malaysia) accepted the status quo for fear that Indonesian would withdraw from the organisation. Singapore and Brunei did not voice opposition or condemn Indonesia.</p> <p>Accepted occupation given that Indonesian control would eliminate East Timor from "falling" into the communist hands. There was already increased fear over the threat already posed in Indochina by the communists.</p> <p>1999 UN Referendum: On August 30, 1999, an estimated 98.6% of the registered voters in East Timor went to the polls to vote on independence. The independence vote had carried by 78.5% of the population.</p> <p>Supported by Indonesian Armed Forces, pro-Indonesian paramilitaries conducted armed operations across the countryside, killing an estimated 1,400 individuals, forcibly displacing some 200,000 people into detention camps in Indonesian West Timor. Order was restored only with the arrival of UN Peacekeeping forces led by Australia.</p>	<p>1975 Prevented the real possibility of ASEAN splintering / breaking up.</p> <p>Even as late as 1996, ASEAN issued a statement at the ARF that it supported Indonesia's position on East Timor.</p> <p>2000-2003: Although ASEAN states) Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) did not want to offend Indonesia, they nevertheless contributed to peace building efforts under the United Nations.</p> <p>ASEAN - and, indeed, UN - actions had to be carried out with Indonesia's consent. In this case, ASEAN members, including Indonesia, undertook consultations, arrived at consensus, and let individual members decide what specific contributions to make to the UN effort. All of these attributes of the ASEAN Way.</p> <p>Indeed after 2003, this need for unanimity and acceptance (particularly by Indonesia) has been a main obstacle in accepting East Timor as an ASEAN member.</p>
<p>Human cost of the ASEAN WAY? : From 1975-1999 some 200,000 East Timorese were killed by Indonesian occupation forces who used starvation and sexual violence alongside chemical weapons and napalm. In 1999, a long-awaited independence referendum brought renewed violence, as Indonesian military and paramilitary reprisals killed over 2,000 East Timorese and decimated 75% of the country's infrastructure. Some 240,000 persons - one third of the population - fled their homes and were forcibly relocated to the Indonesian province of West Timor</p>		

3. ASEAN WAY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT (Pedra Branca / Sipadan & Litigan)

Pedra Branca

The Pedra Branca dispute [2008] ICJ was a territorial dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over several islets at the eastern entrance to the Singapore Strait, namely Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge. The dispute began in 1979 and was largely resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2008, which opined that Pedra Branca belonged to Singapore and Middle Rocks belonged to Malaysia.

Basis of ICJ Judgement:

The ICJ held that although Pedra Branca had originally been under the sovereignty of Johor, the conduct of Singapore and its predecessors (with the title of a sovereign) and the failure of Malaysia and its predecessors to respond to such conduct showed that by 1980, when the dispute between the parties arose, sovereignty over the island had passed to Singapore. The relevant conduct on the part of Singapore and its predecessors included investigating marine accidents in the vicinity of the island, planning land reclamation works, installing naval communications equipment, and requiring Malaysian officials wishing to visit the island to obtain permits.

In contrast, Johor and its successors had taken no action with respect to the island from June 1850 for a century or more. In 1953 the Acting Secretary of the State of Johor had stated that Johor did not claim ownership of Pedra Branca. All visits made to the island had been with Singapore's express permission, and maps published by Malaysia in the 1960s and 1970s indicated that it recognized Singapore's sovereignty over Pedra Branca.

Consensus / Dialogues / Processes	Use of Contextual Knowledge	How did the <u>ASEAN WAY</u> managed Pedra Branca crisis / dispute)
From 1979 – 2003, Malaysia and Singapore held at least 8 discussions over the disputes but failed to find a solution.	<p>Until 1979, even Malaysian maps reflected that the island was under Singapore's jurisdiction. So this was a "new claim" made by Malaysia.</p> <p><u>Singapore's Stand:</u> The island was uninhabited until the British decided to build the Horsburgh lighthouse. In 1954, Johor Menteri Besar wrote a correspondence stating that Johor did not exercise ownership over the island. Even Malaysian maps from 1962-1975 reflected the islands as belonging to Singapore. Malaysia also sought permission whenever entering the area around the island and also when it laid a cable in the 1980's.</p> <p><u>Malaysia's stand:</u> The islands are historically part of the Johor Sultanate and the British were "lighthouse operators" and did not own the deed to Pedra Branca.</p>	<p>Both sides referred the matter to ICJ in 2003 and exercised caution and avoided any armed incident over the island.</p> <p>Both Malaysia and Singapore cooperated in other ASEAN efforts such as combatting Trans-boundary Haze, South China Sea disputes and the setting up of the ASEAN Regional Forum.</p>

Sipadan & Litigan

The dispute originated in 1969 when the two countries negotiated to delimit the common border of their continental shelf. But both countries could not agree on the sovereignty of the two islands. Indonesia claimed that the islands were theirs by virtue of the fact that they were located south of 4° 10" North which it said formed the maritime border between it and Malaysia. The claim was confirmed through its map which it published in 1979. Indonesia protested the delimitation on the map. The dispute was brought before the International Court of Justice and

Basis of ICJ Judgement

The ICJ awarded Malaysia sovereignty over the 2 islands given that it has effectively administered the islands since at least 1917 as the North Borneo authorities had passed laws regulating the control and collection on both these islands. This Turtle Preservation Ordinance of 1917 was applied at least until the 1950s at least in the area of the two disputed islands. In addition to this the authorities in British North Borneo constructed a lighthouse on Sipadan in 1962 and another on Litigan in 1963. These lighthouses exist to this day and that have been maintained by Malaysian authorities since its independence. The ICJ Court noted that "the activities relied upon by Malaysia . . . are modest in number but . . . they are diverse in character and include legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial acts and cover a considerable period of time. This shows an exercise of by Malaysia.". The Court further stated that "at the time when these activities were carried out, neither Indonesia nor its predecessor, the Netherlands, ever expressed its disagreement or protest". Given all these circumstances, the ICJ on 17 December 2002, decided that sovereignty of Sipadan and Litigan belonged to Malaysia.

Consensus / Dialogues / Processes	Use of Contextual Knowledge	How did the <u>ASEAN WAY</u> manage the Sipadan & Litigan crisis / dispute)
From 1989 – 1992, officials had met in an effort to resolve the crisis – but failed. In 1992, Suharto and Mahathir agreed in principle to refer the matter to the ICJ.	-	Both Mahathir and Suharto met and agreed to refer the matter to the ICJ for arbitration.

3. ASEAN WAY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT (Spratley Islands / South China Sea)

Consensus / Dialogues / Processes	Use of Contextual Knowledge	How did the ASEAN WAY function in managing the Spratley Islands crisis / dispute
Informal Workshops including the 1991 South China Sea Workshop which led to the Manila Declaration of 1992, Exemplifies ASEAN's effectiveness in unifying its member states and in presenting a consolidated position especially echoing the norms espoused in the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN & TAC. The 1992 "Declaration on the South China Sea" expressed	Examples: "positive" results of ASEAN's consensus seeking / collective action. 1. In 1995, when the Chinese occupied Mischief Reef (claimed by the Philippines), ASEAN collectively protested this action but instead of "breaking off" diplomatic communication, advocated the need for restraint based on the 1992 Manila Declaration. It demonstrates ASEAN's adherence to its basic	The ASEAN WAY as embodied in the Declaration of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the TAC acted to exert "influence" on the claimants to moderate their behavior, refrain from resorting to the military option, seek co-operative modes of conduct and explore peaceful resolution of disputes. ASEAN had proactively formed

<p>ASEAN's first common position on the South China Sea, and the attempt to promulgate an informal code of conduct based on self-restraint, the non-use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes.</p> <p>The formation of ARF in 1992/1993 also added another security layer for discussions about regional security. ARF was based on idea of collective security and allowed for more countries to express their opinions and concerns over security issues ranging from North Korea's proliferation of nuclear weapons to ASEAN worry over the South China Sea issue.</p> <p>In 2002, ASEAN and China agreed on a non-binding declaration, when they became a party to the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea"(DOC) intended to prevent further tension and reduce the risk of military conflict in the SCS. It urged the relevant parties to settle the South China Sea issue peacefully.</p>	<p>principles of dialogue and consultations.</p> <p>2. In 1997, China had placed an oil rig in territorial waters claimed by Vietnam. In response to this action, ASEAN ministers drew up a joint resolution without supporting the individual territorial claims of ASEAN states. They presented a unified position supporting Vietnam's claim.</p> <p>The DOC reflected that China adapted to the non-binding consensual style of the ASEAN and its evolving policy of good neighborliness. Since the ASEAN's main purpose has always been conflict prevention the signing of the DOC was a step forward in reducing tension in the region, and avoiding conflict by means of confidence building activities between ASEAN and China.</p>	<p>the <u>ASEAN Regional Forum</u> as an avenue for Asia Pacific nations to express concerns over security issues in the region. Through this forum ASEAN was able to harness "international" opinion and hoped to influence the actions of states like China and North Korea. The sideline of the ARF was also used by states to informally discuss other disputes / concerns which might arise. (ZOFPAN)</p> <p>The South China Sea disputes have since then become part of the agenda of annual ASEAN-China meetings, involving all the ASEAN countries and not just the claimants. This again marked an ASEAN consensus to act collectively.</p> <p>The fact that all the ASEAN states-rather than just SCS claimants are party to DOC is a reiteration of the high degree of cohesion and the ASEAN effort to unite and agree on common norms for dispute resolution in a characteristic ASEAN way.</p>
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Weaknesses / Limitations of the ASEAN Way

