



HISTORY

9731/02

Paper 2 History of Southeast Asia, c.1900-1997

Wednesday, 27 August 2014

3 hours

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your name and civics tutorial group in the spaces provided on the cover page and on every sheet of answer paper.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Write clearly the question numbers on the first page of every question attempted and the cover page.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid and tape.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

You are reminded of the need for good English and clear handwriting in your answer, and to leave two lines between each paragraph on the answer paper.

This document consists of **4** printed pages.

Section A

You must answer Question 1

ASEAN IN THE DISPUTES WITH CHINA OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

1 Read the sources and then answer the question which follows.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

During January 1995 the aptly named Mischief Reef was the latest Spratly feature to be occupied by one of the six claimants – in this instance, the People's Republic of China (PRC). This westward expansion of installations continues a pattern of Chinese conduct, and brings the contest close to the Philippine home islands. In directly confronting a member of ASEAN, China might be giving a warning to ASEAN, which is about to add Vietnam as its newest member. The PRC is pressing ASEAN's weakest member in a part of the South China Sea outside that claimed by other current members (Brunei and Malaysia). This reduces the likelihood of a strong ASEAN response from an organisation that is already divided on how to proceed in the Spratlys. Once the PRC reduced the number of ships at the Reef, appeals by the other ASEAN countries appeared to taper off. On 18 March the ASEAN foreign ministers issued a statement expressing serious concern over developments in the South China Sea. They urged all parties to observe the Manila Declaration and specifically called for 'an early resolution of the problems caused by recent developments in Mischief Reef.' On 22 March Vietnam endorsed the ASEAN ministers' relatively mild statement of concern.

Excerpt from an article by an American government official and expert in international boundary issues, 1995.

Source B

In March 1995, the ASEAN foreign ministers reprimanded China through a joint statement expressing serious concern over developments in the South China Sea; the Association referred to the spirit of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, or the Manila Declaration, in reiterating its call for restraint from destabilising actions. Meanwhile, ASEAN encouraged China to participate in 'a network of regional organisations' and workshops or, what has been termed, an 'embryonic structure of good international citizenship'. Despite these efforts, Beijing maintained its long-held position that it was willing to enter into bilateral discussions with other claimant states but that it would not enter into multilateral negotiations with ASEAN.

The period between 1992 and 1995 represented the height of ASEAN solidarity over the South China Sea disputes. However, while ASEAN unity de-escalated public and official tensions over the dispute, China continued its 'creeping assertiveness', and by 1999 it had further fortified its structures in disputed territories, including Mischief Reef.

Excerpt from an article on the role of ASEAN by two Australian academics, 2012.

Source C

The attempts to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea began with informal diplomacy and some agreements became formal intergovernmental positions. For example, the principles of cooperation agreed by the South China Sea Workshop in 1991 became in 1992 the formal ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. The Workshop's formulation of cooperative efforts in the fields of marine science, environmental protection, safety of navigation and others have similarly been initiated in the larger context by other formal forums, including the dialogues between ASEAN and China and in the ASEAN Regional Forum. The good lesson that can be learned from this process is that informal initiatives can be very useful in inducing formal cooperation, albeit in areas other than the South China Sea.

Comment by an Indonesia convener of the annual Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, 2001.

Source D

The first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meeting took place in 1994. It was generally agreed that the situation in the South China Sea was one of the flashpoints of potential conflict in the region. However, sensitive to China's preference for bilateral rather than multilateral discussions on the subject, the ARF took up the South China Sea over dinner rather than during meetings, even though meetings were held behind closed doors. The next year, with alarm and concern rising as a result of the discovery in Mischief Reef, the ARF ministers included a paragraph expressing concern on developments in the South China Sea in their chairman's statement. Subsequent ARF chairman's statements carried references to the South China Sea. For a number of years, ASEAN continued seeking to 'internationalise' the South China Sea issue, not only in ASEAN and ARF meetings but in other international gatherings as well.

Excerpt from a book by Rudolfo Severino, ASEAN Secretary-General from 1998-2002, 2010.

Source E

Lauro Baja, the Filipino Assistant Secretary for Asian Pacific Affairs, described the Philippines as 'an orphan in its campaign' to internationalise the South China Sea issue in recent years. 'On Mischief Reef, we were left alone. The other countries said that while they sympathise and understand our situation, the issue is only a Philippine-China problem'. He added that the Spratlys had no immediate significance to Manila's 'so-called friends in the international community ... even some of our ASEAN friends are either mute, timid or cannot go beyond espousal of the general principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and polite words of understanding given in the corridors or meeting rooms.'

Whether the Philippines can lead ASEAN in a diplomatic campaign to challenge the Chinese claim to the South China Sea in the same way that Singapore and Thailand did against Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia is questionable.

Excerpt from an article by a Singaporean academic, 1999.

Now answer the following question.

'ASEAN made no real difference in the disputes with China over the South China Sea in the 1990s.' How far do Sources A to E support this view?

Section B

You must answer **THREE** questions in this section.

You must support each answer with examples drawn from **at least three** countries.

- 2 To what extent were colonial policies against nationalist movements before 1941 characterised more by suppression than by accommodation?
- 3 Assess the view that Southeast Asian nationalism was transformed by the experience of Japanese Occupation.
- 4 'The communist parties in Southeast Asia had been marginalised since independence.' Discuss.
- 5 'Economic policies towards the minorities were the most effective in ensuring stability in Southeast Asian states since independence.' How far do you agree with this view?
- 6 How successful have Southeast Asian nations been in resolving tensions that have arisen between them?

End of Paper