

## Suggested options (International History Preliminary Examinations 2014)

How far do Sources A to E support the view that UN peacekeeping missions are completely ineffective?

Supports the Hypothesis	Levels 2-3: Evidence at Face Value Sources seem to be supporting the hypothesis	Levels 4-5: Evaluation Reliability, Utility and Credibility
<u>Source C</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emphasizes that the UN peacekeeping missions had been a failure due to the following reasons</li> <li>- 1. “continued lack of clarity about how the United Nations should intervene when its members lack either the military force or the political will — or both — to halt carnage.”</li> <li>- 2. “But some experts say the most important fix is perhaps the hardest. The United Nations, they say, needs to avoid sending missions to countries where there is not yet a real peace to keep.”</li> <li>- 3. “But many feel that peacekeeping has become a panacea, with the deployment of United Nations forces considered proof that the world is paying attention to a crisis, whether the troops are effective or not.”</li> </ul>	<p><b>Reliability check:</b></p> <p>Students can refer to their contextual knowledge on the UN peacekeeping missions and how it fulfils the four points listed out by the author of Source C</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. An attempt to capture Aidid in the Battle of Mogadishu (October 1993) was launched by US marines (and supported by UNOSOM II). It failed miserably and the repercussions were immense: Bodies of US marines were dragged through the streets by civilians and Somali militant fighters. Media coverage convinced the American people that a protracted stay in Somalia was not prudent. The US withdrew its forces on 31 Mar 1994; France, Belgium and Sweden did the same by end 1994</li> <li>2. Although UNITAF achieved short-term success in ensuring the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM II was a dismal failure: General Farah Aidid was in no mood to be forcibly disarmed or to share power as a result of a settlement (unwillingness of combatant to comply with third party mediation) Ambushes increased and attacks intensified on UNOSOM II in Mogadishu. More and more UN forces were killed and more bloody skirmishes between Aidid and UNOSOM II broke out. Aidid evidently had no respect for the mandate of UNOSOM II</li> <li>3. Live-footage in international media of gruesome starvation and fanatic tribal forces led to civil anarchy in which UNOSOM I could not control or alleviate. There was increasing clamour from the American public/media for an end to the sufferings, especially with the plight of the Somali people being brought to international attention.</li> </ol> <p><b>Credibility check:</b></p> <p>NIL</p>
<u>Source D</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- John Bolton, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006 highlights the perceived failures of UN peacekeeping missions, specifically pinpointing the Security-Council for the</li> </ul>	<p><b>Reliability check:</b></p> <p>Students can cross reference to source C as both key points are similar to source C assertion that UN was only acting to peer pressure to handle all perceived humanitarian</p>

	<p>shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping missions. Key points to take note of were;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1. "that too often the member-governments on the Security Council are all too happy to get a particular issue off the front pages of the newspapers..."</li> <li>- 2. "...if the parties to the conflict themselves were not prepared to move toward a resolution, the Security Council had to consider terminating the peacekeeping operation."</li> </ul>	<p>crises and that it's difficult to keep peace when the parties to the conflict are reluctant to do so.</p> <p><b>Credibility check:</b></p> <p>Vested interests of source creator: John Bolton is likely to have vested interests in articulating that his country in the Security Council had done the best it could for all the peacekeeping missions.</p> <p>Source content does not pursue vested interests: Source content actually lay the blame on the Security Council</p> <p>As the source content does not pursue vested interests, the source has high credibility.</p>
<p><b><u>Source E</u></b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Emphasizes that the UN peacekeeping missions are not equipped to handle the types of conflict prevalent post-Cold War. Key phrase used were UN peacekeepers "tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation."</li> </ul>	<p><b>Reliability check</b></p> <p>Again students can highlight that the UN operations were ill-planned and foolish in trying for "peace enforcement" in Somalia.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The UN strayed away from a pragmatic and cautious mediating / peacekeeping role at the request of parties of civil war into a forceful intervention to settle the conflict which was not in the first place sanctioned by the parties of that conflict</li> <li>- All actions were useless when the most powerful of the local leaders (Aidid) was demonstrably not ready for a peaceful settlement and were un-awed by high technological weapons</li> <li>- The SC did not learn from earlier practices of steering clear of bloody civil wars / conflicts, e.g. Sudan</li> <li>- The UN operations were ill-planned and foolish in trying for "peace enforcement" in a country that is irrevocably split into 2 with no immediate prospects for the restoration of central government.</li> <li>- Peace enforcement encounters difficulties in environments where no clear aggressor can be identified, and is doomed to failure if parties are not ready for peace</li> </ul> <p><b>Credibility check</b></p> <p>Vested interests of source creator: Report was commissioned by Sec-Gen and the person-in-charge of the panel was Lakhdar Brahimi, ex-UN official. It is not far-fetched to suggest that the report would try its best to project peacekeeping missions as fundamental and viable to the organization.</p> <p>Source content does not pursue vested interests: Source content was highly critical of the UN</p>