1. ASEAN's consensus decision making process limits the scope of cooperation especially if there are differing opinions.
2. ASEAN's principle of non-interference hinders cooperation with states outside ASEAN. For example Indonesia's policies in East Timor was criticised by the West but ASEAN member states were noticeably silent.
3. Consensus and deliberation does not assist in lessening the suffering of affected populations (Cambodia, East Timor)

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 “Western colonialism was largely responsible for the development of Southeast Asian nationalism prior to World War Two”. Assess the validity of this statement.
- 3 “Southeast Asian nationalism was undermined due to the disunited and diverse responses of pre-war nationalist groups”. How far do you agree with this statement for the period 1900 to 1940?
- 4 “Democratic government is not suited to Southeast Asia”. Discuss with reference to newly independent states of Southeast Asia.
- 5 Assess the impact of Communism on the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia from 1945 - 1975?
- 6 “More than colonial powers, independent states were responsible for problems of ethnic separatism and racial discord in Southeast Asia from 1945-2000”. Assess the validity of this statement?

Emmanuel Devadas Prelim (2) 2014

2. “Western colonialism was largely responsible for the development of Southeast Asian nationalism prior to World War Two”. Assess the validity of this statement.

Objectives & Requirements:

- To check student understanding of the concept and impact colonialism on Southeast Asia.
- To check on the individual students ability to do the following:
 - General knowledge of concept of Colonialism and its effects which led to the growth and development of “Nationalism”.
- Students would be able to provide an understanding / definition for the term “colonialism” & its relationship to the development of nationalism in Southeast Asia.
- Demonstrate clearly “how” the effects of Colonialism (political, social, and economic) led to “nationalism.
- Show how it was a “response” to effects and/or show an alternate point of view

Outline (content) / Perspectives

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempt to define / describe key terms Colonialism & Nationalism • Adopt a position & substantiate points of view 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control of territory, people by another often alien / group (Dutch, French, England etc.) • “Nationalism ”as creating a sense of identity based on ethnicity, race, language, religion, and/or shared experience • To achieve sovereignty, independence from a colonial power
Political, Social, Economic effects leading to the rise of nationalism in Southeast Asia	
<p><u>Political :</u> Response to :</p> <p>(1) Destruction of traditional forms of political organisations (monarchy / religion & customs)</p> <p>(2) Excluding local elites in “sharing power & Evolution of political governments based on colonial legacy (Direct & Indirect Rule)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resident System & development of bureaucracies - Alteration in the distribution of power <p>Burma Village Act 1889 – appointed headmen known as Myooks replacing the thugyis.</p> <p>Dutch had village regulation act 1909. French centralized functions through specialized agencies (Postal, Customs,</p>	<p><u>Examples:</u></p> <p>(1) Loss of political authority by the removal of Monarch and position to Religion. The earliest movements aimed to restore the monarchy and position of traditional religion such as:</p> <p>Burma Power of monarch was undermines after the Anglo Burmese Wars and monarchy was abolished in 1885 & Buddhist Sangha lost its authority. British official disrespected Buddhism (wearing of shoes into pagodas)</p> <p>Vietnam Emperor system was abolished and increased evangelism by Roman Catholic missionaries’ undermined syncretic Buddhist-Taoist-Ancestor worship based religion. The French replaced traditional Confucian based mandarin system with a French Civil Service and Resident System. French officials ran the bureaucracy at all levels.</p>

<p>forestry, Commerce)</p> <p>These Specialized agencies develop to become bureaucracies through which Western Colonial powers organize their systems of administration.</p>	<p>Malaya While they retained the Sultans, a Resident System was set up to ensure that political power was vested in the hands of the British. The Malay Chiefs lost their traditional roles in Malay society.</p> <p><u>“Nationalist movements”</u> Movement centered around the restoration of the Monarchy , Religion : Shoe Controversy, Saya San (Burma), Can Vuong Movement, Cao Dai (Vietnam) Marked the beginnings of anti-colonial movements which sought to overthrow colonial powers & restore monarchy & religion <u>but</u> Western education had a greater impact on the development of Nationalism</p>
<p>Territorial boundaries as demarcations of colonial possessions / denoting “borders”.</p>	<p>These demarcations later became political boundaries within which nationalist try to establish independent states.</p>
<p>Social effects and development of Nationalism</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Western Education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideas • Education (introduction & spread) • Leadership (political elites) • Print media 2. Rise of Urbanisation 3. Development of Printing press 	<p>Spread of ideas such as “equality, liberty, democracy, nationalism, and communism”. These “foreign” ideas formed the basis of modern nationalist movements which sought political participation, autonomy and eventual self-government.</p> <p>Modern concepts such as nationalism, “nation-state, communism led to rise of ideological movements such as: Indonesia : - The Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI) - Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI) Vietnam: VQNDD (Vietnamese Kuomintang) Indo-China Communist Party (ICP)</p> <p>Spread of Western education: although it was limited (Vietnam/Burma) or targeted (Malaya – elites and aristocrats) & focused on creating a clerical class it had major impact on nationalism</p> <p>Leadership: All of the nationalist leaders were Western Educated : Sukarno (Indonesia), Aung San(Burma) , Ho Chih Minh (Vietnam), Rizal (Philippines), Dato On Jaafar, Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaya)</p> <p>Creation of educated middle class: Although colonial powers wanted to create a compliant middle class, it was this class which felt more enfranchisement and unhappy over lack of opportunities for advancement in Civil Service which was dominated by colonialists.</p> <p>Rise in urbanisation & cities in Southeast Asia (these were the centres of commerce /political / education / industrial centres). Urban centres with ports, Universities, became locus point for spread of ideas, mass mobilisation etc.</p> <p>Development of print media: western colonialism saw the rapid development of print media and this became a common media through which nationalist ideas were spread.</p> <p>For purposes of administration a standardised form of language</p>

<p>Development of infrastructure / Communications and its effect on Nationalism</p> <p>There was development in communications and transport in order to extent colonial control and commerce. (Roads/ Rail /port facilities/telegraph etc.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spread ideas and successful nationalist movements 	<p>Such development had a positive effect on the growth of nationalism as they also became conduits for ideas, propaganda and print media to affect the urban as well as the rural masses.</p> <p>This is particularly so with regards to successful nationalist movements in other parts of the world. This includes the 1905 - Russo-Japanese war, 1911 - Sun Yat Sen's revolution, 1917 - Bolshevik Revolution. Woodrow Wilson's 14 points which advocated self-determination for nation.</p>
<p>Conclusion:</p>	<p>Based on Students stand and substantiation</p>

3. "Southeast Asian nationalism was undermined due to the disunited and diverse responses of pre-war nationalist groups". How far do you agree with this statement for the period 1900 to 1940?

Objectives & Requirements:

- To check the students understanding about Pre-war nationalist movements, their weaknesses, successes and limitations.
- Students should be able to ascertain how "disunity" (leadership, organisations & objectives) and "diverse responses" to colonialism undermined the growth and development of Southeast Asian Nationalism
- Students should be able to identify other factors which clearly lead to the failure of these pre-war nationalist movements (Colonial response in the form of armed suppression, the lack of mass mobilisation, elitism, elitism and even geographical limitations) amongst others.

Key Terms:

"Disunity and Diverse responses": fragmentation, infighting, differing aims and agendas, strategies, nature of response towards colonialism, ideologies etc

"Undermined their success": in the sense that it hindered the path to restoring the traditional order (restoring the monarchy / position of religion) and /or independence.

Approach:

- The diverse responses of nationalist groups largely undermined their success due to their inability to form a cohesive blueprint and strategy in response to colonial rule and their inability to garner widespread mass support. It also allowed the colonial masters to crush them easily.
- However, it is also necessary to consider the strength of colonial rule and response in limiting the achievements of nationalist movements. Next, other weaknesses such as elitism and inherent geographical limitations similarly undermined their success.
- Finally, it is also possible to see the diversity of responses in a positive light and as the foundation for the success of future nationalist movements occurring after the Second World War.

