



**HWA CHONG INSTITUTION**  
**JC2 Preliminary Examination**  
**Higher 2**

**CANDIDATE  
NAME**

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**CT GROUP**

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**CHINA STUDIES IN ENGLISH H2**

**9733/01**

Paper 1

**16 September 2014**

**1hr 30 min**

Additional Materials: Writing Paper

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**READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST**

Write your **name** and **CT class** clearly in the spaces at the top of this page.  
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.  
Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, and glue or correction fluid.

Answer **ALL** the questions

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.  
The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

## Case Study

### Effective Governance in China

1 Read the following sources and answer all the questions that follow.

#### Source A

Since taking power in 2002–2003, General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have committed the administration to improving the quality of governance and, in particular, improving the lot of those who have not benefitted so well from the reforms to date. With substantial political reform ruled off the agenda anytime soon, policy is also focused on improving the quality of local officials and instilling in them a more upright, moral vision of what a good official should be — a Confucian notion in all but name.

In a survey conducted on 4,000 respondents on their attitude towards government, two clear trends are visible. Citizens ‘disaggregate’ the state and, while they express high levels of satisfaction with the central government, satisfaction declines with each lower level of government. While in 2009, 95.9 per cent were either relatively or extremely satisfied with the central government, this dropped to 61.5 per cent at the local level. In China, local governments provide almost all public services and the fact that satisfaction levels decline as one gets closer to the people is a worrying sign. However, satisfaction with lower levels of government has risen steadily since Hu and Wen took over leadership, rising from 43.6 per cent. In the villages, the highest and the lowest income earners are the most satisfied. This would suggest that the wealthy have done well under the current system, while the poorest are clearly responding to such Hu-Wen policy initiatives as the abolition of the agricultural tax or the extension of medical insurance and basic welfare guarantees.

Adapted from an article entitled ‘*Chinese governance seen through the people’s eyes*’ taken from the East Asia Forum, July 2011

#### Source B

Central and provincial leaders like to portray themselves as benign, and in many countryside localities this image still retains much legitimacy. To outside observers, this legitimacy may seem puzzling, since the Party central in Beijing is often far from the scene of contention yet holds ultimate responsibility for defects of the political system. Paradoxically, the distance to central power, as referred to in the old and much used proverb “the mountains are high and the emperor is far away”, is of benefit to central, provincial and local officials alike. For local officials, the power of the central government is too distant from everyday governance to effectively enforce policy implementation in what at times come across as rural fiefdoms. More often than not Beijing is unable or unwilling to intervene. Yet belief among local people, the *laobaixing*, and trust in the good heart and sincerity of officials at higher administrative levels continue to be strong. When on occasion a local blame game starts, accusations are directed at the local officials. And such beliefs about evil local leaders and benign central cadres seem to have played out also in the Wukan case, especially after the Governor and Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, Wang Yang, gave the matter high-level attention in December 2011. His deputy, Zhu Mingguo, was soon engaged in a face-to-face dialogue with the Wukan villagers, effectively bypassing county level officials of Lufeng that the villagers did not trust.

Extract from ‘*The Wukan Uprising and Chinese State-Society Relations: Toward “Shadow Civil Society?”*’ from **International Journal of China Studies Vol. 3, No. 3, December 2012**

## Source C

Despite the legal guarantee of autonomy under PRC laws, minorities are not able to affect legislation or exercise significant self-governance in their own communities. This is due to a lack of preconditions for public participation, such as physical security, adequate levels of education, and financial resources, all of which shows how the PRC government's state sponsored development schemes result in the marginalisation of minorities. Furthermore, the government's violations of cultural rights, including those related to language and religious practice, exacerbate the vulnerable situation of minorities in China.

As a result, there has been growing unrest, not only among minorities living in the autonomous regions, but also among the Han majority throughout China. The growth of social unrest first became apparent publicly in July 2005, when the Ministry of Public Security revealed that the number of 'mass incidents' had risen by 30 per cent in 2004 to 74,000, and that a total of 3.8 million people had participated in these demonstrations. On 19 January 2006, the Ministry announced that there were 87,000 cases of disturbances of public order recorded in 2005.