		and its peacekeeping missions.
<b>Challenges the Hypothesis</b>	<b>Levels 2-3: Evidence at Face Value Sources seem to be challenging the hypothesis</b>	<b>Levels 4-5: Evaluation Reliability, Utility and Credibility</b>
<b><u>Source A</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- States that the UN peacekeeping was “a vital tool in the hands of the world body for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Further reaffirm the success of peacekeeping by pointing out that the “success of peacekeeping has led to high expectations and a surge in demand.”</li> <li>- Also reminded the audience that with great expectations and demands on the missions, it needs to evolve to cater the to the challenges.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Reliability check:</b></p> <p>Students can explain the rise of peacekeeping missions post-Cold War using contextual knowledge.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In the late 1980s, as bipolarity began to dissolve, there was an explosion of new peacekeeping commitments: This was unlike the period from 1945 to 1978, where only 15 operations were established, with 3 missions involving observer corps of less than 100</li> <li>- In this new era, the five permanent members of the SC cooperated in forming coalitions and peacekeeping entities in contrast to the confrontations and vetoes of the Cold War</li> <li>- Unconstrained by superpower rivalry, the UN was strengthened by active superpower participation at the operational level of peacekeeping</li> </ul> <p><b>Credibility check:</b></p> <p>Vested interests of source creator: As this is from the President of the United Nations General Assembly, there are clearly vested interests in relating optimistically to the notion of increased and successful UN peacekeeping. Thus this source has low credibility</p>
<b><u>Source B</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Source highlights some of the successes of the UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, Kashmir, Cyprus, the Congo, and West New Guinea, thus proving that they were not a completely ineffective.</li> <li>-</li> </ul>	<p><b>Reliability check:</b></p> <p>Students can refer to their contextual knowledge to prove the source’s claim on UN success in the Middle East, Kashmir, Cyprus, the Congo, and West New Guinea.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNEF I in the Middle East was temporary and its objective was to achieve the mutual disengagement of opposing forces and the stabilisation of the general situation. The UN was successful in its first ever peacekeeping operation because it achieved the limited BUT feasible objectives</li> </ul> <p>Students can also challenge that UN peacekeeping in Congo was a failure instead.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The ONUC was the largest, most controversial and most expensive peacekeeping operation during the CW. It was in the Congo for 4 years, numbered more than 20,000 troops and the budget amounted to over \$400 million. The shocking incidents of murder,</li> </ul>

		<p>atrocities and attacks on UN personnel also made the international community increasingly disillusioned as to the actual progress of peacekeeping (and peace enforcement)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Furthermore, the Soviet Union and France did not regard the costs of the Congo operations as regular expenses of the UN and refused to pay. Because of the huge budget over Congo, the UN for the rest of the Cold War period was unable to mount a peacekeeping operation on a similar scale</li></ul> <p><b>Credibility check</b></p> <p>Vested interests of source creator: As this is from the Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee there are clearly vested interests in providing a glowing account of the effectiveness of its prize winner. Thus this source has low credibility</p>
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## **2. Assess the significance of the Truman Doctrine in the development of the Cold War.**

The Truman Doctrine is often perceived as the political expressions of containment which emerged as the paradigm for US Cold War policy between 1947 and 1948. It was significant in revealing the hardening of US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union as a response to perceived Soviet aggression. It further aggravated the relationship between both countries as the USSR responded with Zhdanov's two-camp speech. Nonetheless, Truman Doctrine was the political expression of US policy while the Marshall Plan was its manifestation. Marshall Plan has greater scope of impact and provoked more substantive Soviet response, for example heightened Sovietization and the formation of COMECON. As a superpower conflict, it is also important to note that the Truman Doctrine articulates a shift in US foreign policy but doesn't account for Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and hence fails to articulate the various facets of Cold War division. And lastly, one needs to consider how the Berlin Blockade further served to crystallize Cold War divisions via a military standoff.

