

<b>Name:</b>		<b>Index Number:</b>		<b>Class:</b>	
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**DUNMAN HIGH SCHOOL**  
**Preliminary Examination**  
**Year 6**

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**H2 HISTORY**

**9731/ 01**

Paper 1 International History 1945-2000

**16 September 2014**

**3 hours**

Additional Materials:                      Answer Paper

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**READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your Centre number, index number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

**Section A**

Answer **Question 1**.

**Section B**

Answer **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

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This document consists of **4** printed pages.

**[Turn over**

### Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

#### UN Peacekeeping in Congo

- 1 Read the sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1** candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the sources both individually and as a group.

#### Source A

*Interviewer:* You were making things up as you went along.

*Sir Brian Urquhart:* Well, few of us even knew where the Congo was. That's how prepared we were. But we had to make it up as we went along, and for about two months, it was an extraordinary success. We did manage to get things quieted down. We got the Belgians out. We managed to get the government going again. But then, unfortunately, three months later the Congo broke out on Cold War lines. While the United States backed President Joseph Kasavubu who was a rather dim figure, the Soviet Union backed Lumumba, the prime minister, who was a firebrand and an extremely volatile figure. So you had a civil war, on which was superimposed the Cold War in the outside world, and that was a nightmare. We kept going for another four years but it was very, very difficult.

*Adapted from an interview with Sir Brian Urquhart, advisor to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the Congo, 1996.*

#### Source B

"The head of the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly said among other things, that the present Secretary-General has always been biased against socialist countries, that he has used the United Nations to support the colonial forces fighting the Congolese Government and Parliament in order to impose "a new yoke on the Congo" and finally, that if I myself cannot muster the courage to resign, "we [the Soviet Union] shall draw the inevitable conclusions from the situation". In support of his challenge, the representative of the Soviet Union said that there is no room for a man who has, "violated the elementary principles of justice in such an important post as that of Secretary-General". In this context, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke of courage. It is very easy to resign. It is not so easy to stay on. It is very easy to bow to the wishes of a Big Power. It is another matter to resist. As is well known to all members of this Assembly, I have done so before on many occasions and in many directions. If it is the wish of those nations who see in the Organisation their best protections in the present world, I shall now do so again".

*From Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's response to Soviet calls for his resignation at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1960.*

**Source C**

By mid-1961, the Secretary-General had been relieved of much of the Soviet and radical Afro-Asian pressure which has surrounded the *troika* debates and the murder of Lumumba. Certainly, the Cold War dimension to the Congo question was less marked than previously as both Moscow and Washington were now committed to a unified Congo. Buoyed by perceived victories over ONUC, Tshombe had greater confidence in pursuing the secessionist cause, leading to an escalation of the crisis in Katanga. In response, a new Security Council resolution was adopted in November with further implications for ONUC mandate. The UN now committed itself to an even more forceful approach and ONUC was instructed to take 'vigorous action' including the use of force, to end Katangese secession.

*From an academic book on UN peacekeeping in the Cold War, 1999.*

**Source D**

Fatally, the breach between Kasavubu and Lumumba was cast in ideological terms that could be drawn out beyond the Congo into the broader Cold War context. Lumumba became the revolutionary, pro-Soviet prophet of Afro-Asian liberation. Kasavubu on the other hand, became the pragmatic and helpful friend of the west. ONUC was caught in the middle of a squabble which was rapidly mutating into an international crisis. The Security Council was fundamentally divided on developments in Leopoldville, which were now cast in explicitly Cold War terms. As a result, the Security Council found it impossible to quickly agree on a direction for ONUC. The principle of UN intervention in domestic affairs was now meaningless. With Kasavubu and Lumumba continuing to insist that each was the legitimate leader of the Congo state, any action of the UN would inevitably be perceived as partial.

*From an academic book on UN peacekeeping, 2002.*

**Source E**

In both its military and civilian aspects, any United Nations operation would require close and daily contact with the central government. The relations between the Congolese government and the United Nations by and large have been tolerable, although they have seldom been very happy. In a situation where the government has to lean so heavily on United Nations assistance, problematic relations with the United Nations posed a serious challenge. In this regard, I cannot help but recall my own experience with Mr Lumumba back in August 1960, when I was rejecting almost daily demands from them that elements of the United Nations Force be put instantly at the disposal and at the command of the Congolese government. Also, I suppose one cannot speak of the United Nations operation in Congo without some reference to the attempted secession of Katanga, which has more than any single factor, complicated and bedeviled the post-independence history of the Congo.

*Adapted from an article by Ralph Bunche on his experience as Under-Secretary-General in Congo, 1964.*

Now answer the following question.

*How far do Sources A to E show that the Cold War impeded UN peacekeeping in Congo?*

**[Turn over**

**Section B**

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 How far do you agree that the development of the Cold War in Europe was unexpected by the US and USSR?
- 3 Assess the claim that the end of the Cold War brought about more stability than instability.
- 4 “Japan’s economic growth had been nothing less than an economic miracle.” Discuss the validity of the statement from 1945 – 2000.
- 5 How far do you agree that protectionism posed more challenges to the development of the global economy than the oil crisis between 1970 and 2000?
- 6 To what extent were India and Pakistan responsible for accelerating the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir from 1947 to 2000?

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*Copyright Acknowledgements:*

Question 1 Source A	© <a href="http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/PubEd/research/UN/Urquhart/urquhart6.html">http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/PubEd/research/UN/Urquhart/urquhart6.html</a>
Question 1 Source B	© <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/time1960.htm">http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/time1960.htm</a>
Question 1 Source C	© Norrie MacQueen, <i>The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War</i> , 1999.
Question 1 Source D	© Norrie MacQueen, <i>United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960</i> , 2002.
Question 1 Source E	© Ralph Johnson Bunche, <i>Ralph J. Bunche: Selected Speeches and Writings</i> , 1995.