In response to these challenges to the regime's legitimacy, Hu Jintao's 'harmonious society' is a thinly veiled campaign to crack down and exert more power over society. Rather than addressing the root problems of these protests, such as structural changes and ensuring more human and minority rights protection, the government is focusing on crackdowns and repression, using scare tactics to ensure that no one dares to act or speak out. This is evident from its trend of PLA militarisation, the rise in violence in its responses to protest, including the use of thug violence, and riot-suppression tactics used by the PAP.

Adapted from a report from the Human Rights in China entitled '*China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalisation and Rising Tensions*', 2007

## Source D

China's recent performance has certainly been impressive. Yet recent official conduct in China, by turns extravagant and brutal, should give observers pause for thought. It has emerged that Bo Xilai, former Communist Party secretary of mega-city Chongqing and a rising star in the party, systematically terrorised and exploited his municipality. Bo and his wife allegedly sent hundreds of millions of dollars out of the country; she is the prime suspect in the murder of a British businessman; he is said to have plotted to kill his own police chief. Abuse of power was practised throughout their extended family, of which Bo Xilai was merely the *capo di tutti capi*\*. Bo Xilai's behaviour may have been more extreme than that of most senior officials. But corruption is widely entrenched throughout the country. There are Bo Xilais in other cities and provinces, too. This has deleterious consequences for government revenues, business efficiency, and social harmony -- all important elements of national power. Nor is corruption limited to the civil authorities. Recent reporting reveals that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is riddled with it.

The case of the blind lawyer and activist Chen Guangcheng is, in many ways, just as telling as that of Bo Xilai. Chen's mistreatment by local authorities, who were infuriated at his campaigns against forced abortions and sterilisations, reveals the feebleness of China's rule of law, the tensions between the centre of power and the periphery, and the discrimination and abuses that can be a part of Chinese life. His escape from house arrest and its unfolding consequences demonstrate that, despite Beijing's wishes, these blemishes are not purely an internal matter.

\* *capo di tutti capi* means 'boss of all bosses'

Adapted from an article entitled '*China's Biggest Challenge Isn't Military or Economic, It's Basic Governance*', from The Atlantic, 2012

## Source E

The growth of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in China since has not always been a smooth one. But in recent years that tight control has relaxed again, largely out of necessity. Rapid urbanisation and a more complex society mean that the party can no longer provide everything for its citizens as once it did, or claimed to. Anger over inadequate social services could put at risk the domestic stability that underpins the party's rule. Nor does it help that the central government has pushed responsibility for health, education and other services onto local governments that are unwilling or unable to pay for them.

The array of unofficial NGOs that have sprung up over the past decade is remarkable. Some are inspired by religious faith: Christian doctors setting up a local clinic to fill gaps left by the health-care system, or Buddhists caring for the elderly. Idealism is far from dead, as the Communist Party increasingly appreciates. When party leaders sent out researchers to look into NGOs, they realised, that NGOs are not all revolutionaries who want to overthrow the party—as they had thought.

Behind the growth is the irrepressible rise of a new middle class. It shares the party's desire for stability. But some members, at least, also want new ways to participate in society. Party leaders, now only vaguely constrained by Communist ideology, have a new sense that something is to be gained by co-opting such activist citizens rather than suppressing them. It may, they think, offer a way of providing some of the social support that the party can no longer supply on its own.

Adapted from an article entitled '*Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier*', from The Economist, April 2014

Answer **all** the following questions.

- a) How valuable are Sources A and C in showing the impact of Hu-Wen's attempts to create a Socialist Harmonious Society? [6]
- b) With reference to the Sources B and D, as well as your knowledge, assess the extent to which central-local relations affect governance in China. [9]
- c) You are an independent advisor engaged by the Chinese government to make recommendations to improve governance so as to shore up the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Using information from Sources A-E and your knowledge, what recommendations would you make and why? [15]

## End of Paper

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### Copyright Acknowledgements

Source A: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/24/chinese-governance-seen-through-the-people-s-eyes/>

Source D: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/chinas-biggest-challenge-isnt-military-or-economic-its-basic-governance/256867/>

Source E: <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21600747-spite-political-clampdown-flourishing-civil-society-taking-hold-beneath-glacier>