

TITLE: ASEAN and the Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia

QUESTION: How far do Sources A – E support the view that ASEAN’s handling of the Cambodian Crisis (1978 – 1991) proved its relevance as a regional grouping?

Unpacking hypothesis:

- 1) “handling of the Cambodian Crisis” – in what sense? Raising awareness on the international platform? Role in resolving the conflict?
- 2) “proved its relevance as a regional grouping” – in what sense? Ability to respond effectively and in a timely manner? Able to influence others? Were there other players who were more relevant?
- 3) “proved its relevance as a regional grouping” – from whose perspective? Internal participants vs. external observers?

Introduction: Sources B and D support the hypothesis while Sources A, C and E challenge it.

Source B supports the hypothesis as it demonstrates **ASEAN’s ability to influence the international position** taken on Cambodia, thus turning a significant challenge into an important milestone in ASEAN’s diplomatic achievements.

<p>LIFT/INFER <i>(Be concise. Do not quote extensively. Must pick up on the key points – especially if this is a rich source)</i></p>	<p>EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES <i>(C-R must match the key source evidence that you have pulled out. CK must have key details. E.g. Data, Event, Year, Outcome)</i></p>	<p>EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE <i>(If the speaker/author does not have vested interest in the speech/extract, then it is likely to be reliable. Pay attention to dates and the occasion.)</i></p>	<p>CONCLUSION (Based on reliability – Provenance; and utility – how useful on its own in helping you to understand the H</p>
<p>ASEAN was taking the lead on the handling of the Cambodia Crisis, and was able to garner “majority support” for their General Assembly resolution against Vietnam. This was commendable, considering that Vietnam “for years had been an object of adulation in the Third World” and against the “combined lobbying of Vietnam and its communist allies”.</p>	<p>Cross-refer to CK on ASEAN member state’s persistence in sponsoring the GA resolution against Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia; to reinforce B’s reliability.</p> <p>And/or</p> <p>Cross-refer to Source A (will be proven reliable later) to demonstrate limitations of Source B. Challenges Source B’s claims that ASEAN was taking the lead in the handling of the Cambodian Crisis, as it demonstrates the complexity of the Cambodian Crisis, which</p>	<p>May not be reliable, as it may have a hidden agenda. May be using political memoirs as the platform to reiterate ASEAN’s relevance as an organisation. Postured Cambodian Crisis as ASEAN’s “first big test”, which they successfully overcame, which was “proof that ASEAN is not ineffectual”</p> <p>Utility also limited, as it has overemphasised ASEAN’s supposed unity and effectiveness in leading the efforts, but have downplayed the</p>	<p>May not be strong evidence due to possible unreliability and lack of balance in perspectives.</p>

	involved the great power interests – China, USSR and USA, which made it unlikely for ASEAN to intervene effectively. <i>*Should not cross-refer to Source C, as the time period is different, and positions may have changed due to the changing Cold War context.</i>	internal disagreements, which were revealed in Source A.	
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Source D supports the hypothesis as it demonstrates **ASEAN's timely response to the Cambodian crisis** and its active campaigning, by mobilising all diplomatic channels in raising international awareness on this issue.

LIFT/INFER	EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES	EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE	CONCLUSION
The foreign ministers recognised that the “rivalry of outside powers in the Southeast Asian region” had affected their efforts in seeking a resolution to the conflict; and thus that it was necessary to utilise broader diplomatic platforms, such as the UN General Assembly, ASEAN-EEC meeting and through appealing to the UN Secretary-General in order to raise the profile of the conflict, in hope that a political solution may be reached, with the backing of the wider international community.	Can cross-refer to Source A (will be proven reliable) to demonstrate the limitation of D. Although D was blaming the rivalry of outside powers for undermining the “earnest efforts of ASEAN member countries to seek a durable political solution to the conflict; Source A demonstrates that this impotence may be due also to the fact that ASEAN was “beset by internal problems arising from different interpretations of the appropriate balance of power in Indochina.”	May not be reliable, there may be a hidden agenda, to demonstrate ASEAN’s unity and efforts in the Cambodian Crisis, in order to convince others of its continued relevance, despite the lack of a “durable political solution to the conflict.” Evinced through choice of words: “discussed at length”, “noted with grave concern”, “viewed with serious concern”; “reiterated”; “reaffirmed”. Downplayed the internal disagreements seen in Source A (previously mentioned).	May not be strong evidence in support of hypothesis, due to possible unreliability and the lack of balance in perspectives.

However, Source A challenges the hypothesis as it argues that ASEAN **was irrelevant** in the Cambodian issue, due to the **presence of power struggle between the great powers and disagreements within ASEAN**, which have hindered ASEAN’s ability to undertake concrete actions to resolve the conflict.