1. Diverse responses: difference in goals, aspirations and objectives

There were generally four categories of movements during this period:

- Restore the Monarchy/ Role of Religion (**Traditional**)
- Reformist groups / social causes – education / uplift status of women etc) (**Moderate**)
- Revolutionary (Ideological movements based on Nationalism and Communism) (**Radical**) /
- **Modern movements** (sought to overthrow colonial rule but willing to wait for opportune time to achieve objectives)

- a. **Traditional (Aims** - Backward-looking. No concept of nationhood (no political element, anti-colonial in nature).
- b. **Moderate (Aims** – Gradual change, little or no force involved, rejection of violence, seeking a middle way between nationalist aims and Western desires
- c. **Radical (Aims** – involves the use of force and wants immediate achievement of objectives)
- d. **Modern (Aims** – Forward looking, overthrow existing colonial administrations and clear idea of nationhood)

From 1900 – 1940, Pre-War nationalist movements were disunited, had diverse objectives and did not have a common platform to unify against the colonial powers.(see tables for various movements according to category)

Traditional Movements

Return to Centrality of Culture to their Societies

Initial nationalist efforts (peasant nationalism), despite stemming from socio-economic alienation, were largely **cultural religious / ethnic-economic** and aimed to return to the centrality of culture to their societies.

□ Burma: Pongyis focused on bread and butter issues; and fanned the anti-Indian sentiments.

□ Vietnam: Can Vuong movement; “Aid the King” movement.

□ Initially Burma; YMBA wanted to return to the roots of Buddhism.

Economic nationalism aimed to defend the rights of the native community, against the immigrants (who filled up positions in the civil service, took up jobs, and dominated the commerce sector).

□ Economic disparities arising out of the penetration of capitalism (land alienation, tax rates) had contributed to ethnic tensions.

□ Malaya; Malay aristocrats were primarily interested in progress of the indigenous race and they made demands for the Malay race; asked for more privileges, increased employment in government, and for preferential treatment; against the Chinese commercial dominance.

□ Indonesia; Sarekat Islam had its beginnings as an Islamic Traders Association, which was set up in response to Chinese commercial competition/success and was committed to the progress of indigenous merchants (anti-Chinese element); they had organised a boycott against the Chinese in 1912 and aimed to promote a commercial spirit among the people and serve their spiritual and economic needs.

Moderate Movements	
Concerned with Flaws within, rather than Flaws with the System they were run by.	<p>They aimed to reform the administrative and economic system established by the colonial powers by reforming it to suit the interests.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Often they did not seek immediate independence but more of limited self-rule (control over internal affairs) through gradual constitutional means, cooperating with the colonial regimes and gaining concessions which would give them more say in the system. □ Self-strengthening movements did not seek to undermine colonial rule in the first place; they hardly doubted colonial authority. □ They posed little threat to colonial rule, while disunity eventually exacerbated their ineffectiveness, □ Philippines: US benevolence and personality politics between Quezon and Osmena (nationalists turned politicians turned presidents) instead of pressing for further colonial concessions. □ Malaya: British indirect rule and immigrant population led to the ethnic economic brand of nationalist and lack of anti-colonial pressure. □ Vietnam: Phan Chu Trinh was a pro-monarchy moderate who believed in merging elements of French and Vietnamese monarchies through negotiation. He represented the interests of the few who believed in the benevolence of French rule. □ Burma: GCBA was divided over members who wanted to collaborate and take part in the Diarchy elections and those who opposed it altogether. <p>Early moderate nationalists found no qualms with the colonial system and instead, wanted to reform their inherent societal flaws.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Indonesia: Muhammadiyah sought to reform Islam. It criticised the heterodox (dissident) religious practices in the country (wanted to get rid of Indonesian and Indian influences on Islam) and sought to apply reason to the Koran so as to deal with contemporary issues. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Modernist movement sought to reform traditional Islam, purify and standardise the religion to remove centuries of superstition, ignorance and decline and combine it with modern, Western learning. o Reform Islam movement (modernisation). □ Indonesia: Budi Utomo was founded to promote social reform to restore Javanese culture and values. It rarely played an active political role as the <i>priyayi</i> leaders of the organization were too concerned with their own careers and divided to forge Budi Utomo into a dynamic party. □ Thailand: King Vajiravudh was a cultural nationalist – celebrate past achievements in Thai culture and wanted to preserve culture as it was in the past (literary culture); through the use of language.

Radical Movements	
Continued Violence and Tensions	<p>Radical anti-colonial nationalists led to the emergence of anti-colonial sentiments and dissatisfaction with the colonial rule, challenging the colonial values of native subordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Burma: The Saya San movement awakened public opinion/stimulated Nationalist sentiment when the rebellion failed as it set an example of sacrifice and anti-colonial zeal that few could ignore. The Saya San rebels rejected modernisation brought about by British rule and sought to return to pre-colonial Burmese values and religion. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Drew attention to the economic-religious dislocation of natives □ Vietnam: The Can Vuong (aid the king) movement aimed to “exterminate the religion [Catholicism] and drive out the French”, an edict issued by provincial leaders Phan Dinh Phung & Hoang Hoa Tham. The movement was fighting the French in the name of the Confucian tradition and the monarchy. The French eventually suppressed them.

	<p>They were unanimous in their condemnation of the ill-effects colonialism and aimed to completely eradicate it.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ These nationalists, unlike the moderate and cultural-religious movements, had very clear political goals (non-compromise with the colonial regimes and demand for outright, immediate independence). Because of their nature, they often functioned underground. □ Indonesia: PKI started revolts (1926 revolt very bloody.) in which the government clamped down on. 13,000 people were arrested, 4,500 imprisoned, 1,308 interned, and 823 exiled; PKI was banned in 1927. □ Vietnam: VNQDD, focused primarily on revolution and overthrow of the French; relied on traditional methods of rebellion- assassination of French officials and subversion of Vietnamese garrison forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o 1929, French crackdown after assassination of a French official. □ 1930 (Yen Bai Rebellion), premature rebellion, eventually suppressed. <p>The nationalists did not support the moderate stance of collaboration. Such movements were usually successful only when they attracted mass support and possessed clarity of vision.</p> <p>Burma: Thakins.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ University of Rangoon strike 1936. □ Disrupted exams, spread to 32 secondary schools and supported by pongyis and peasants, as well as politicians. □ Revolutionary; all movements after this adopted a more confrontational approach towards the British. This had appeared unlikely after the suppression of the Saya San Rebellion. □ Good to compare with Saya San (how in the same country and within the same radicalism, radical nationalists differed in terms of succeeding in achieving their goals). <p>Malaysia: KMM (Kesatuan Melayu Muda).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Adopted policy of non-cooperation and confrontation, use of violent boycotts or protests. □ Sought to achieve independence from the British for a union with Indonesia) a “Greater Indonesia”. □ However, unsuccessful; marginal, peripheral and lacked mass support □ Malays still looked to the Sultans for leadership, which limited the ability of the political parties to lead the people.
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Modern Movements	
Possessed a Concept of Nationhood	<p>Modern movements attracted a mass following based on identification with leaders.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ They were unanimous in their condemnation of the ill-effects colonialism and aimed to completely eradicate it. □ These nationalists, unlike the moderate and cultural-religious movements, had very clear political goals (non-compromise with the colonial regimes and demand for outright, immediate independence). □ Vietnam: Ho Chin Minh’s Indchina Communist Party (ICP). □ United front of nationalists; played down the more radical ideas of social revolution and emphasised rather, the “national” goal of independence. □ The ICP won much support from a wide spectrum of Vietnamese who wanted to rid their country of foreign domination. □ Burma: Aung San and the Thakins’ Dobama Asiayone. □ Dobama Song is the national anthem of Burma today, illustrating the profound unifying effect that it had during the nationalist movement. □ Its influence over student politics and labour movement provided the indispensable catalyst that changed an elite group of student intellectuals into an organisation capable of winning support. □ Indonesia: Sukarno’s PNI. □ The red-white national flag, a national anthem (“Indonesia Raya”) and the use of common language (Bahasa Indonesia).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Great political advance toward unity in a massive country of numerous divisions and a history of fractious movements. □ Sukarno was bold in his speeches; Dutch had to ban the use of emotive terms relating to freedom and independence.
Other reasons	<p>While such diversity and disunity undermined the success of nationalist groups, there were other reasons which accounted for this lack of success. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military weakness of the nationalist movements & organisational incompetence ▪ Elite Mass divide (Upper Class, Middle Class, Peasants) ▪ Colonial divide and Rule policy