## **3. To what extent was the Cuban Missile Crisis a Cold War conflict?**

The Cuban Missile Crisis had its roots in regional conflict where the US and Cuba clashed over national and economic interests in Cuba itself. After the success of the revolution in 1959, Castro quickly initiated a programme of land redistribution. This involved the confiscation of American-owned sugar plantations and mills and this action puts it at odds with Kennedy's administration. The conflict evolved into one of a Cold War conflict when Castro turned to the Soviets for help after the botched Bay of Pigs operation. Khrushchev took the opportunity to install missiles on Cuba as a defensive measure to deter an American invasion. The regional conflict took a backseat to superpower interests as Kennedy and Khrushchev escalate the conflict into one of nuclear brinkmanship and the threat of M.A.D. The resolution of the conflict was again largely dominated by Cold War politics and it ended as most Cold War conflicts, armed tension but no direct military conflict between the superpowers. Cuba was largely sidelined in the conflict resolution, with most of the superpowers' concerns addressed first.

## **4. "The USA must shoulder all the blame for the ills in the global economy since the 1970s." How far do you agree with this statement?**

The poor state of the USA economy pushed President Nixon to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold in 1971. The subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods system led to more than a decade of floating exchanging rates and global economic instability, ending the longest period of sustained economic growth in the industrialized world. At the losing end of the rising economic competition, USA also countered with their protectionist policies, only serving to further slowdown the global economy. Some could argue that the oil crisis in 1973 also comes about of USA foreign policies in the Middle East and the Yom Kippur War. Nonetheless, protectionism was not only practice by developed countries but also least developed countries, which dealt

damage to the global economy by undermining the economic growth of individual states and exacerbating trade imbalances, thus contributing to the eventual collapse of the global economy's structural pillar: the Bretton Woods system. OPEC has to be responsible for starting the oil crisis in 1973. The LDC governments (esp. Latin America) were also culpable in exacerbating their own plight, blending ISI (protectionist policies) with an overdependence on foreign loans which contributed to an overwhelming debt spiral in the Third World. Last but not least, non-state actors were also culpable for the debt crisis, even if the Third World countries needed to take most of the blame for their own plight.

**5. To what extent was protectionism the cause of the decline in the Japanese economy since 1989?**

The Japanese government was culpable for the decline of the Japanese economy since 1989 because of the stagnant sectors of the economy which had emerged due to its protectionist policies. Not only did protectionism result in structural flaws as mentioned above in the Japanese economy, but it also triggered counter protectionist responses by developed and developing countries. However, we would also need to consider how the Japanese government also failed to address the rigidities of business conglomerates under the keiretsu system. The institutional problems has manifested in the asset price bubble crisis of the 1980s which led to a prolonged economic decline in Japan. Both government and the banks were to be blamed for their role in the expansion of the asset price bubble to a point where it became unsustainable. And lastly, the close relationship between government and business interests created further institutional problems in the economy as the political leadership was unable to implement effective and far-sighted leadership or decisive reform whilst being entangled in a web of vested interests.

**6. "Nationalism was the main impediment to the resolution of the Kashmir issue." How far do you agree with this statement?**

The roots of the contention between India and Pakistan have indeed stemmed from conflicting statehood visions, as both state actors have staked claims upon Kashmir based on their respective secular and religious nationalisms. We would also need to consider the nationalist aspirations of the Kashmiris themselves, and how it further complicates the conflict. Nonetheless, nationalism alone is not the main impediment to the resolution of the Kashmir issue. It is crucial to note that a more complete explanation of the evolution of the conflict necessitates a consideration of the interests of non-state actors such as religious fundamentalists which serve to explain the radicalization and intensification of the Kashmir conflict. Contextual shifts in the evolution of the conflict have also involved the intrusion of Cold War influences and the internationalization of the conflict, hence incorporating the intervention of external state actors who had their own narrow parochial interests in the conflict, instead of conflicting nationalist aims.