

RAFFLES INSTITUTION
Year 6 Preliminary Examinations 2014

HISTORY

Higher 2

Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia c1900-1997

9731/02

19 September 2014

3 hours

COVER SHEET

Name : _____

CT class : _____

Question No.	<i>For Examiner's Use Only</i>
	Marks
1	
TOTAL	

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READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and CT class on the cover sheet and all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.
Indicate the question numbers attempted in the space provided on the cover sheet.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work and the cover sheet securely together.
All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

This document consists of **5** printed pages, including the cover sheet.

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

1 Read the sources, and then answer the question.

Source A

Since 1979, with each meeting, we have been regularly able to increase the votes against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The fact that ASEAN is able to mobilize more support in the United Nations against the combined lobbying of Vietnam and its communist allies, is proof that ASEAN is not ineffectual. It is an ASEAN effort. We asked the Americans and our Western friends not to take the lead in this matter but to follow us.

From an interview with S. Rajaratnam in 1987.

Source B

The main reason behind the willingness of the Cambodian factions to agree on the establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) was not directly influenced by ASEAN's diplomacy, but by the pressure of the "Perm-Five". It was the "Perm-Five" who pressed all Cambodian factions to hold elections in 1993 and the UN produced five resolutions allowing the UN to monitor peace and democratization process in Cambodia through UNTAC. This was a triumph as it successfully transformed the fighting among Cambodian disputants in battlefields into national elections.

This success was, of course, the result of the ASEAN's continuous efforts in seeking political solutions to the problem of power-sharing among Cambodian conflicted parties, and these contributions can be seen in ASEAN's consistent desire to engage the UN in monitoring the peace and democratization process in Cambodia plus consistent ASEAN efforts to provide platforms for relevant parties to seek resolutions to the conflict.

From a book published by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 2009.

Source C

The idea to declare this region a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality was endorsed by all ASEAN members. Then missions were sent to all the capitals of the major powers to enlist their support and approval. The result was mixed as there appeared to be reservation on the part of certain parties to whom the approach was made. In this instance, neutrality will be effective only if other nations, not merely those concerned, are willing to respect it; otherwise it is absolutely meaningless. Belgium, in particular, whose proclaimed neutrality was violated twice in two World Wars, stands out as a striking example.

From an article written by Thanat Khoman in 1988.

Source D

After two days of discussions in Kuantan, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn and Indonesian President Suharto agreed on what was officially described as a principle to clear up the conflict. The basic idea is simple: Vietnam should not continue to be under Soviet influence, nor should it fall into China's grip. But the implications, say analysts, are significant. Hanoi, the two leaders seem to be saying, would be welcome to deal with ASEAN once it is rid of superpower influence. And China's hawkish attitude towards the conflict was not welcomed.

The basic idea is not a new development. It is deeply rooted in Malaysian foreign policy, harking back to the ZOPFAN Declaration of 1971. But the need to repeat the declaration in the form of a principle is remarkable. The latest call was made bilaterally, whereas in 1971 all five foreign ministers of ASEAN signed the document. In 1971 there was no mention of any superpower by name, but in Kuantan on March 27, the Soviet Union and China were named, and the call to these countries to leave Vietnam alone was blunt. The Kuantan principle is patently an attempt to dramatize the 10-year-old call for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. In calling on Moscow and Peking to leave Vietnam out, Hussein was underlining the renewed urgency for the superpowers to keep out.

From a Hong Kong-based academic journal, published in April 1980.

Source E

Until 1995, ASEAN had not taken a public position regarding the South China Sea. But a series of unilateral Chinese actions from 1992 culminating in the Mischief Reef issue of January 1995 led to a change of stance. Two days before the bilateral talks between the Philippines and China in Beijing, on 18 March 1995, ASEAN, for the first time, adopted a united stand by issuing a statement calling for all parties concerned to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea.

However, four years on, in response to the second Mischief Reef incident of January 1999, ASEAN apparently was unwilling to confront Beijing more strongly despite the fact that this was China's second transgression. Although China is not the sole claimant to the Spratlys, she is the principal source of worry. This is not surprising given her size and power vis-à-vis the other claimants. It is aggravated by the fact the Beijing's words regarding maintaining the status quo and her deeds have not been entirely consistent.

From an article by a Singapore academic, published in 2000.

Now answer the following question.

"Since 1970, ASEAN attempts at regional security cooperation have been largely unsuccessful." How far do Sources A-E support this statement?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section. You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

- 2 “Nationalist leaders across Southeast Asia had made little progress towards independence by 1941.” Discuss.
- 3 To what extent did colonial policies affect the success of nationalist movements after 1945?
- 4 How effective were Southeast Asian governments in maintaining political control in their countries since independence?
- 5 To what extent was the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 the result of flawed policies in the Southeast Asian states?
- 6 Assess the consequences of tensions between Southeast Asian states on regional stability.