Weakness of Pre-War Nationalist Movements	
1. Military weakness of the nationalist movements & Organisational Incompetence	
<p>The strength of the colonial rulers was also essential in ensuring that the SEA nationalists were effectively kept at bay and that they did not pose any threat to colonial rule before WW2. The secret police and the colonial military was effective in crushing and limiting nationalist sentiments, hence keeping nationalism in Southeast Asia weak and colonial rule secure.</p> <p><u>French Indochina:</u> The French secret police was able to investigate the death of a French labour recruiter and found out that it was an assassination attempt by members of the VNQDD. Hence it started destroying many cells and killed 225 out of 256 members in the south. The remaining members were utterly crushed by the French military which consist of a few divisions of legionnaires, hence dissipating the leadership of VNQDD and caused its total collapse.</p>	
<p>The nationalists were a lot more disadvantaged in militia equipment and professionalism in warfare; rebellions often cracked down quickly by colonial masters' powerful armies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Lack of weapons (fire power) as the colonial masters had a monopoly of guns; Burma: Saya San's rebellion failure; Vietnam: Nghe-Thin rebellion. □ Colonial masters' possessions of powerful mass-destructive weapons scares and demoralise masses quickly and effectively; Vietnam: Nghe-Thin rebellion stopped with bombarding by French planes. □ Scale and professionalism of army of colonial masters reduce(significantly) chances of success of rebellions; British had the Indian Army at hand to combat Saya San's rebellion (12,000 British troops against protestors that were mostly armed with very rudimentary shotguns.) □ Clamped down with hard-lined, confrontational tactics. Extensive use of the police force; predominantly intimidation of uncooperative villagers. Military police units were sent in to punish recalcitrant villagers and even to raze buildings. Other coercive measure used to collect taxes in the face of peasant opposition, between 1923 and 1942, 802000 rupees were collected. 	
<p>Badly organised rebellions allowed colonial masters to find out about nationalist plans and enabled effective suppression; the movements lacked a clear sense of purpose, especially a vision of an independent nation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Vietnam: VNQDD, focused primarily on revolution; overthrow of French. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Relied on traditional methods of rebellion- assassination of French officials and subversion of Vietnamese garrison forces o 1929, French crackdown after assassination of a French official o 1930, premature rebellion, eventually suppressed, cells completely destroyed. 	

□ **Indonesia: PKI uprising**

o Inherently confused movement with great disorder within the party ranks; local branches followed independent policies based on regional differences. There was also lack of contact between branches, exacerbated by the harassment of the Dutch

o There was also lack of educated influential figures (inner circle) to fully explain the long term plan to masses (outer circle). The lack of immediate successes results led to disillusionment of masses

o **1926 to 27 uprising in Banten and West Sumatra**- failure. Due to lack of support by the Comintern/Soviet Union. Tan Malaka (Soviet Comintern agent) warned PKI timing was not right.

o 4500 Communists were imprisoned and one thousand were exiled to the political concentration camp in West Irian.

Many **did not make the right use of trade unions** : Union strike organisations were beyond the capabilities of inexperienced leaders; workers not understanding the long-term aims – leaving unions after short-term increase in wage and leave advantage for employers to undo previous wage raises; **colonial masters were also quick and able to suppress strikes**.

□ Bad organisation of Burmese oil worker strikes – the British used Indian workers (who were cheaper and less trouble) to fill up the jobs that the Burmese vacated / left.

□ ICP; mobilised workers through factories and coal mines; but was unsuccessful because the French clamped down harshly on the protests.

2. **Elite Mass Divide** was due to several reasons such as education, political aspirations and objectives.

The upper class and the elites were **generally disinterested** because they wanted to maintain the status-quo so that they could remain at the top of the society (the occasional nationalistic statements by these individuals are insignificant / not impactful).

- **Indonesia:** The intelligentsia had abandoned the traditional system of “adat” and had accepted a western moral code – as a result communications between the educated elite and the Javanese were weak. The upper class in Indonesia also included members such as sons of the “priyayi” (nobility) who were protective of their positions in the colonial administration and hence often played lip-service to the colonial government. They did not support nationalist movements.

Even when the elite class was involved in nationalism, their concerns did not match those of the other classes; often portraying **a movement that was peripheral and self-serving**.

- **Burma:** The GCBA was moderate; wanted to collaborate and seek for elections. Other groups sought to convince the peasants to boycott elections; the student nationalists termed them as the “sell-out” politicians.
- **Vietnam:** Phan Boi Chau also represented the interests of an educated minority. Phan Chu Trinh, as well, represented the interests of the few who believed in the benevolence of French rule.

Middle Class: There was difficulty in evoking middle-class to nationalism. The commercial middle class was mostly comprised of foreigners and locals who worked for the government; nothing to gain from rebelling against the government.

- **Indonesia:** Sukarno did not manage to get across his entire idea (Communism) well and resorted to using emotional techniques which were less maintainable/ stable. Few could identify with the Dutch-led ISDV of Communist PKI.
- **Burma:** Masses were unable to understand the constitutional processes, democracy and elections. Voter turnout was only restricted to 6.9% in 1922.

The Peasants seemingly looked for short-term goals and thus unable to perceive that tangible results/fulfilment lay in the future, leading to anxiety and unwise decision of nationalist parties which has detriments.

- Indonesia: party elites succumbed to pressure (impatience of the peasants who were only interested in immediate results) and passed policies that produced disastrous results for the PKI (PKI Uprising, 1926).
- Burma : The Saya San uprising was due to the Great Depression of 1929, the loss of land to Indian money lenders and the promises made by the aristocrat-monk Saya San who wanted to restore the monarchy through a “righteous war” with the British
- Malaysia: Rural Malays were concerned only with socio-economic issues.

3. Colonial Divide and Rule Policy

- **Segregation** of specific areas for the accommodation of various ethnic groups as seen in Singapore , Malaya (Urban/Rural), Burma (Excluded areas / Burmese areas).
- **Use of minorities/ other races** to control majority population : The colonial administration wanted to keep the **guns and weapons away from the nationalists**; and the army composed of **people who were not likely to become nationalists** (other races).

Burma: The Karen were employed as military and police in controlling the Burmese and other nationalities. Burma; British-Indian Army made up of Indians and minority tribes (Karens – 2/3, Kachins – 1/3 and Shans). Part of the ‘divide and rule’ strategy of the imperialists. Thought that Indian and hill area-recruited troops were the safest method of controlling nationalist opposition in central Burma, since there was less likelihood that they would side with demonstrators or rebels that they were sent to put down.

Indonesia: Dutch employed the Ambonese in colonial military.

Malaya: British employed sepoys from India to maintain law and order.

- **Legislation:** Laws were passed to control nationalists with “**anti-subversive**” legislation to restrict civil rights (freedom of speech and assembly, strikes). These policies were often adopted when the government had seemingly no other recourse except to resort to vigorous repressive measures against radical political agitators.

Vietnam: there was a lot of censorship in works published in the vernacular language in Vietnamese.

Burma: Anti-Boycott Act of 1927; severe penalties for promoting boycotts and press incitation to disloyalty and violence, even the distribution of Indian political pamphlets were listed as seditious offences; brief period of absence of nationalism activities (after U Ottama arrested in 1928).

- **Concessions** were used to win over certain nationalists leaders such as Burma and Malaya

Burma: The 1922 Diarchy elections saw the setting up of an administration with the GCBA, effectively winning over the GCBA members to the British side. The GCBA themselves later helped the British to suppress more radical nationalists, such as the Thakins in 1930s. In 1930, there was a fully Burmese cabinet of ministers and in 1937 demanded for Burmese Home Rule. The British granted Home Rule as a concession to moderate nationalists. (the concessions made only satisfied the key nationalist leaders but aroused no popular enthusiasm, rather it **raised expectations of self-rule and this inspired nationalism instead.**)

Malaya: The 1930s Policy of decentralisation in Malaya; more power given to the Sultans, State Councils were created. The Malay aristocrats were very docile in the late 1930s and they showed very conservative loyalty to the British.

Indonesia: The Volksraad in 1932 used as a gesture towards popular involvement. It allowed the Indonesians to have a ‘share’ of political power even though Volksraad was very limited in legislative power. When the Dutch administration became more hard-lined in the 1930s, the Dutch were even more unwilling to see the Volksraad play any significant role. By the 1930s, no political progress made towards

self-determination and the Dutch had Indonesia in an iron fist and were determined to remain so. Volksraad was never a proper parliament and was never it to be so. (It eventually backfired when this **led to immense popular discontentment and displeasure for the Dutch had raised expectations and failed to meet them**. As the Dutch responded to this by increasingly employing coercion, mass arrests and other punitive measures).

In spite of these limitations, Pre-war Nationalist groups did have successes (in brief)

- Recognised the futility of armed struggle (led to underground movements particularly among the Communists)
- Need for broad based mobilisation of the masses (Development of mass movements)
- United and Visionary leadership (national level not based on religion, race or culture) & others

Conclusion: based on stand, substantiation and arguments

4. Assess the suitability of democracy as an effective political structure for newly independent South East Asian states?

