


Candidate's Name: _____

CT Group: _____

Index no: _____



PIONEER JUNIOR COLLEGE

H2 HISTORY

JC 2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2014

H2 9731/02 History of Southeast Asia, 1900 – 1997

DATE: 25/09/2014 (THU)

TIME: 0800–1100

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES:

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

Write your answers on the separate answer papers provided.

If you use more than one sheet of paper, fasten the sheets together.

Attach this cover page on top of your answer scripts upon submission of paper.

Information to candidates:

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

You are reminded of the need for grammatically correct English and clear presentation in your answers.

For official use:

Question No.	Full Marks	Marks Obtained
(1)	/25	
()	/25	
()	/25	
()	/25	
	TOTAL: 100	

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Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

ASEAN AND THE CAMBODIAN CRISIS

1 Read the sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

ASEAN learned a great deal from its concerted opposition to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Its members discovered the diplomatic benefits of being part of a larger organisation, and it grew considerably as an institution. The habits of cooperation and consultation became an ingrained part of the ASEAN process. However, ASEAN ran solidly into its own limitations. Its ability to affect regional security was constrained by the parameters set by great powers. ASEAN needed to call on outside support in order to be an effective and credible opposition to Vietnamese aspirations. In the end, even the extent to which ASEAN itself was a coherent organisation is questionable. The ASEAN states' common interest in opposing Vietnam was strained by conflicting perceptions of long-term regional security and their own economic and political interest. Thailand diplomatic about-face, in many ways, undermined the process of consultation and consensus. There were key failures in ASEAN-led negotiations and the critical change in international context was a key determiner as well. Overall ASEAN did not emerge from its Vietnam-Cambodian experience as a unified and coherent regional institution.

From a book written by a historian, 2002.

Source B

There was also a perception that Vietnam's advance (into Cambodia) would enlarge the influence of the Soviet Union, Vietnam's principal backer at that time, and thus upset the regional balance. In this respect, ASEAN had the support of China, the USA, most of Western Europe and the majority at the UN General Assembly, where ASEAN led the campaign to keep Cambodia's UN seat for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). At the same time ASEAN led the search for a political settlement of all contending factions in Cambodia and eventually of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. A settlement finally arrived through a series of conferences in Paris following ASEAN-brokered and Indonesian-led meetings (JIM I and II) among the Cambodian parties.

*From a research paper written by former ASEAN Secretary-General,
Rodolfo C. Severino, 2008.*

Source C

The time has come for ASEAN to lay down its heavy and now risky burden of trying to find a solution to the Cambodian problem if it is not to suffer further humiliation and hurt from its Western partners. The villains and victims that ASEAN and its Western allies had agreed upon eleven years ago have been unilaterally and unexpectedly reversed by the

latter. The new objectives, now that accord has been reached between the Western nations and the Soviet Union, required that the Vietnamese, rather than the Cambodians, should win the battle for Cambodia. It was fear of the Soviet Union which earlier prompted the Western powers to cheer ASEAN's efforts to force the Soviets' proxy to disgorge its fruit of aggression. But since Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev descended from the mountain five years ago bearing the perestroika and glasnost tablets proclaiming an end to the East-West Cold War, it has become necessary to reward the Soviets by ditching the Cambodian coalition and reinstating the Vietnamese as the overlords of all Indochina. Hence the need to also ditch the ASEAN solution.

Former Singapore Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, in an article contribution to the Straits Times, 1990.

Source D

Immediately after the Vietnamese intervention, the ASEAN standing committee issued a statement that deplored the escalation and enlargement of the conflict in Indochina and called for conformity to the principles of the UN charter as well as the Bandung Declaration. The core of ASEAN's policy hinged upon its perception that Vietnam's intervention was illegal and unjust. The most successful implementation of ASEAN's policy was its use of the UN. It supported the move for the recognition of Democratic Kampuchea regime in the UN. It also called for a total and immediate withdrawal of forces from Cambodia and the convening of an international conference which would achieve a political settlement inclusive of UN-sponsored elections. In order to consolidate its position, the Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin regime held elections in 1981. ASEAN rejected this and questioned the validity of an election that compelled the Cambodians to accept a foreign-backed regime. Denouncing the elections, ASEAN called for the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolutions which sought a comprehensive and durable solution to the conflict and also asked for UN-sponsored elections.

From an online academic article, 2011.

Source E

ASEAN played a prominent diplomatic role during the Cambodian conflict, especially in keeping the issue in the political limelight at the United Nations. In attempting to bring pressure to bear on Vietnam to withdraw, however, it did not act alone but was part of an international division of labour, including China and the United States, which employed complementary military and economic instruments of coercion. There was a period during the late 1980s when ASEAN, under the leadership of Indonesia, which had been accorded an interlocutor role in dealing with Vietnam, held a series of informal meetings in Jakarta in an attempt to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict on a regional basis but without evident success.

An academic article on the ASEAN peace process, 1999.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A-E support the view that ASEAN played a key role in the successful resolution of the Cambodian Crisis?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three countries**.

- 2 'Without the provision of Western education, nationalist movements would not have emerged during the pre-war period in Southeast Asia.' To what extent do you agree with this statement?
- 3 Assess the view that the Southeast Asian nationalist movements deserved the greatest credit for the successful post-war decolonisation process.
- 4 'Communism was never seriously regarded as a viable option in the search for political structures and governments.' Discuss with reference to the independent states of Southeast Asia.
- 5 To what extent was the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 the result of excessive foreign influence over the Southeast Asian economies?
- 6 'Inter-state tensions only served to impede the various regional cooperation initiatives by the independent Southeast Asian states.' How far do you agree with this statement?

---THE END---