LIFT/INFER	EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES	EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE	CONCLUSION
Despite the “surface consensus” that ASEAN	The reliability of this source is enhance	Likely to be reliable – credible	Very strong

<p>has over the Cambodian issue, the situation was too complex and polarised for ASEAN to resolve. ASEAN was not only unable to deal effectively with conflicting great powers' (China, USSR, and USA) interest, but was also divided by "differing interpretations of the appropriate balance of power in Indochina."</p>	<p>because it corresponds to my CK. Bring in Kuantan Principle 1980 which demonstrates the internal disagreement within ASEAN – Indonesia + Malaysia vs. Singapore, Thailand and Philippines. The former group wanted to take a more conciliatory stance towards Vietnam, in order to extricate it from Sino-Soviet Rivalry; whereas the latter group wanted to take a stronger stance on Vietnam.</p>	<p>academic, no hidden agenda. Very useful – acknowledges ASEAN's attempts to establish a "surface consensus", but also revealed the deeper underlying complexities which make it difficult for ASEAN to resolve the conflict.</p>	<p>evidence which challenges hypothesis.</p>
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Source C challenges more than supports the hypothesis, as although it demonstrates Indonesia's prominence as the ASEAN representative, it reveals that **the improving relations between USA, USSR and China** had led to the growing irrelevance of the Cambodian issue; **and ASEAN by being so closely associated with it, was also by extension, becoming increasingly irrelevant.**

LIFT/INFER	EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES	EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE	CONCLUSION
<p>Although it seems to demonstrate ASEAN's relevance as a member of ASEAN (Indonesia) was Co-Chair of the Paris Conference together with France, it demonstrates that in reality, the Conference had failed to achieve its aims due to the great powers' (USA, USSR and China) "lack of urgency for a speedy and comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict." Moreover, despite the close links with US, ASEAN was nevertheless unable to convince the US to take a firm stance on "breaking the deadlock on Cambodia".</p>	<p>Can cross-refer to CK to support the source + explain the changing context of international relations. Although American and Chinese interests were against USSR's in the Cambodian Crisis, as the former supported the Cambodian Government in exile, whereas the latter supported Vietnam, and by extension the incumbent government in Cambodia; USA and USSR were keen not to allow this issue to affect bilateral relations, which were at a highpoint, as seen from the subsequent declaration by Bush and Gorbachev on the end of the Cold War at the Malta Summit on 3 December 1989.</p>	<p>Likely to be reliable – credible academic, no hidden agenda. Very useful. Written in 2005, able to give a nuanced assessment of ASEAN's role across the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. While it acknowledges ASEAN's previous visibility in the conflict, it also demonstrates the impact of the changing international context on ASEAN's increasing irrelevance in the handling of the Cambodian conflict.</p>	<p>Very strong evidence which challenges hypothesis.</p>

Source E challenges the hypothesis, as it credits the UN and other players for helping to resolve the Cambodian issue, but has no mention of ASEAN's agency in it.

LIFT/INFER	EVALUATION OF CONTENT: CROSS-REFERENCES	EVALUATION OF PROVENANCE	CONCLUSION
<p>Although Indonesia's contribution was hinted at, given that it was made Co-Chair at the first Paris Conference on Cambodia, it was acknowledged as a country, rather than as a representative of ASEAN.</p> <p>Moreover, this Conference failed to provide a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, and it fell to the Security Council to discuss a proposal put forward by Australia in the attempt to seek a more comprehensive resolution.</p>	<p>Use CK to challenge the reliability of the source. Glaring omission of the role of ASEAN in the handling of the conflict.</p> <p>CK: The ASEAN-sponsored resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, which called for a durable and comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea, received consistent support from the international community since 1979. With Indonesia as interlocutor, ASEAN maintained its dialogue with all parties to the conflict which eventually led to the Jakarta Informal Meetings (July 1988) in which the four Cambodian factions would be able to hold a dialogue towards peace and national reconciliation.</p>	<p>While it may be reliable, as it has demonstrated both the limitations and achievements of the UN in the handling of the Cambodian Crisis; its utility in response to the hypothesis may be limited.</p> <p>While it acknowledges the agency of other agents such as Indonesia, Japan and Australia, its utility may be limited as there appears to be a glaring omission of ASEAN's role in sponsoring the UNGA resolutions, and of Indonesia's role as being a representative of ASEAN.</p>	<p>Not very strong evidence, as utility may be limited.</p>

Conclusion

Comparative judgement:

Challenge set is slightly preferred to the support set of sources, as the latter appears to have a hidden agenda in terms of the need to portray ASEAN's relevance as an organisation. Whereas Sources A and C from the challenge set are very strong evidence as they are both reliable and useful in providing a more nuanced assessment of ASEAN's handling of the Cambodian Crisis. Hence, the sources largely do not support the view that ASEAN's handling of the Cambodian Crisis proved its relevance as a regional grouping, as while ASEAN has done much in terms of raising the profile of the conflict to the international community, they were ultimately unable to resolve the conflict, as this was subject to the agendas of the Great Powers – USA, USSR and China.