Objectives & Requirements:

- To check student understanding about concepts such as “democracy”, “democratic governments” and assess its “suitability” as a political form/structure in post-independent Southeast Asian states.
- Students must take a stand and assess /weigh the assertion. There should also be a clear attempt made to identify the various reasons / conditions which accounted or the failure of “democratic government”, with clear examples and elaborations drawn from various Southeast Asian countries.
- Students must also compare “democratic forms” against other forms of political structures in the syllabus such as “maximum/military regimes”, “Authoritarian governments” and reasons for the ascendance of these political forms in Southeast Asia as alternatives. States in which the military dominate are known as Maximum/military governments. Authoritarian regimes refers to civilian governments which are elected” to power but have features which are not representative of the democratic system.

Key Terms:

Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally—either directly or indirectly through elected representatives. Main features of Democracy: Political representation, free and fair elections and political competition.

Reasons : Why it was not suitable / failed

1. Lack of democratic tradition and processes: Traditionally nearly all Southeast Asian societies did not have democratic traditions nor placed importance in the role of the individual. Village and Society was hierarchical and decisions were made based on rank, status, age and for the benefit of the community. As such it has often been argued that the concept of democracy was arbitrarily borrowed and imposed on Southeast Asian society.

2. Colonial policies impeded the growth of democratic traditions and/or representative government. Apart from the Volksraad in the Dutch East Indies (1910) and minor representation from commercial and some ethnic groups, the British, Dutch and French did not promote any form political

engagement and/or tradition. Much of society was based on traditional forms of organisation (village headmen, tribal chiefs, Sultan, Monarch) or based around western administrative forms such as the residential system and other bureaucracies.

3. **Democratic governments failed** in these independent SE Asian states **due to** fragmentation, infighting, poor leadership, lack of mass support, inability to secure economic growth and national unity.

Indonesia

- **Leadership:** Factionalism and coalition governments of different ideologies led to instability and affected progress of country
- Weak multi-party democracy with a myriad of political parties (Masjumi, Nahdatul Ulama, PNI) many with regional/religious interests and affiliations caused divisions among the political elites and the population. None of these parties had a clear majority / mandate and strong enough to lead the nation. There was at least five cabinets changes in the 6 years from 1949 – 1955 which lead to political instability, inflation and breakdown of public services
- **Economic instability:** There was no coherent plan for rebuilding Indonesia's economy. Sukarno's nationalisation of Dutch assets and anti-US rhetoric led to a decrease in investments and aid from Western countries including the IMF and the World Bank. The increasing rates of unemployment, inflation fuelled discontent amongst the masses. The need to establish "order" favoured maximum governments under Sukarno (Guided Democracy 1957/58 – 1965) and Suharto (1966-1998) a welcomed alternative.
- **Security threats:** Inability of the democratic governments and Sukarno to combat the growing influence of the PKI gave the military to opportunity to use force to combat the PKI in 1965 and establish its dominance over politics.

Burma

- **Leadership:** After the assassination of Aung San, there was no charismatic leader who could retain the trust of the minorities/nationalities. U Nu's tenure witnessed the breakup of the AFPFL into the 'Clean AFPFL' and 'Stable AFPFL' with each group contesting for power. His elevation of Buddhism as a state religion, the recognition of Burmese as the medium for schools and civil service posts alienated the non-Burmese non Buddhist population. By 1958 the political instability was so threatening that U Nu invited the military to form a caretaker government until the conduct of the 1960 elections
- **Economic Instability:** The U NU's elected government was unable to control escalating prices of daily necessities, fuel and other prices. There was unemployment, strikes and disorder.
- **Security threats:** The civilian government under U Nu was unable to eliminate security threats from the Communists (Burmese Communist parties which were creating instability in the border areas and the increased demands for political representation/autonomy and even secession) from minorities groups such as the Karen, Kachin, Shans and Kayah.

4. **Military/maximum governments** seemed to be a more suitable than democratic governments due to the following reasons:

Historical legitimacy of the military during the decolonisation process helps explain why the military maximum governments dominated the country.

- **Indonesia:** The military's image as the guardian of the Revolution and protector of the Indonesian state. Regional revolts broke out in Indonesia during the 1950s and in early 1958, the situation had worsened to a point that a rebel government was set up in Sumatra by separatist rebels. At the urging of the military, Sukarno was to declare a nation-wide martial law, placing the military in charge of dealing with the regional rebellions. The military acted decisively and by mid-1958, they had brought the situation under control. The key role played by the Indonesian military in crushing these regional rebellions and preserving the unity of Indonesia had several consequences. First, the military became a more unified and stronger institution. The dismissal of rebellious regional

military commanders during the martial law period facilitated the development of a more unified armed forces with an integrated command structure. However it was still far from a well-organized, disciplined and cohesive body. Second, the experience reinforced the military's contempt for civilian control and its belief that it should assume a broader role in society that would later become codified and legalized in the doctrine of *dwifungsi*.

- **Burma:** The military in Burma played an important historical role in expelling the British from the country in 1941, helping them to retake the country from the Japanese in 1945, and then in resisting British attempts to re-impose colonial rule on the country in 1946-47.

Compatibility between military values and traditional values further enhanced the military maximum government's prestige, thus ensuring its dominance over the country.

- **Thailand:** Military maximum governments and the Thai people shared similar values like hierarchy and deference to authority
- **Indonesia:** Javanese and Indonesian culture was strongly communitarian, emphasising values such as mufakat (consensus) and gotong royong (mutual benefit). The authoritarian strain in Indonesian thought comes across clearly in the principle of "sapto pandhito ratu", an expression for the sanctity of the ruler's utterances.

Through its monopoly of force and position of strength, military maximum governments were able to combat sources of opposition to its rule.

- **Burma:** The Burmese military instilled fear and crushed potential uprisings, such as the demonstrations by the students from the Rangoon University Students Union, that further entrenched Ne Win's rule.
- **Thailand:** Sarit's military government declared martial law in 1958 and arrested all suspected Communists and Communist sympathisers

Tight control over political structures and procedures prevented dissent and opposition to military maximum government rule, thus allowing the military maximum governments to dominate government.

- **Thailand:** Thai senate dominated by the military – 128/164 under Thanom; Thai PM chosen by Head of Senate
- **Indonesia:** Territorial Command Structure meant that the military was represented at all levels of Indonesian society
- **Burma:** Under Ne Win's military government, Burma was led by the military Revolutionary Council government.

Military maximum governments also maintained tight control **over political space** by dominating political parties and circumscribing other forms of political opposition, hence preventing the rise of political opposition to its rule and further perpetuating its dominance

- **Burma:** The military's Lansin Party was the only legal party in 1964; monks were disallowed from political activities by Ne Win in 1965.
- **Indonesia:** Suharto banned popular Masjumi and PSI, and permitted only 10 designated parties in parliament. He also designated seats in the Indonesian parliament for various interests group including setting aside seats for the military (ABRI). Through this, Suharto "politicised" the role of the armed forces.

Other forms of Maximum Governments included the **Communist systems** which dominated the Indochinese peninsula in states such as Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Communist Ideology, policies and government are antithetical to democratic ideals and practices. Power was concentrated in the hands of the party cadres and party leadership.

While Military/Maximum governments replaced "failed" democratic systems in Indonesia (Suharto 1965-1971), Thailand (12 military coups since 1932, *1951- Phibun,*1957 – Sarit, 1971 –Thanom, Burma (1962-current), **democratic forms of governments still functioned** in the region. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (1971 onwards) are clear examples.

Democratic forms of governments still functioned in the region. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia

(1971 onwards) are clear examples. So it's not accurate to claim that democratic government is not suited for Southeast Asia. **Liberal democracy was alive** and relatively well only in **Malaysia and Singapore**, although in both countries there were greater restrictions on the opposition than would be found in Western Europe. Sustained formal democratic rule has existed since independence in Singapore and Malaysia (with the exception of the NOC after the 1969 riots.) There have been regular elections in these countries and population has selected their own representative governments. Both governments were not truly democratic due to the following reasons:

Restrictions of personal and press freedom: Both countries were acutely sensitive about issues which could create racial and religious tensions in the context of the multi-ethnic composition of the population. Both retained the Internal Security Ordinance which allowed for the detentions without trial individuals who could be deemed to be a security. There has been strict regulation and censorship of the press, broadcasting stations and news by the government.

Right to Industrial action/strikes / unions: In addition to this both governments have worked towards reducing industrial strikes through deliberate control of industrial relations through their own trade union movements (National Trade Union Congress (NTUC – Singapore, Malaysian National Trade Union Congress-MTUC).

Malaysian democracy has often been described as '**Quasi Democracy**' also due to the "social contract" agreed to at the onset of independence in 1957. The Alliance Party (UMNO / MCA/MIC) representing the major ethnic groups had agreed to the political dominance of the Malays, special position of Malays as "natives" (Bumiputras), Malay as the official language and the position of the hereditary Sultans and Islam. As such it was not "full democracy" in its application.

The **Singapore** style has been described as "**Paternalistic Democracy**". Like its Malaysian counterpart it also curtails personal, press and other freedoms. From 1965-1981, the PAP dominated parliament and did not have any opposition parties. In addition to this the PAP has used a series of law suits and defamation trials and 'cowed' political opponents. In recent times, it has also adopted rezoning of existing constituencies before elections to minimise chances of the opposition winning in anti-PAP enclaves.

Singapore's longest serving Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew felt that Western style democracy was not necessarily the best model suited to Asian countries. Instead, he subscribed to the Confucian tradition of a strong leadership and a government which had the moral obligation of meeting the needs of the people. As such it is paternalistic by nature.

After seizing power in **Indonesia** in 1966, General Suharto became President after the 1971 elections. While elections are a part of the Western democratic process, Suharto had deliberately manipulated the political process by forcing political groups to merge and in assigning representation to various Indonesian interest groups including the army which was his main power base. Inevitably this ensured that Golkar and Suharto would retain power in Indonesia.

It is noteworthy that even in these states it was not the democratic process but rather the charismatic leadership of "strongman" politicians (Tunku Abdul Rahman, Lee Kuan Yew, Suharto, Mahathir, Ferdinand Marcos) which prevailed. This seems to substantiate the principle of "sapto pandhito ratu", an expression for the sanctity of the ruler's (and /or political leaders) utterances.

External Reasons : Role of US, Containment & Maximum/Authoritarian governments

The US pursuit of containment would have an adverse effect on "democracy/democratic governments" and it led to the rise of maximum/military governments in Southeast Asia. US military and economic support for anti-communist maximum governments entrenched the rule of maximum governments which also used the increasing Communist threat as an excuse to consolidate control and legitimise undemocratic rule. For example:

- **Thailand:** The US became increasingly supportive of the Thai military and military governments

because it saw them as a bulwark against Communism. From 1948, the US has accepted the role of strongmen politicians such as Phibun Songkram (1948-1957), Sarit Thanom (1957-1973) as Prime Ministers. Between 1951 and 1957, Thailand received US\$222 million in military aid, allowing the Thai government to maintain control. Sarit Thanom used the growing threat of Communism in neighbouring Indochina in the 1960s to promote maximum rule over Thailand. The only serious democratic challenge would occur only in 1973, when students staged strikes in an effort to change the political status quo. As the US looked the other way – the students were violently and brutally put down by the military.

- **South Vietnam:** Although his tenure was marked by rigged elections, human rights abuses, nepotism and corruption, the US supported Ngo Dinh Diem from 1955 to 1963. The US was willing to back Diem because of his anti-Communist stance and the deteriorating security situation in Indochina by providing economic aid to South Vietnam in the excess of US\$3 billion
- **Indonesia:** The US had supported Sukarno for suppressing the communist Madiun movement in 1948. After the Gestapu incident and seizure of power by the Indonesian military, General Suharto banned the Communist party of Indonesia (PKI). He would purge 500,000 communists whom he blamed for the incident. His anti-communist actions would gain him support for his “dictatorship” which lasted for 31 years. Suharto continued to use the growing threat of Communism in Indochina and Southeast Asia in ensuring US support for his administration.
- **Philippines:** Due to the Philippines strategic location to Indochina, Korea and Japan, the US would continue to support financially and militarily. In spite of Ferdinand Marcos’ rampant corruption and human rights abuses he remained a strong anti-communist ally. The Armed Forces of the Philippines was a tool of Marcos to combat the growing communist New People’s Army and the separatist Moro Nationalist Liberation Front threat, and found itself in a position of dominance because Marcos gave the AFP this role.

Conclusion: Based on students’ stand, argument and substantiation

5. Assess the impact of Communism on the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia from 1945 – 1975?

Objectives & Requirements:

- To check on students’ understanding about the role of Communism and its impact on the decolonisation process of Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975.
- Students would be able to elaborate on the role communism played (ideology, as a threat, catalyst) in “accelerating” and/or “decelerating” decolonisation.
- Clear examples/case studies (Malaya, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines) should be used to elaborate with evidence to ascertain its “weightage”.
- Students should also strive for a balance in considering other “factors” which in itself affected decolonisation (Role of Colonial powers, Nationalists and the US).

1. Role of Communism in the decolonisation of Southeast Asia

Popular appeal of Communist Ideology:

After WW2 Communist ideology appealed to the masses. The heroic role played by Red Army and the USSR elevated the status of Communism in much of Southeast Asia. Communist movements played

visible roles as part of the anti-Japanese resistance.

Example/s: In **Burma**, the communists were a component party of the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL). In **Malaya**, the Malayan Anti Peoples Japanese Forces (MPAJA) was allies with the British and in **Vietnam**, supplied by the West, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh was a recognised the most important anti-Japanese force. As a result of this, Communists were generally regarded as “nationalists” and as “liberators”.

Challenges & Impact on decolonisation of :

Malaya: The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) waged a guerrilla war from 1948 – 1989 in an attempt to establish a communist state in Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia. The CPM justified its actions by claiming that it was response against the Federation of Malaya (1948) which restricted citizenship rights to immigrants such as the Chinese and Indians. It attempted to mobilise support especially amongst the Chinese population by asserting that its goals was for equal rights and for a multi-racial Malaya. In its initial phases the Emergency was successful in spreading fear through assassinations and acts of sabotage.

Impact on decolonisation: The British realised that that they needed to address the political aspirations of the Chinese population in order to cut off manpower and logistical support to the CPM. The Briggs plan had resettled the rural Chinese into “new Villages” and had effected control of over the Chinese population. In order to undermine the CPM's claim that the Chinese had “no political voice”, the British actively supported the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) as the “representative” of the Chinese minority population. The MCA build its reputation and legitimacy by assisting resettled villagers and in highlighting the concerns of the Chinese. In addition to this, Sir Gerald Templer, had proposed that the British government should consider granting self-government indicating that the British were genuine in wanting to devolve power to the Malaysians. He also wanted to extend citizenship to the Malayan Chinese so as to build loyalty. This lead to the formation of the Alliance Party (MIC, MCA & UMNO) and established the platform for Malayan independence in 1957. It has been argued that if not for the communist insurgency, the British would have been reluctant to decolonise and possibly continued to exploit Malaysia tin and rubber resources. In the case of Malaya, decolonisation was accelerated. Malayan Emergency was declared over in 1960's and the communist would be forced to flee to the Thai-Malaysian border. It was only in 1989 that the CPM would renounce its objectives of forming a communist Malaya and Singapore.

In the case of **Singapore**, the threat posed by communism slowed down the decolonisation process. While Malaya was successful in 1957, the British were reluctant to even grant self-government to Singapore due to its large Chinese population, the communist inspired industrial strikes organised by the trade union and the general fear that it would turn into communist base. In 1959, Singapore was only granted self-government when the PAP took strong action to curb the activities of communists. Singapore would eventually gain independence from the British through merger with Malaya (Malaysia) in 1963.

Communist Vietnam & Decolonisation (through War)

Vietnam 1945: By 1945, the Viet Minh had established absolute control of North Vietnam and strategically occupied all major ports, rail and infrastructure in the South. Ho Chi Minh declared independence for Vietnam but this was rejected by the French and the United States. The French waged the first Indochina War with the Viet Minh in order to regain control over its colonial possession. By 1947, the US was supporting the French due to its policy of containment.

By 1954, the Vietminh successfully defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu and forced the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. At the Geneva Accords, this led to the formation of 2 Vietnamese states: the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) which was recognised by the French and an independent Republic of South Vietnam which was supported by the US. As such by 1955, the French had

given up their sovereign claims to Vietnam and effectively “decolonised”. It is hard to ascertain if indeed decolonisation could have taken place any earlier in Vietnam given that the battlefield, dictated by Cold War politics, would surely have focused on the total defeat of the Communists. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Vietminh (Communists) played the most important role in the decolonisation in Vietnam.

Indonesia (1945 – 1949)

In August 1945, Sukarno declared independence and waged an armed struggle against the Dutch. His leadership and vision was unchallenged until 1946/47 when the communists (Partai Komunis Indonesia PKI) seized power and established a “soviet” centred on Madiun. Led by Busso, the 1948 Madiun soviet represented a counter-revolution and was an alternative to Sukarno’s vision of a republican state. As such, Republican forces crushed the Madiun communists in 1948. While there was support for the communists and sporadic rebellions in South Sumatra and Sulawesi the communists were effectively isolated from the Indonesian political scene.

In the context of decolonisation, the Madiun uprising was important since Sukarno was perceived not only to be anti-colonial but also anti-communist. Due to this reason, the US would assert political (as a result of Truman Doctrine) and economic pressure (the Marshall Plan) on the Dutch to negotiate with the Republicans and establish the United States of Indonesia in 1949. This Communist Madiun Uprising and its violent suppression by Sukarno is still regarded as a key event which won US support for Indonesian independence leading to decolonisation. The USA would be the first country to recognise the United States of Indonesia.

Cambodia & Laos (1946/47)

Laos: In 1946 the French appointed the Luang Prabang monarch as king of all Lao, and also permitted an elected national assembly, leading to a national government. In 1949 the French declared Lao ‘independent’ but retained ultimate control of the kingdom’s armed forces, foreign policy and finances.

Cambodia: Faced with a revolution in Vietnam, the French had opened discussions with King Sihanouk about limited Cambodian self-government in 1946. The French announced elections for a new National Assembly and permitted political parties to form. At the elections, held in September 1946, the Democratic party won 50 out of the Assembly’s 67 seats. The French however retained control of finance, defence, foreign affairs and all key instruments of government.

In both cases, the French only granted limited self-government to Laos and Cambodia. They realised that that should be some gesture towards Cambodia’s and Laos aroused national feelings would be wise and also needed the collaboration of the political elite to restore order. Given that such concessions were a response to the aspirations of self-determination of the Vietnamese communists. It is undeniable that Communism did also impact the decolonisation process (in these cases move towards self-government) these Indo-China States.

It is also at the Geneva Accords (convened as a result of defeat at Dien Bien Phu) that France would surrender its sovereign rights over all of its Indochinese possessions. As a result of this both Laos and Cambodia achieve full independence. As such the impact of the Vietnamese communist victory was critical for the decolonisation of Indochina.

Communism did not have an impact on decolonisation process in the following countries due to actions of Colonial Powers

Philippines (1945 – 1946): The Hukabalahap (HUK) “communist” movement had emerged as anti-Japanese forces they did not present a threat and/or impacted the decolonisation process due to the following reasons: Lacked mass support, was confined to rural areas and suppression by US military. More importantly the US had already promised Filipino independence through the Tydings McDuffie Act of

1934 and decolonised in 1946 by granting independence to the Philippines in 1946.

Burma (1945-1948): The British wanted to retain only Malaya due to its stable political situation and vast rubber and tin resources. Burma was seen as divided and a political liability. In any case Britain had given up India (with its human resource, i.e. the Indian Army) and therefore unable to forcibly occupy Burma. It was easier to grant Burma independence on January 1948.

Role of the Nationalist Leaders

Sukarno (Indonesia), Ho Chih Min (Vietnam), Aung San (Burma) was clear in their objectives in securing independence. They were charismatic and influential in securing national will and unity.

Burma: In Burma, the plan to impose direct rule over and reinstatement of the 1931 constitution led to mass protests and opposition. Aung San used his position and charisma to unify all Burmese political factions into the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL). He mobilised strikes and protests for the British to rescind on their proposals. He also convened the Panglong Agreement to secure the accession of the minorities and ensure viability of the Burma as a nation state. During the 1947 elections, the AFPFL would emerge victorious and form the government of the Union Of Burma. It is through organised peaceful compulsion that the British relented and decolonised.

Indonesia: Sukarno's declaration of independence was an outright rejection of the Dutch claim on Indonesia. He established a republican government and effectively directed action against the Dutch. Even after 2 police actions and the capture of the entire Republican leadership, the Dutch had to concede that they could not extinguish the Indonesian desire for independence. Eventually, the Dutch offered to recognise "independence in the context of a federation / commonwealth" known as the United States of Indonesia. The Dutch has secured this with Sukarno – an act which acknowledges his indefatigable role in decolonisation process.

Vietnam: Ho Chih Minh's stature as a anti-Japanese freedom fighter and the Viet Minh role as a "nationalist" rather than communist party made it popular. In spite of being betrayed by French, he would declare war and defeat the French militarily in 1954. Without mass support, this would not have been possible. So decolonisation was achieved through war in Vietnam.

General awakening of nationalist sentiments in Southeast Asia

The abandonment of colonial powers, Japanese ill treatment, **political aspirations amongst the elites** and masses led to a heightened sense of nationalism. **In Burma**, the Japanese had already granted its independence in 1943 and had established Ba Maw as Prime Minister. While it was subordinate to Japanese authorities, this idea of "independence" was ingrained in the Burmese psyche. This explains why there were rampant protests when the British wanted to revert back to the 1931 constitution which severely curtailed Burmese rights and political participation. **In Indonesia**, Sukarno had already declared independence as PETA and other irregular forces opposed the British and returning Dutch militarily. The momentum of freedom galvanised the *pemuda* movements (and *perjuangan*) as spontaneous opposition arose in various parts of Indonesia. In the **Philippines**, the promised anticipation of independence by the US was eagerly awaited. In **Vietnam**, the Vietminh had taken over from the Japanese and Ho Chih Minh resonated the demands for freedom in his Independence declaration. The Malays had a new sense of "nationalism" in 1946, when the Malayan Union plan threatened the status of the Malay Sultans and the position of the Malays. Such emotions and aspirations were an important factor which drove the decolonisation process.

The Role of the US and its impact on the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia

1. Atlantic Charter (1941) & Self Determination of Nation States

The US and UK agreed to allow liberated territories including former colonial possessions to determine their own political destiny. The US set the example by granting independence to its colonial possession – the Philippines

US & Philippines: In accordance to the promises made in the Tydings-McDuffie Act the US would grant independence to the Philippines. The Philippines would be the first Southeast Asian country to become independent.

US & the Dutch: US also tied the Marshall plan & reconstruction loans to the pace of decolonisation undertaken by the French and the Dutch. For example, **the Netherlands** : US had made a 10 million grant to the Dutch East Indies Government & 1 billion reconstruction loan to the Netherlands. In Indonesia, the US role would be 2 fold (delaying and also facilitating decolonisation process). The 10 million grants would be used to find the Indonesian republicans and the threat to withdraw Marshall aid and other loans would force the Dutch to negotiate and conclude the Renville Agreement and the Round Table Conference in 1949 leading to the formation of the United States of Indonesia in 1949.

2. US and Containment as a factor for the pace of decolonisation

After 1947, the Truman doctrine and Containment becomes a priority of the US government. US would shift its emphasis from decolonisation to securing its interests in Southeast Asia.

US and Indonesia: Sukarno's suppression of the Communist Madiun Uprising would secure support from the US government, which would force the Dutch to negotiate with the Republicans.

US and Vietnam: US support for the French and fear of the “domino theory” fuelled US support for the first Indo-China War and possibly delayed decolonisation in Vietnam. If it had not been for insistence from the USSR and China, the Vietminh had intended to advance south after the victory at Dien Bien Phu.

Conclusion: Based on the stand made by student and justification with clear evidence and the weighing of factors

6. “More than colonial powers, independent states were responsible for problems of ethnic separatism and racial discord in Southeast Asia from 1945-2000”. Assess the validity of this statement?

Objectives & Requirements:

- To check student understanding about the role/s played by colonial powers and independent states this led to problems of ethnic separatism and racial discord.
- Weigh / assess role played by both factors and ascertain which was more responsible for the above problem/s in Southeast Asia.
- To demonstrate in brief, the role played by Colonial powers as a general overview and then provide an understanding of the impact of post war independent government policies (political, social, economic, others) on various ethnic groups and how these had led to, and/or aggravated issues related to separatism and disunity.
- Students should be able to also demonstrate examples of “inclusive” & “exclusive” policies which led to integration and/or “disintegration/disunity” within these states.

Background: Colonialism (only as Introduction – focus is post-1945)

The arbitrary division of boundaries which separated ethnic populations and created a heterogeneous / plural “nation” state in much of Southeast Asia. In some ways this marked the start of these “issues” of ethnic separatism and racial discord.

Aggravated by :

- Deliberate “Divide and Rule” Racial policies (segregation according specific settlement patterns / use of minority groups to control majority populations).
- Mass Immigration of people (Chinese & Indians) due to economic development & trade
- Cleavages & divides caused by conversion of population to Catholicism/ Christianity / threat posed to traditional beliefs etc

Stand : Yes it was due more to policies adopted by independent states rather than Colonial Masters

Definition / Description:

Key terms : Ethnic minorities – refers to :(1) Indigenous people within territorial boundaries which another group dominate “numerically” and have political power .These groups often belong to different race (physical appearance, speak a different language, adopt different traditions, customs and religion. (Examples: Burma: Kachins, Mons, Karen/Christians, Thailand: Malay/Moslem in south, Khmers in Northeast, Hill tribes in Northwest, Philippines: Malay/Moslem in South, Hill Tribes in North). (2) Immigrant Chinese and Indian populations to Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia/Malaya, Indonesia). (3) Populations which are identified / associated with a particular religion & respond when their beliefs are undermined or abrogated. (Moslems in Southern Thailand & Philippines, Karen in Burma)

Ethnic Separatism refers loosely to movements which aspire to breakaway and set up a separate state/ region due to several reasons. These could range from racial, religious, cultural differences to discriminatory policies exercised by a central state often dominated by another ethnic group.

The treatment of ethnic minorities and religious differences were major obstacles which hindered / impeded many Southeast Asian states from achieving national unity. This can be examined in political, social/cultural and economic areas of various Southeast Asian countries

Issues centred around :

- Political: In terms of the “recognition” of ethnic (often regional) identity, political participation, autonomy.
- Social: Acceptance of / and recognition of Language, Religion and traditions.
- Economic: Access to economic opportunities, share of economic “fruits” (equity) and development opportunities.
- Religion: - Discrimination of particular faith / group of people who practise it and/or adherents seeking to displace existing political structures with a “theocracy” and/or government supporting their religion.(fundamentalism)

Political: A. Recognition of Minority rights and aspirations (Issue of Centralised and/or Federal form of government / autonomy)

Burma: This splintered the minorities (nationalities) from the Burmese majority. Aung San had promised to grant greater autonomy and had signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947. (It also contained provisions for secession after a period of 10 years from the Union Of Burma). The disagreements between these ethnic minorities (Karen, Kayah, Mons, Shans) and the Burmese state over degrees of representation and autonomy led to the military takeover in 1962 and separatist movements).

Indonesia: To a lesser extent this was also evident in Republican Indonesia where the Javanese dominated the central government and there were greater calls for autonomy in other parts of Indonesia (Pandangese / Minangkabau (Sumatra), Bugis and Toraja populations in Sulawesi). The lack of consensus had led to political instability with a change of at least 3 cabinets from the period 1950 – 1957 until Sukarno imposed Guided Democracy. There were also several rebellions in South Sumatra and Sulawesi against the Republican government throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Political stability was imposed by force (by the military) after 1966 when Suharto seizes power.

Social:

1. Language issues: **Burma:** Only the Burmese language is used as the official medium of communication. Ethnic groups are forced to learn Burmese in government schools. Shan, Karen and other languages are not given official recognition and suppressed accordingly. This act as an obstacle in promoting national unity. **Thailand:** The Thai state also imposed the learning of Thai language on the southern Malay-Moslems, the Khmers in the Northeast and hill tribes in the north-west. Patani Malay in the south was not even officially recognised as a language. Such measures at "integration" had adverse effect particularly in the south, where it laid the foundations for the Moslem separatist movement led by Pattani United Liberation Front (PULO)

2. Ethnicity/ race: **Burma:** Indians were discriminated in post independent Burma under Ne Win and about 300, 00 fled to India. Non Burmese ethnic population's cultural traditions, festivals and other such events were not recognised by the Burmese "military" government. **Thailand:** Under Phibun Songkram, Chinese were discriminated and forced to adopt Thai names in order to become assimilated. The process continued into the post 1945 era. **Indonesia:** Under the Dutch and even Sukarno, the Chinese were required to carry special passes. They were never "recognised as Indonesians" and forced to adopt Indonesian sounding names under the Suharto regime. They were also disallowed from practising their traditions and festivals until 2003. **Cambodia:** During Pol Pot regime more than 425,000 Vietnamese and Chinese minorities were persecuted and they fled the country.

Economic Discrimination (Treatment of Minorities)

Thailand & Cambodia: Pibun Songkram took over and nationalised Chinese commercial interests. After 1975, the Cambodians took over the retail trade and prohibited the Chinese to engage in commercial activities.

Malaysia: After the 1969 riots, the government introduced the New Economic Policy which promoted the dominance of the Malays and "bumiputeras" by granting mandatory quotas and other economic concessions. This meant that lesser opportunities were given to non Malays and bumiputeras.

Indonesia: The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998 was blamed on the Chinese population leading to mass killings and rapes in major cities.

Religion as an obstacle

Burma: In 1954, U Nu declared Buddhism the state religion and was opposed by the Christian majority Karen groups – which considered it as a means to discriminate non Buddhists. There were also significant numbers of Moslem-Arakanese, Rohingyas within Burma. Such measures were undertaken at the expense of minority groups. This would be accentuated further when Buddhist ideas would be absorbed by Ne Win and his concept of the “Burmese way to Socialism”. In a sense Buddhism would become the vanguard again in the 1990/1991 when Buddhist monks would stage nationwide protest in Yangon against Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest. While it united proponents of democracy, it was not broad based or inclusive enough to include the Christians and Moslems.

Indonesia: In post 1945, religion was an obstacle in forging “national unity” as shown by the Darul Islam revolt in 1948. The objective was challenge to Sukarno’s secularism and creates an Islamic state in Indonesia. While this was effectively crushed, Islam and the theocracy as an alternative model would remain pervasive throughout Indonesia. This is also exemplified in the Free Aceh Movement. While there were legitimate economic grievances related to Aceh’s oil and gas revenues and demands for greater autonomy, it was the avowed aim of establishing an Islamic State which led to a rebellion in North Sumatra from 1976 – 2005.

Philippines (Mindanao): The Moslem separatist movements began during 1968-1971 in order to protest against the government policies and discrimination of Moslems. The Moro Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF: 1971) was formed to promote the national interests of the *Bangsamoro* people. In 1977, a splinter group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front sought to seek independence and create an Islamic republic in Mindanao. Such movements polarised society and were obstacles in creating national unity.

Thailand: Pattani United Liberation Front was also formed to due to similar discriminations particularly the building of Buddhist temples and forcible control exerted by the military in the region. PULO sought to create an independent Malay-Moslem State.

Religion & State Ideologies

Thailand: Nation, King and Religion (Buddhism). : While it unified the majority Thais, the Malay Moslems were unable to affiliate/associate with the motto. Ethic , religious differences, social customs (such as Thai practise of prostrating to the King and/or regarding the King as divine was an abhorrence).

Indonesia: Pancasila was accepted by Hindus, Buddhists and Christians due to its inclusive nature. But radical Moslems felt that it had diluted the essence of Islam and position of “Allah” as the Supreme deity. The Darul Islam movement in east Java was a result of this opposition. Backed by the Indonesian Army, concept was used to foster integration throughout Indonesia.

Contrasting & Successful case studies : Singapore: (Treatment of minorities & religious difference)

State Ideology: Multiracialism and Meritocracy – This meant equality of races and reward through merit (educational qualifications / hard work and perseverance). Not based on ethnicity or patronage.

Political: Parliamentary System. There are inherent safeguards to ensure minority rights (the Presidential Council for Minority Rights) and political participation and representation (Group Constituency Representative System).

Social: Common language policy, syllabus, shared experiences such as National Service etc. Adopted English as a common language and granted “official” and “equal” status to 3 other main languages (Malay, Chinese & Tamil). Bilingualism was promoted. Symbols such as flag, national anthem & pledge across all racial groups. Ethnic housing quotas to prevent formation of racial enclaves and creating understanding

each other cultures.

Religion: Legislation to prevent racial slurs, discrimination and criticism of other religion (Religious Harmony Act) & the use of extra-judicial powers (Internal Security Act) to ensure social stability. All of these measures lead to political stability.

Other factors: Economic development: Creation of jobs, investments, distribution of wealth among the population in order to ensure that there is no major class “rich and poor” divide (little income disparity). Alliance to US during the Cold war leads to financial assistance, grants and access to US and Western European markets which accounts for 70% of world trade.

Malaysia: While Malay is the official language of Malaysia and its school curriculum is held in Bahasa Malaysia (Malay), vernacular schools (Chinese, Tamil) are allowed to function side by side. While there is no “official” status / recognition given, there is acceptance of these vernacular languages.

Contrasting & Successful case studies : Malaysia: (Treatment of “minorities & religious differences”)

State Ideology: Acceptance of the paramount political position of the Malay rulers and the Malays. Acceptance of the New Economic Plan (1971) which promoted the economic interests of the Malays (*Bumiputera policy*), by allowing greater access to economic opportunities by grants, loans and concessions.

Political: Constitutional Monarchy (safeguards the position of Sultans) and a Parliamentary System. The safeguards which ensure minority rights was done through power sharing as seen in the Alliance party (1954) and its successor Barisan Nasional. There is ethnic representation through parties such as the Malaysian Chinese association (MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) led by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). While there are other parties such as Gerakan, Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) – these represent ethnic and religious conclaves. Nevertheless, this concept of power sharing and ethnic based politics (with the exception of 1969) has led to political stability in Malaysia.

Social: While Malay is the common language, Chinese and Indian vernacular schools thrive alongside Malay based government schools. A Common language policy, syllabus, shared experiences and sense of being “Malaysian” create a sense of national identity/unity especially for the post 1965 generation. Symbols such as flag, national anthem & pledge cuts across all racial groups.

Religion: While Islam is the dominant religion, other major religions are recognised in the constitution. Until recently, Extra-judicial powers (Internal Security Act) was used to detain, arrest and imprison people who make offending remarks aimed at polarising racial and religious differences. The ISA has ensured social and political stability in Malaysia.

Other factors: Economic development: Creation of jobs, investments, distribution of wealth among the population in order to ensure that there is no major class “rich and poor” divide (little income disparity). Alliance to US during the Cold war leads to financial assistance, grants and access to US and Western European markets which accounts for 70% of world trade.

Conclusion: Based on the stand and substantiation by the students.

Good Luck for the “A” Levels